



# MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

*Helping Build Mississippi*

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.  
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

January 7, 1981

Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-416/417  
File 0260/15525/15526  
PRD-80/53, Oil Level Indicator  
Lines Outside Missile Barriers,  
Final Report  
AECM-81/23

References: 1) AECM-80/234, 9/29/80  
2) AECM-80/294, 11/25/80

On August 28, 1980, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. M. Hunt of your office of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) concerning the location of oil indicator lines for fan gear boxes outside the tornado missile barriers of the standby cooling towers.

We reported in Reference 1 that this item is reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). Our final report for resolution of this deficiency is attached. This condition is not reportable under 10CFR21, since the cooling towers have not yet been offered to MP&L for acceptance.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

EWC:mt  
Attachment

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley  
Mr. R. B. McGehee  
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Victor Stello, Director  
Div. of Insp. & Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm.  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor  
South Miss. Electric  
Power Association  
P. O. Box 1589  
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

8019  
S  
110

S 8101190147

FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-80/53

I. Description of Deficiency

Oil indicator piping for the two standby service water (SSW) system cooling towers for Units 1 and 2 are located outside the missile barriers. This condition exists on all eight cooling tower fan gear boxes. The oil indicator piping protrudes approximately two feet past the cooling water missile barrier.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications

The piping is susceptible to missile damage which could cause the oil pipe to break. If the oil pipe were to break, a loss of lubricating oil from the fan gear box could cause the gears to seize, disabling the fan. With the loss of the fans, a loss of cooling to the water in the SSW basins would occur. This loss of cooling would prevent the SSW System from performing its function of cooling safety related equipment. The condition, if it had remained uncorrected, could have adversely affected the safety of the plant, and is therefore reportable under 10CFR50.55(e)(1)(ii). Since the cooling tower had not been offered to MP&L for acceptance, 10CFR21 is not applicable.

III. Corrective Actions Taken

Corrective action to provide missile shielding of the cited exposed oil lines has been coordinated by our Architect/Engineer with the contractor, Ceramic Cooling Tower Company. Specific installation details to relocate the cited exposed oil line to the existing Fan Motor Room on the Fan Deck, which is already designed for missile protection, has been provided. Pipe re-routing is in progress, and the piping isometrics were issued in December, 1980. Corrective action is scheduled for completion by April 21, 1981.

Recurrence of the cited condition at Grand Gulf Unit 2 is precluded by virtue of the fact that missile shielding protection is being provided for both units.

The Constructor's Management Corrective Action Report, MCAR #100, will track corrective actions to completion, and is available at the GGNS jobsite.