

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.4 At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. \*

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.4 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each accessible valve (manual, power operated or automatic), in the flow path, servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:
  1. Verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.
  2. Verifying that the buried piping is still leak tight by visual inspection of the ground area.

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\* One time only exception for modification of the service water recirculation lines- the 72 hour action statement provision may be exceeded for a period of 10 days for the recirculation portion of the service water system. All other portions of the service water system are not covered by this one time exemption.

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3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.4 At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE with at least two service water pumps per loop.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. \*

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
BASES FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3.7.4  
ONE TIME ONLY CHANGE

1. Only one train of the service water recirculation line to the pond will be made inoperable at any one time. Recirculation to the pond is not the normal mode of operation.
2. Both trains of service water to the plant and within the plant will perform their intended functions with current specifications remaining in effect.
3. Prior to initiating the modification on the service water recirculation line, both trains of river water for Units 1 and 2 will be verified operable.
4. In addition, Alabama Power Company will not initiate the modification if there is any forecast of unusual river water flows which could possibly impair river water operability.
5. It is extremely unlikely that a dam failure at Farley Nuclear Plant will occur because of the following:
  - a. The dam is conservatively designed and constructed to withstand the design basis seismic event selected for the site. The acceleration levels assumed for the design basis earthquake are conservative since Farley Nuclear Plant is located in one of the lowest seismic regions of the United States as stated in FSAR Section 2.5.
  - b. The dam is conservatively designed and constructed to withstand the probable maximum flood postulated to occur at the site coupled with the wave heights that could be reached for extremely high wind levels.

6. The accident scenario also required loss of one train of river water. This in and of itself is unlikely within the short time period of the modification.
7. Operators will receive additional emphasis on the specific actions required to balance service water flow under the postulated accident conditions.

Conclusion:

This modification will not adversely affect the safe operation of the Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 during implementation.