

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director Division of Reactor Licensing United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, DC 20545

Dear Dr. Morris:

Enclosed are 40 copies of the response to your letter of August 6, 1970.

Listed below are Consumers Power Company's answers to the nine questions asked in your letter of August 6, 1970:

<u>Question 1</u> - Identify all known sensitized stainless steel components of and within the reactor coolant pressure boundary,* including portions of piping. Include furnace-sensicized components affected by substantial field stress relieving, but not the heat affected zones caused by field welds. State location, type of material and sensitization process.

6 and 7. Answer - Please refer to the attached data sheets, Columns 1, 5,

<u>Question 2</u> - Specify the maximum stress levels (calculated or measured, if known) these components receive in service. Indicate whether the calculations or measurements of stress level were based on the "as-built" condition, including effects of "as-installed" piping hangers and restraints. Summarize the results of any field measurements of piping displacement that have been performed, including the system conditions for which the measurements were made.

Answer - Stress level information will be supplied by January 15, 1971.

The acceptance test for the nuclear steam supply system included measuring constant support hanger deflections in the vertical direction, the movement of the steam drum by use of temporary trams at each end of the drum, the horizontal movement of each reactor recirculating pump by use of a plum bob and the movement of the horizontal downcomer headers also by using plum bobs. These measurements were obtained from the cold and empty condition to the filled-with-water 365° condition. The results of these tests are as follows:

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a. Constant Support Hanger Data

		Travel With Drum									Total
Hanger	Equipment	Design	Cold &		Fill	ed to 1 2000	lormal 250°	Level 3000	3500	3650	Travel- Flooded
Number	Supported	Travel	Empty	1000	1500			0.6"	0.5"	0.9"	1.2"
H-101A	Drum Northwest	2.25"	0.0"	-0.3"	0.0"	0.2"	0.2"		0.8"	0.9"	1.1"
H-101B	Drum Northside	2.25"	0.0"	-0.2"	-0.1"	0.2"	0.2"	0.6"		0.8"	1.0"
H-101C	Drum Northside	2.25"	0.0"	-0.2"	-0.1"	0.1"	0.2"	0.4"	0.7"		0.9"
H-101D	Drum Northeast	2.25"	0.0"	-0.2"	0.0"	0.2"	0.2"	0.6"	0.8"	0.7"	
H-101E	Drum Southwest	2.25"	0.0"	0.0"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.7"	0.7"	0.9"	0.9"
H-101F	Drum Southside	2.25"	0.0"	0.1"	0.2"	0.2"	0.3"	0.7"	0.7"	0.9"	0.8"
	Drum Southside	2.25	0.0"	0.1"	0.3"	0.3"	0.5"	0.9"	1.0"	1.1"	1.0"
H-101G	Drum Southeast	2.25"	0.0"	0.1"	0.3"	0.3"	0.3"	0.7"	0.8"	0.9"	0.8"
H-101H		1.63"	0.0"	0.1"	-0.1"	-0.1"	0.2"	0.2"	0.3"	0.2"	0.1"
H-102	#1 Riser Above		0.0"	-0.3"	-0.1"	-0.1"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.3"	0.6"
H-103	#6 Riser Above	1.63"	0.0"	-0.3"	0.1"	0.2"	0.2"	0.5"	0.7"	0.6"	0.9"
H-104	#3 Riser Above	1.63"			0.3"	0.2"	0.4"	0.6"	0.8"	0.7"	0.7"
H-105	#4 Riser Above	1.63"	0.0"	0.0"		-0.2	0.0"	0.7"	0.3"	0.3"	0.3"
H-106	#5 Riser Above	1.63"	0.0"	0.0"	-0.1"		0.2"		0.8"	0.8"	1.0"
H-107	#2 Riser Above	1.63"	0.0"	-0.2"	0.0"	0.2"			0.9"		0.8"
H-LA	#1 Pump Suction	1.75"	0.0"	0.1"	0.3"	0.5"	0.6"				0.8"
H-1B	#2 Pump Suction	1.75"	0.0"	0.1"	0.3"	0.5"				0.9"	
H-2A	#1 Suct Valve	1.69"	0.0"	0.2"	0.5"	0.7"	0.7"				0.8"
	#2 Suct Valve	1.69"	0.0"	0.2"	0.7"	0.5"	0.7"	1.1"			1.0"
H-2B		1.69"	0.0"	0.6"	0.6"	0.8"	0.8"	1.1"	1.1"	1.1"	0.5"
H-3A	#1 Pump Inlet	1.69"	0.0"	0.3"	0.6"	0.6"	0.7"	1.0"	1.0"	1.0"	0.7"
H-3B	#2 Pump Inlet		0.0"	0.7"		0.9"	1.0"	1.1"	1.2"	1.4"	0.7"
H-4A	#1 Pump Outlet	1.63"		0.6"		0.6"			1.0"	1.0"	0.4"
H-4B	#2 Pump Outlet	1.63"	0.0"	0.6"		0.6"			1.1		0.5"
H-5	#1 Butterfly	1.63"	0.0"	0.0	0.5	0.0					ai antona

Note: Above travels in vertical direction only, based on position of hanger movement indicators. Negative values indicate overtravel in cold direction upon filling system with water. N

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Hanger	Equipment	Design	Cold &		Total Travel-						
Number	Supported	Travel	Empty	1000	1500	5000	2500	3000	3500	3650	Flooded
н-6А	#1 Disch Valve	1.63"	0.0"	0.2"	0.8"	0.6"	0.9"	1.0"	1.0"	1.2"	1.0"
н-6в	#2 Disch Valve	1.63"	0.0"	0.61	0.6"	0.7"	0.7"	0.8"	1.0"	1.0"	0.4"
H-7	#2 Butterfly	1.63"	0.0"	0.4"	0.8"	0.8"	0.8"	1.0"	1.2"	1.2"	0.8"
H-8A	#1 Disch Pipe	1.19"	0.0"	0.5"	0.6"	0.7"	0.9"	0.9"	0.9"	1.2"	0.7"
н-8в	#2 Disch Fipe	1.19"	0.0"	0.6"	0.5"	0.7"	0.9"	1.0"	1.2"	1.2"	0.6"
H-9A	#1 Bypass Valve	1.44"	0.0"	0.6"	0.7"	0.7"	0.7"	0.8"	0.9"	0.9"	0.3"
н-9в	#2 Bypass Valve	1.44"	0.0"	0.6"	0.8"	0.6"	0.7"	0.8"	0.9"	0.7	0.3"
H-10A	#1 Disch Pipe	1.00"	0.0"	0.1"	0.5"	0.5"	0.5"	0.6"	0.6"	0.7"	0.6"
H-10B	#2 Disch Pipe	1.00"	0.0"	0.1"	0.4"	0.4"	0.5"	0.5"	0.6"	0.7"	0.6"
H-11	#1 Bypass Pipe	1.44"	0.0"	0.3"	0.6"	0.7"	0.6"	0.6"	0.9"	0.5	0.6"
H-12	#2 Bypass Pipe	1.44"	0.0"	0.3"	0.1"	0.4"	0.7"	0.7"	0.9"	0.9"	0.6"
H-13A	#1 Pump Mtg	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"
H-13B	#2 Pump Mtg	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.1"	0.1"	0.1"	0.3"	0.3"
H-1'+A	#1 Pump Mtg	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.1"	0.1"	0.1"	0.2"	0.3"	0.3"
H-14B	#2 Pump Mtg	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.1"	0.1"	0.1"	0.1"	0.3"	0.3"
H-15A	#3 Riser Below	0.38"	0.0"	0.0"	0.1"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"
H-15B	#4 Riser Below	0.38"	0.0"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"	0.2"
н-16	#2 Riser Below	0.50"	0.0"	0.1"	0.5"	0.2"	0.0"	0.0"	0.1"	0.2"	0.1"
H-17	#5 Riser Below	0.38"	0.0"	0.1"	0.4"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	-0.1"
H-18A	#1 Riser Below	0.38"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.1"	0.1"	0.1"
H-18B	#6 Riser Below	0.38"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.0"	0.1"	0.1"	0.1"	0.2"	0.2"
H-19A	West Downcomers	1.75"	0.0"	-0.3"	0.5"	0.7"	0.7"	0.9"	1.0"	1.0"	1.3"
H-19B	East Downcomers	1.75"	0.0"	0.1"	0.3"	0.4"	0.7"	0.7"	0.7"	0.9"	0.8"
H-20	Suct Crossover	1.87"	0.0"	0.1"	0.7"	0.7"	0.7"	1.1"	1.1"	1.1"	1.0"

Note: Above travels in vertical direction only, based on position of hanger movement indicators. Negative values indicate overtravel in cold direction upon filling system with water. Dr. P. A. Morris September 11, 1970

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b. Steam Drum Movement

	West	End Mov	ement	East	End Mov	ement
Condition	West	South	Up	East	South	Up
System Cold and Empty Normal Drum Level, 100	Zero	Zero 0.19"	Zero 06"	Zero Zero	Zero 0.25"	Zero 06"
Normal Drum Level, 150°	Zero 0.06"	0.25"	0.37"	0.12"	0.37"	0.12"
Normal Drum Level, 200° Normal Drum Level, 250°	0.19" 0.37"	0.37"	0.31"	0.12"	0.50"	0.31"
Normal Drum Level, 300° Normal Drum Level, 350°	0.44"	0.75" 0.88"	0.75" 0.94"	0.37" 0.50"	0.88"	0.69"
Normal Drum Level, 365° Design Movement at 600°	0.62"	0.88" 1.88"	1.00" 2.25"	0.50"	1.00" 1.88"	0.81" 2.25"

c. Recirculating Pump and Downcomer Header Movement

	No 1	Pump	No 2	Pump	West	Pipe	East	Pipe
Temperature	West	South	East	South	West	South	East	South
100	-	0.06"	0.06"	0.06"	-	1.1	Zero	Zero
150°	0.12"	0.06"	0.12"	-	0.12"	0.12"	Zero	Zero
2000	0.25"	0.12"	0.37"	0.37"	0.25"	0.25"	0.25"	0.12"
2000	0.25"	0.12"	0.37"	0.37"	0.25"	0.25"	0.25"	0.12"
250°	0.50"	0.31"	0.50"	0.43"	0.19"	0.50"	0.19"	0.25"
300	0.43"	0.56"	0.69"	0.37"	0.19"	0.50"	0.19"	0.37"
3500	0.75"	0.56"	0.50"	0.50"	0.19"	0.50"	0.25"	0.37"
365°	1.00"	0.55"	1.00"	0.50"	0.25"	0.50"	0.25"	0.50"

During the hot function testing program, the constant support hangers and sway braces were inspected to insure that they did not impede piping travel caused by thermal expansion. The results of this inspection were satisfactory.

In addition, linear motion transducers were used in June 1970 to determine the upward movement of the steam drum from the cold condition (no pump flow) to the hot operating condition at 164 MW_t. These transducers indicated an upward motion of 1.75 inches at each end of the drum.

<u>Question 3</u> - Specify the normal external operating environment of the components listed above. Discuss the probability of external surface contact with corrodents.

> Indicate the normal water chemistry that has been maintained within the reactor coolint system during both operating and shutdown conditions, including the range of values for materials whose concentrations have varied appreciably. Include measured values of oxygen and halide concentrations.

Answer - Please refer to Column 8 for the normal external operating environment. As all these lozzles are insulated, the skin temperature should be approximately that of operating temperatures.

A search of the construction records yielded no evidence of external surface contamination by corrodents prior to plant operation. Since plant operation commenced in 1962, there has been no known contamination of these components by corrodents. It is very unlikely that these surfaces will ever become contaminated by corrodents because:

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1. They are covered by insulation.

2. No known corrodent source exists in the steam drum and vessel cavities to contaminate them.

3. Most are physically inaccessible.

The normal operating and shutdown water chemistry conditions are summarized as follows:

Operating Conditions

pH Conductivity Turbidity	7.1 0.5 µmho/em ³ <0.1 APHA Units (ppm)
Chloride	<20 ppb
Boron	.25 ppm
Silica	0.15 ppm
*Iodine Activity,	-1
µCi/cc	1 x 10 ⁻¹
Filtrate, Gross	
Gamma at 2 Hours, cpm/ml	3 x 10 ⁵
**Crud, Gross Gamma	
at 2 Hours, cpm/Turbidity	1 x 10 ⁸
Unit	1 x 10
Dissolved Oxygen	
Measured at the	
Clean-Up Deminer- alizer Influent	180 ppb

*Based on Efficiency of I-131, 2 Hours After Sampling **Based on APHA Units (Turbidity) and 500 ml of filtered sample.

Shutdown Conditions

	Minimum	Average	Maximum
pH	6.1	6.8	7.4
Conducticity, umho/cm ³	0.3	0.6	0.9
Turbidity, APHA Units (ppm)	<0.1	0.2	15.0
Chloride, ppb	<20	<20	40.0
Boron	0.1	0.1	0.1
Silica		0.2_4	
*Iodine Activity, µCi/cc Filtrate, Gross Gamma	8 x 10 ⁻⁵	6 x 10 ⁻⁴	7 x 10 ⁻³
at 2 Hours, cpm/ml	7×10^{2}	5 x 10 ³	3 x 10 ⁵
**Crud, Gross Gamma at 2 Hours, com/Turbidity Unit	6 x 10 ³	4×10^{5}	9 x 10 ⁷

*Based on Efficiency of I-131, 2 Hours After Sampling **Based on APHA Units (Turbidity) and 500 ml of Filtered Sample

Question 4 - For each component listed, indicate whether the internal surface is normally in contact with flowing water, stagnant water or steam, and indicate whether the configuration and operating conditions are such that a possibility exists of entrapment of gases within the sensitized portion. Also, discuss whether possible corrodents could have come into contact with the internal surfaces during cleaning or other preoperational exposure of these surfaces.

Answer - Please refer to Column 10 on the attached data sheets for normal internal component environmental conditions.

No construction records exist for monitoring of possible corrodents on component surfaces during construction. The nuclear steam supply system was chemically cleaned following construction with a solution consisting of 25,000 gallons of demineralized water, 250 pounds NaOH, 250 pounds Na3PO4, 3.9 gallons detergent (Triton 100) and 550 gallons of tri-ethanol-amine (chelating agent) at a temperature of 150°. Periodic samples showed the PO4 and OH residuals remained steady and there was no buildup of S_1O_2 . Rinses were conducted with a solution consisting of 10,000 gallons of demineralized water, 21 pounds monosodium phosphate, 21 pounds disodium phosphate and 42 pounds sodium nitrate. The first rinse solution was first used as the final rinse solution for the feed-water and heater drain system. Following the nuclear steam supply rinse, samples showed a low iron color residual measured by colormetric analysis. A second rinse solution similar to the first was prepared and recycled. Analysis showed that a complete rinse of the nuclear steam supply system was obtained.

<u>Question 5</u> - Specify the nondestructive tests that have been performed internally and externally on each component listed since its installation. Indicate the acceptance criteria established for each type of test, the sensitivity in terms of flaw detection and the results of these tests.

Answer - Ultrasonic examinations were performed in early 1970 on one steam drum downcomer nozzle extension, one steam drum riser extension and three "J" welds between the stub tube and control rod drive housing assembly. For the steam drum nozzle extensions, the ultrasonic inspection system was calibrated from a 3% of wall notch cut into the inner diameter of a 3-inch schedule, 80-pipe section. The signal from this notch was adjusted to equal 9 divisions on the tester's display scope. Normal scanning was performed with the sensit vity increased by a factor of two. Evaluation of indications received during normal scanning were performed at "times one" sensitivity. All defects above the background noise level were noted (none). For the "J" welds, the system was calibrated using 10% and 20% notches machined into a mockup of the assemblies to be inspected. As ex mination on a half skip or full skip basis was not possible for accessibili / reasons, a distance amplitude correction curve was developed. Both anning and evaluation were performed at "times one" sensitivity. All i ications above background noise level would be considered a flaw if it coul of be otherwise evaluated. There were none.

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Hydrostatic tests at 1450 psi are conduc during each refueling outage. While the pressure is held, a visual inspe. on of all accessible piping, valves and other equipment is made. The acce tance criteria is no visible leakage. In addition, during this hydrostati test, a pressure drop test is conducted. The acceptance criteria for t is drop test is approximately 100 psi or less pressure drop occur in the 30-minute hold period. As the test is conducted above ambient temperature control is difficult.

A reactor vessel surveillance inspection of vessel internals is conducted during each refueling outage prior to loading fuel. This inspection is visual and utilizes viewing aids, mirrors and an underwater television camera to observe the various components inside the reactor vessel. This inspection will be continued at each refueling outage.

<u>Question 6</u> - Indicate whether any destructive metallurgical examinations have been performed on sensitized material removed from the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or samples thereof, and the results of such tests.

Answer - No sensitized material has been removed from the reactor coolant pressure boundary; therefore, no destructive metallurgical examinations have been performed.

Question 7 - Discuss the operating performance of leak detection systems during plant operation to date. Indicate the current sensitivity of each system.

Answer - A dew cell with a remote recorder is installed in an exhaust duct from the steam drum cavity. A significant increase in the dew point temperature alerts the operator to a possible steam leak. The increase in dew point temperature considered significant is that which is caused by a moderate valve packing leak. The presence of a steam leak is confirmed

by taking a grab sample for air particulate activity on the steam drum cavity exhaust plenum. The minimum sensitivity of this sample is 5.2×10^{-4} gpm based on a reactor water iodine activity of 7 x 10^{-2} µCi/cc and 10% of the activity in the leak being carried away by the ventilation stream.

The dirty waste collection system for the Big Rock Flant typically runs 15 gallons per hour and doubling of this rate for no known reason will be reported by an operator. If this increase in collection rate cannot be explained by plant operation, a grab sample for air particulate activity is taken to confirm or deny the presence of a leak. The sensitivity of this sample is as discussed in the preceding paragraph.

Very small leaks in the control rod drive room can be heard on inspection rounds as the background noise level is very low.

An air particulate sample is routinely taken weekly on the steam drum enclosure exhaust line. The sensitivity of this is 5.2×10^{-4} gpm as discussed above. This method allows detection of very small valve packing leaks.

<u>Question 8</u> - For each component listed, indicate the degree of accessibility which presently exists for the performance of nondestructive tests and inspections.

Answer - Please refer to Column 4 of the attached data sheets.

<u>Question 9</u> - Describe the plans you have developed for surveillance and nondestructive tests of the sensitized stainless steel components of and within the reactor coolant pressure boundary, including a proposed timetable. In this connection, the recent experience with furnace-sensitized stainless steel components indicates that unless a considerable amount of evidence attests to the current integrity of such components or unless valid technical reasons would preclude performing nondestructive tests, the performance of a program of nondestructive testing of a sizeable sample of such components may be appropriate at an early date. These examinations should include dye penetrant testing and either ultrasonic testing or radiography.

Answer - During the February-March 1970 refueling outage, Consumers Power Company inspected ultrasonically one steam drum downcomer nozzle extension, one steam drum riser nozzle extension and three control rod drive assembly "J" welds in addition to other welds associated with the primary coolant pressure boundary but considered nonsensitized. Original plans for the March 1971 refueling outage were for a similar program. However, since the telephone conversation of March 16, 1970 between Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann of the Division of Reactor Licensing and Mr. Gerald J. Walke of Consumers Power Company, Consumers Power has modified these plans to include ultrasonic examination of all the remaining uninspected steam drum riser and downcomer extensions, the steam drum vent nozzle extension (piece No 104-7), the two reactor head vent nozzles and three more control rod drive assembly "J" welds. In addition, Consumers Power is attempting to develop equipment to volumetrically examine

the reactor vessel steam outlet nozzle from the inside of the vessel. If this equipment is successfully developed, at least one of the reactor vessel steam outlet nozzles will be inspected. These plans are contrigent on the allowable radiation exposure of the inspector; the items discussed above will receive preferential treatment.

A drum manway and seal plate will be removed during the next refueling outage so that the drum internals may be visually inspected. However, it is doubtful that much information can be gained by an inspection of this nature due to the high radiation dose rate estimated to exist inside the drum (5 to 10 R/hr).

The visual reactor vessel surveillance inspection of reactor vessel internals discussed in the answer to Question 5 will be continued at each refueling outage.

When sufficient experience has been gained concerning which components can be inspected volumetrically and/or surface and/or visually and the radiation dose associated with the inspection is determined, Consumers Power Company will formulate a program for recurring inspections.

Yours very truly,

Shot r. Haute

RBS/dmb

Robert L. Haueter Electric Production Superintendent -Nuclear

ATS BOCK POINT - CHARLENDIX, MICHIGAN

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	Dvg No.	PC No	Degree of Accessibility	Material Wo	Cond	Sensitization Process		Atmosphere	Guantity & Sign	Surface Environment	Actual/Allowable
Part 1 5									2 - 20*		
Beniro Vessel Beniro Vessel Inlet Sozzie Bozzie Sut (Safe End)	8-201×796 £-201-796	796-1	NA	C-Steel 38-30k	3-	18	ACT+	1975A	1 - 5"	04 & 120	
· Poises Talet Wozale	8-201-796	736-6	NA	C-Steel 88-304		58	ACT+	RPRA	4-2	08 8 G.G.	1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1
Sozzle Est Thermal Sleave	8-201-796	-12		88-304 38-304	NG	58			32	×	
.ab Tubes Control Drive Novaing Assy	8-201-799	798-0,-12		88-304	89-				32	×	
Control Drive Housing	8-301-798 8-201-798	198-2	A (Refer to Gen Motez-1) NA	58×304 58×304	N9						
Flongs Nogale Ingert	8-201-798	798-19	NA NA	153 - 304 555 - 304	80- N3-		ACT+	70° 75A			
Nozzle Ext. In-Core Scale Assy	8-201-798 8-201-798	798-20 798-4	85.	33-36	183-				8	35M	
In-Core Pipe In-Core Flange	E-201-798 E-201-798	798-5		88-304 88-304	83-				4.5	54 & U	
Instrument Scale Assy	8-201-795	795-1	NA	C-Steel			ACT+	RERA			
Sozale Son (date 2nd)	8-001-795 8-201-799	795-2		33-304 35-304	5*	58	ACT*	REFA			
Thermal Sleeve Smergency Cooling Inlet Asay	E-201-795 E-201-795	-19. 795-6	NA	Duplicate of 795-1					$1 \sim 3^n$	GM & 0	
	8-201-795	795+15	NA.	Matl & Assy			1.1		$1 = 8^{\circ}$	- (H	
Shutdown Cosling Vessie	8-901-795	-16		C-81001. (25-304	9-		ACT +	RPRA RPRA			
fearle Est	8-201-795	-17 -20		35-304	NS				6 - 18"	33	
Steam Outlet Nozzle Assy Vozzle	E-201+795 E-201-795	795-11 -10	A (Befer to Gen Sotes-2)	C-Steel			ACT+	IO'RA			
Hozzle Ext	8-201-795	-23		559-304	3-	SR	ACT+	RPRA	8 - 3"	G & 65	,
Vent Noisle Assy Noisle	E-201-807 E-201-807	-12		C-Steel		58	ACT +	H2'BA			
Horris Flange Chrs Thipport Flate Bracket	8-201-307 5-201-302	302-18	NA .	15 5 × 3 04 88 × 304	3*	100		it ouble	4	5	
Diffuer Bracket	8-201-802 8-201-802	302-32	AR AR	198~30% 158-30%	()*. ()*	78 58	Not App	licable licable	8	29	
Opper Support Bracket Core Support Bracket Asay	E-201-909	802-14	NA	30-304	80-			licable		1.010	
Support Flate Coeset	8-501-905	-15 -16		38-304	12#	SR		licable			
Steam Drus									h = 17"	1.1	
Downing new .	8-230-103	103-1	A	C8 05-316	3+	SR	0.97	RPRA			
ixtension Ristr	8-230-103	103-6	A	CS			0.92	NE2A	6 - 19"	GW	
1964710 1964710		103-8		88-316	24	59	CST	RPBA RPBA	2 - 8*	1.1	
Fand-inter Mizzle [http://Diseve)	8-03, 403	103-14	A SA	08. 58104	824			plicable			
Dupport Bracket			SA	1, cus) (SB-156)				plicable . plicable			
Supp Bing Dupp Flate		103-17	XA.	38+304	30# 30#		Not Ap	plicable .	3 24		
Nomder Conterante Pet	830-103	103+33 103+20	38	12-304	394				2 - h"	SW & 0	
loarle		103-61	A NA	Enconel (SB-166) SS-304	10.00		Sot Ap	HTRA piltombie			
Liner (Bleers) Bagy Wing		203-23	35A	Inconel (3B-166) 98-304	10*			plicable plicable			
Gipt Flate Gradara		103+29 103+39	NA. NA	88-304	10*			plicable	3 Ea 1 - 4°	59	
teval infinating Motale	8+230+103	103-26	A	fammel (89-166)			0.92	102-9A	1.87.80		
5. 98VW		103-28	NA NA	33-304 [ncose] (53-166)	N9.			giliemble giliemble			
Support Ring Support Plate		103-30	NA.	98-304 38-304	50# 52#			plicable plicable			
Upacer Decontacioate	8-230-104	103 1	NA A		1.00		can	TIFTRA	$1 + 2^{*}$	33 6.0	
Norshe Vent	8-230-104	104-5	A	Inconal (ISE-166)					1 + 1.5	"	
Scale		104-6		Inconel (88-166) 83-304	51	- 18	CHE	RPRA			
Constantion Level for & PM Cont - Upper		104-9	A				Care	RPEA	2×1.5	0.4.00	
Scale Inst Scale - Lower	8-230-10	104-6		Incon#1 (0B-166)					1 + 1.5	* 39 & G	
Acasle		104-11	A NA	Inconel (3B-166) 38-304	3.94		CHT McS A	RPRA pilosbie			
Sinera Spacar		104-15	NA A	30-304	88*		Not A	pplicable	3 5a 1 - 1.5	35 & G	
Inst Nozzle - Upper Nozzle	E-230-10	104-12		Inconel (IB-166)			COT	RETA	$\Sigma \times \Sigma^n$		
Cample Vizile	P-230-10	 104+17 104-18 		Inconel (58-166)			COT	RPRA			
Vent Rozzle	8-230-10	104-21 104-22	×	Incomei (3B-166)			COT	AFTRA	$\tilde{\chi} = T_{\pi}$		
Sozzle Gafety Belief	8-230-10	4 1Ch-25	- A	Inconel (88-166)			CIT	RERA	6 - 3"	02.4.0	
Norrie Monsky Asey	8-230-10	104-26								W, 58 & 1	1
Real Plate Truncomer Deffin Assy		102-4	NA ³	33-304	NO				1.1		
Spider Clanpa	E+030+10			130+304 180~304	5			pplicable pplicable	16-24	¥	
Clevis Gorean Dryer	R-830-10		SA ³	52-304	8			pplicable	32	38	11.1
Hangtr Lug Feed-water Header Supt	Z+230+10	6 79							2		2, 2, 3, 7, 7
Angles	8~230-10	8 BSA	NA ³	33=304	3	* 2B	Not A	pplicable			
				General No	tea						
G = Senaitized NS = Nonamnaltizet						a housing tore	NK.				
 * > Confirmed * Assumed by SER 						ve housing J-we e only.	c.e.				
St. + Stams						t costle says -					
(54 - Stear & Water 9 - Mater				H111	mptic	g to develop					
G = Gas 1210 = for Probability of Gas						to inspect.			-		and an
* * Assumed by CF Lo						al attachments t can be made t				CONSCRETES IN	
ACE = Aluminum Canned Type COT = Calcium Sillowte Type					unity	inspect by remo				Furnace De s	itized
<pre>SS = Daturate1 Steam SS = Stream Pellaving</pre>			e∞120 ⁰ , Rumitity 10 to 20%)						Stat	Rig Rock P	Osta Sheet

We as stress Reflecting MPAA section lattice framework 20° , Rundlity 10 to 20%) A = Accessible $_{\rm MA}$ = Sch Accessible $_{\rm MA}$

POOR ORIGINAL

Hig Blok Pilot. 8+26-70 DP01/R\$6