


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION



Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-6000 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

April 8, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406



Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-11/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-11/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finkrock, Jr.
Vice President - JCP&L
Director - Oyster Creek

IRF:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-11/3L

Report Date

April 8, 1981

Occurrence Date

March 9, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing, the Isolation Condenser isolation pipe break sensor IB11B2 tripped at a value greater than that specified in the Technical Specifications Table 3.1.1, item H.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters:

Power:	Reactor	1450 MWt
	Generator	432 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation	14.2×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater	4.58×10^6 lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

During the performance of the "Isolation Condenser Isolation Test and Calibration" (Procedure 609.3.002), one of the isolation pipe break sensors for the condensate return line, IB11B2, tripped at a value greater than the limit of <27.0 " H₂O ΔP given in Table 3.1.1, item H of the Technical Specifications. The testing yielded the following data:

<u>Sensor</u> <u>Designation</u>	<u>"As Found"</u> <u>Value ("H₂O ΔP)</u>	<u>Desired</u> <u>Setpoint ("H₂O ΔP)</u>	<u>"As Left"</u> <u>Value (H₂O ΔP)</u>
IB11A1	26.9	<27.0	26.9
IB11A2	25.0	<27.0	26.9
IB11B1	27.0	<27.0	27.0
IB11B2	28.5	<27.0	26.3

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to instrument repeatability. The total design error bandwidth, due to both instrument accuracy and calibration accuracy, is $+2.08''\text{H}_2\text{O } \Delta P$ ($1.80''\text{H}_2\text{O}$ for instrument accuracy and $0.28''\text{H}_2\text{O}$ for calibration accuracy). Sensor IB11B2 was last reset at 26.7 and tripped at 28.5, which is within the range of design repeatability.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Isolation Condenser pipe break sensors are designed to provide protection in the event of a steam or condensate line pipe break outside the containment, and are located on pipe bends inside the containment. During normal operating conditions the Isolation Condensers are in a standby condition and the condensate return lines are isolated by normally closed isolation valves.

In the event of a pipe break outside the containment during system operation of the Isolation Condensers, the steam line pipe break sensor located in the same trip system as sensor IB11B2 (sensor IB05B2) would have actuated within the specified limits to isolate Condenser "B" in the required manner. Based on the above, the safety significance of the occurrence is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The switch was reset to trip within the limit of $\leq 27''\text{H}_2\text{O } \Delta P$ as required by the Technical Specifications (note the "As Left" values in the Description of Occurrence). Due to the frequency of setpoint drift problems associated with these snap-action type switches, the PORC has recommended replacement with a more suitable qualified model. An evaluation of ITT Barton pressure switches is currently in progress, and possible setpoint changes are also being studied.

Failure Data

Manufacturer - ITT Barton
Model - #228A Indicating Pressure Switch
Range - 0-60'' H_2O