Initial Telephone Report Date: 4/25/74

Date of Occurrence: 4/23/74

Initial Written Report Date: 4/26/74

Time of Occurrence: 1720

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/29

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 2.3.4, Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Switches, 1A83B and 1A83D, were found to trip at pressures in excess of the maximum allowable value of 1070 psig.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

____	Steady State Power	____	Routine Shutdown Operation
____	Hot Standby	____	Load Changes During Routine Power Operation
____	Cold Shutdown	____	Other (Specify)
X	Refueling Shutdown		
____	Routine Startup Operation		

The reactor mode switch was in the REFUEL position with reactor coolant temperature approximately 100°F.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On Tuesday, April 23, 1974, while performing surveillance on the five Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Switches, it was found that 1A83B and 1A83D tripped at 1090 psig and 1096 psig, respectively. These values are in excess of the maximum allowable trip points of 1084 psig and 1082 psig, respectively, which are derived by adding appropriate head correction factors to the Technical Specification limit of 1070 psig. It is noted here that switches 1A83B and 1A83D are associated with valves NR108B and NR108D, respectively.

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The "as found" and "as left" switch settings were:

Switch	Associated Valve	"As Found" Setting	"As Left" Setting
1A83A	NR108A	1079 psig	1079 psig
1A83B	NR108B	1090 psig	1084 psig
1A83C	NR108C	1077 psig	1077 psig
1A83D	NR108D	1096 psig	1082 psig
1A83E	NR108E	1082 psig	1082 psig

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

X Design	____ Procedure
____ Manufacture	____ Unusual Service Condition
____ Installation/ Construction	____ Inc. Environmental
____ Operator	____ Component Failure
	____ Other (Specify) _____

Instrument drift has been tentatively identified as the cause of this occurrence.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The relief valves are provided to remove sufficient energy from the primary system to prevent the safety valves from lifting during a transient. The limiting pressure transient is that which is produced upon a turbine trip from rated design power with a failure of the bypass system to function. Under these conditions, the five (5) relief valves are required to operate in order to prevent reaching the lowest set point of the primary system safety valves. It should be noted that a 25 psi margin exists between the resulting peak pressure and the lowest safety valve set point as added assurance that the safety valves will not lift dur this transient. With valves NR108B and NR108D actuating 6 psig and 14 psig, respectively, above the maximum allowable trip point of 1070 psig, and assuming the most limiting

pressure transient had occurred, the lowest set point safety valve or valves may have been required to actuate in order to limit the pressure transient. Since the safety valve capacity is based upon providing sufficient vessel over-pressure protection upon failure of all pressure release devices, in addition to a failure of the reactor to scram, over-pressurization of the vessel would not have occurred.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: The involved pressure switches, 1A83B and 1A83D, were immediately reset to trip at allowable pressure levels. Additional items of corrective action will be determined following review of this occurrence by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

FAILURE DATA: Manufacturer data pertinent to these switches are as follows:

Manufacturer - Dresser
Type - 1539VX
Serial Nos. - BK3339 (1A83B)
BK3338 (1A83D)

Prepared by: _____ Date: 4/26/74