



OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION



Jersey Central Power & Light  
Company is a Member of the  
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

February 3, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region I  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
641 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406


Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-29/3L-1

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-29/3L-1 in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b(2) of the Technical Specifications.

This report supplies additional information concerning further corrective actions that have been initiated after further analysis of the event. The original report was submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 13, 1980, Re: Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-29/3L.

Very truly yours,

  
Ivan R. Finrock, Jr.  
Vice President - JCP&L  
Director - Oyster Creek

IRF:dh  
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)  
Office of Management Information  
and Program Control  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, N. J.

8102100465

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Report No. 50-219/80-29/3L-1

Report Date

February 3, 1981

Date of Occurrence

July 11, 1980

Identification of Occurrence

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation when the automatic and remote manual initiation features of two of the core spray pumps were defeated.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b(2).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was being restarted following a refueling/maintenance outage.

Plant parameters at the time of occurrence were:

Power	Core:	67.5 MWe
	Electrical:	0 MWe
Flow	Recirculation:	$5.2 \times 10^4$ gpm
	Feedwater:	$3 \times 10^5$ lb/hr
Rx Level		70"
Rx Pressure		940 psig
Rx Temp.		537.4°F
Stack Gas		$5.7 \times 10^3$ $\mu$ ci/sec.

Description of Occurrence

On Friday, July 11, 1980, at approximately 1525 hours, while conducting a plant shutdown, the High Drywell Pressure Sensor RV46B actuated causing the core spray pumps and both diesel generators to start. After verifying that an actual high drywell pressure condition did not exist, the primary core spray pumps were turned off. This caused the alternate pumps to start and these were also stopped. Under these conditions the alternate core spray pumps would have been prevented from starting automatically.

### Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The occurrence was initiated by the actuation of High Drywell Pressure Sensor RV46B at a pressure more conservative than the required setpoint. This led to the operator stopping the primary and alternate core spray pumps. Due to the design of the logic circuit, the alternate core spray pumps were prevented from starting automatically until the trip signals cleared allowing the breakers to be reset.

### Analysis of Occurrence

The core spray system provides an alternate supply of cooling water to the reactor following a postulated pipe break accident in the reactor primary system. The core spray system consists of two independent loops. Each loop has a primary and alternate core spray pump and core spray booster pump which pump water from the torus into the reactor vessel through isolation valves and a spray sparger. Both core spray systems will start automatically upon receipt of a trip signal from any one (1) of four (4) drywell pressure sensors or four (4) reactor low level sensors. When the reactor pressure decreases to 285 psig the parallel isolation valves open to allow flow to the reactor. Should either of the primary core spray pumps fail to start, the alternate pump in that system will receive a start signal within 10 seconds of the initial signal.

The safety significance of the event is considered minimal since the primary core spray pumps would have started automatically if another high drywell pressure or low reactor water level trip signal was received. Also, the alternate core spray pumps could have been started manually, if required, by locally resetting their breakers.

### Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to verify that an actual High Drywell Pressure condition did not exist. The core spray pumps and diesel generators were then stopped. At 1605 hours a plant shutdown was commenced. Subsequently, the Core Spray System Instrumentation Channel Calibration and Test was performed for sensor RV46B then reperformed for all sensors.

The surveillance tests revealed the following data:

<u>Pressure Switch Designation</u>	<u>Desired Setpoint</u>	<u>As Found</u>	<u>As Left</u>
RV46B	< 2 psig	1.19psig	1.93
RV46A	< 2 psig	1.55	1.98
RV46B	< 2 psig	1.91	1.91
RV46C	< 2 psig	1.2	1.95
RV46D	< 2 psig	1.45	1.91

As an interim measure the system operating procedure has been revised to provide specific instructions to the operators in the event a similar situation occurs in the future. As a permanent corrective action the pump control logic will be modified to include an automatic reset feature which will allow the pumps to restart automatically, if they've been manually stopped by the operators, should the trip signal persist or recur. These corrective actions were deemed necessary after further analysis of the occurrence was performed subsequent to the original report submitted on August 11, 1980.

Failure Data

ITT Barton

Model 288A

.5 - 9.5 psig adjustable range