

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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T. C. NICHOLS, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT AND GROUP EXECUTIVE  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

January 30, 1981

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Fire Protection


Dear Mr. Denton:

On October 27, 1980, the Commission approved for publication in the Federal Register a new section 50.48 and Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50 delineating certain fire protection provisions for nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979. Although this fire protection rule does not apply to the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, the applicant has reviewed this regulation against the fire protection design. Our initial review indicates general compliance with minor exceptions or clarifications listed on the attached sheet.

If, in later detailed reviews, further clarifications or exceptions are noted, we will inform you.

If you have any questions, please let us know.

Very truly yours,



T. C. Nichols, Jr.

RBC:TCN:rh

Enclosures

cc: V. C. Summer  
G. H. Fischer  
T. C. Nichols, Jr.  
E. H. Crews, Jr.  
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NPCF/Whitaker  
File

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### FIRE DETECTION - APPENDIX R

III. C. Individual isolation valves are not provided for each fire hydrant; however, sectional isolation valves permit isolation of hydrants from the fire main for maintenance or repair.

F. Automatic fire detection systems are provided in accordance with commitments made in the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Fire Protection Evaluation which has been submitted to the NRC. These fire detection systems are capable of operating with or without offsite power.

G.2 In some cases where low fire loading exists, separation of redundant cable is provided by a  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hour fire barrier on one train. NRC representatives listed this as an acceptable way to meet separation requirements in our meeting with NRC in the Fall of 1979.

G.3 The control room was considered as an area which required alternative shutdown capability. The control room, which is continuously manned, is provided with area smoke detectors, fire standpipes and hose cabinets, and manual fire extinguishers. We have taken the position, as indicated in the Fire Protection Evaluation, that fixed fire suppression is not needed in this area.

N. An automatic total flooding CO<sub>2</sub> suppression system is provided in the Control Building for the relay room and the computer rooms. The computer rooms contain no equipment required for safe shutdown. All doors into the relay room are self-closing fire doors. Five doors into the relay room are alarmed security doors (i.e., electrically supervised). Two doors between the relay room and the cable chases are self-closing fire doors but not alarmed. The permanent records storage room is provided with a Halon gas suppression system; the doors to this room, which contains no safe shutdown equipment, are not alarmed.