NRC FORM 366 (7-77) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | G A E I H 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 (7) | 0 3 0 7 8 1 (8) | 0 3 2 6 8 1 (9)

DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | With Unit 1 in refueling while performing a logic system functional test

0 3 | of the automatic depressurization system per HNP-1-3252, timer relays

0 4 | B21-K752A&B were found out of calibration. No significant occurrence

0 5 | took place as a result of this event. This is a nonrepetitive occur-

0 6 | rence for these timers. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. This

0 7 | event was in violation of requirements set forth in Tech Specs table

0 8 | 3.2-4. This event posed no threat to public health or safety.

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE S F (11) | CAUSE CODE E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE E (13) | COMPONENT CODE R E L A Y X (14) | COMP. SUBCODE J (15) | VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 1 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 7 | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 | REPORT TYPE L | REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN E (18) | FUTURE ACTION Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) | HOURS (22) 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER A 1 0 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | This failure was caused by setpoint drift of the relays which are Agas-

1 1 | tat model FTR 14D3EC750. These relays will be recalibrated prior to

1 2 | unit startup. No further corrective action is required.

1 3 |

1 4 |

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS H (28) | % POWER 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Routine Surveillance

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION (43) NA

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA | NRC USE ONLY

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0247 18 049

LER #: 50-321/1981-017
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1981-017

With Unit 1 in the refueling mode, while performig a logic system functional test of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) per HNP-1-3252, timer relays B21-K752A&B were found out of calibration. These relays provide a 120 second time delay between initiation of the automatic depressurization system permissive signals and actuation of the ADS safety relief valves. This delay provides operators with enough time to override the signals and prevent valve opening if this action is determined to be desirous. B21-K752A actuated in 160 seconds. B21-K752B actuated in 200 seconds. This means that actuation of the ADS valves would have been delayed in an emergency situation. However, this delay can be overridden by manual valve actuation. Therefore, no unsafe condition existed that could not have been corrected by operator action.

These relays will be calibrated prior to unit startup with no further corrective action required. This is a nonrepetitive occurrence for these timers. No significant occurrence took place as a result of this event. This event pored no threat to public health or safety.