

The NRC design criteria assume a very severe accident with a very large radiation source term and assume that stringent limits on radiation exposure to personnel would be met.

Because of the staff safety evaluation which concluded that the control room, the interim Technical Support Center and the Operational Support Center would remain accessible under post accident conditions, and the steps already taken to protect two of the three remaining vital areas of concern, it is our judgment that a deferral of implementation of additional shielding protection requirements until 1982 will not result in exposure of plant personnel to significant risk from a loss-of-coolant accident or a greater risk to the public than previously evaluated, if such an accident should occur. However, we will require more immediate actions if further review indicates they are warranted.

Issue: "5. We demand that repetitive malfunction of their containment isolation valves CV/4096, CV/4097 be resolved."

Issue: "6. We demand that the repetitive malfunctions of valves CV/4027, CV/4117, CV/4105, MO/7050 be resolved."

Response: Repetitive malfunctions have occurred in several containment isolation valves. Valve CV/4097 is a butterfly valve in the supply line of the containment ventilation system. The valve is a replacement valve installed in April 1974. Excessive leakage through this valve was reported March 31, 1975, June 5, 1975, May 3, 1976, July 2, 1976, February 1, 1978, September 12, 1978 and February 1, 1979. Our records indicate that with the possible exception of one test, the leak rate through the line during accident conditions would have been

CV/4105 is an air operated isolation valve on the demineralized water line inside containment. Our records do not indicate a repetitive failure of this valve.

Based on our review of these valve malfunctions and the corrective actions taken by the licensee, it is our judgment that these events did not significantly affect the health and safety of the public. It is our further judgment that these valve malfunctions do not indicate a significant pattern of valve failures. Therefore, we conclude that these valve malfunctions do not require shutting down the Big Rock Point Plant.

Issue: "7 We demand evidence that the BRNPF could withstand the crash of a B-52 Bomber without disaster to surrounding environment."

Response: The concern with overflight of the Big Rock facility by aircraft began in 1963, when the Air Force installed an aircraft tracking station at Bayshore, Michigan, which is located approximately five miles from the Big Rock Point Plant. Following this installation, the Air Force began training the tracking station personnel in the detection of approaching aircraft. Concurrently, the Air Force was training the flight crews in avoiding detection by the radar station.

In the beginning it appeared that the Air Force was using the Big Rock Point Plant as a flight target, since there were many close overflights. Consumers Power Company management complained to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) regarding this matter, and an agreement was reached with the Air Force at that time to discontinue the direct low level overflights. Low level overflights in the near vicinity of the plant continued until 1970 when the Big Rock Point Plant insurer raised the insurance rates because of these training

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR

In the Matter of )

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY )  
(Big Rock Point Plant) )

) Docket No. 50-155  
)

MODIFICATIONS

The following modifications to the text of DD-80-34, issued on December 18, 1980, will be made in the printed version appearing in "Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances":

Page 8 - Substitute the following paragraph for the second paragraph on the page:


Because of the staff safety evaluation which concluded that the control room, the interim Technical Support Center and the Operational Support Center would remain accessible under post-accident conditions, and the steps already taken to protect two of the three remaining vital areas of concern, it is our judgment that a deferral of implementation of additional shielding protection requirements until 1982 will not result in exposure of plant personnel to significant risk from a loss-of-coolant accident or a greater risk to the public than previously evaluated, if such an accident should occur. However, we will require more immediate actions if further review indicates they are warranted.

Page 10 - Insert the following paragraph after the first paragraph on the page:

Based on our review of these valve malfunctions and the corrective actions taken by the licensee, it is our judgment that these events did not significantly affect the health and safety of the public. It is our further

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judgment that these valve malfunctions do not indicate a significant pattern of valve failures. Therefore, we conclude that these valve malfunctions do not require shutting down the Big Rock Point Plant.



Harold R. Denton, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland  
this *29<sup>th</sup>* day of January, 1981