



SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT □ 6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813; (916) 452-3211

March 23, 1981

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director
Region V Office of Inspection & Enforcement
1990 North California Boulevard
Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202
Walnut Creek, CA 94596



Re: Operating License DPR-54
Docket No. 50-312
Reportable Occurrence 81-13

Dear Mr. Engelken:

In accordance with Technical Specifications for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Section 6.9.4.2b, and Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, Section C.2.b(3), the Sacramento Municipal Utility District is hereby submitting a thirty-day report of Reportable Occurrence 81-13.

Technical Specifications Section 3.8 places specific restrictions and limits on fuel loading and refueling operations. One of the limits, Section 3.8.6, requires that at least one door on the personnel and emergency hatches shall be closed during the handling of irradiated fuel in the reactor building.

Normally this requirement is automatically met as a result of the design of the personnel hatch. The inner and outer doors on the hatch are mechanically interlocked which prevents both doors being open simultaneously.

On February 23, 1981, due to a mechanical malfunction, the inner door of the personnel hatch would not close completely. Fuel movement itself had been temporarily halted due to some difficulty with the auxiliary bridge mast. The Reactor Building Coordinator, interpreting the Technical Specification action to mean "fuel movement", momentarily bypassed the interlocks and opened the outer door to allow personnel to exit the building.

Although fuel was not being moved at that particular time, the interpretation of the Technical Specification requirement was in error. A fuel assembly was in the auxiliary bridge mast at the time of the occurrence and refueling operation/fuel handling had not been officially stopped via the appropriate log entries.

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As a result, this occurrence was determined to be a violation of Technical Specification Section 3.8.6 and reportable via a LER.

Following this occurrence the Shift Supervisor contacted the Reactor Building Coordinator and informed him of the proper interpretation of the Technical Specification. To preclude future misinterpretations, the Technical Assistant will distribute a written interpretation of Technical Specification Section 3.8.6 to the appropriate personnel involved with refueling operations.

There were no transients nor power reductions associated with this event.

Respectfully submitted,



John J. Mattimoe
Assistant General Manager
and Chief Engineer

JJM:HH:rm

cs: I&E Washington (30)
MIPC (3)
EPRI-NSAC