

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

February 20, 1981

SQRD-50-328/81-01

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DISCREPANCY IN AS-BUILT VERSUS AS-ANALYZED
PIPING ANCHOR LOCATION - SQRD-50-328/81-01 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
R. W. Wright on December 3, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR SQN CEB 8037. An interim report was submitted on January 5, 1981.
Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with
D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
DISCREPANCY IN AS-BUILT VERSUS AS-ANALYZED PIPING ANCHOR LOCATION
SQRD-50-328/81-01
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During a review of a support modification request, it was discovered that design drawings of an anchor in the component cooling water system did not agree with the as-analyzed anchor location. The as-analyzed location of the anchor is at elevation 705'-6" on a run of pipe 45° with the vertical. The as-built location is at elevation 707'-6" on a horizontal run of pipe.

Safety Implications

As a result of this discrepancy, it was not known whether the anchor and associated run of piping were qualified to the appropriate design loads. Failure of this support could have rendered the component cooling water system inoperable. The component cooling water system supplies coolant to various heat loads in systems and components necessary for the safe operation of the plant. Failure of this safety-related system could have adversely affected the safety of the plant.

Corrective Action

TVA has performed a reanalysis of the subject piping and has determined that no hardware changes will be required because the anchor and associated run of piping is still qualified to the appropriate design loads. Verification of support locations on a generic basis is being handled in response to IE Bulletin 79-14.