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March 5, 1973

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Regional Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations US Atomic Energy Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Re: Docket No 50-155 License No DPR-6

Dear Mr. Grier:

8101100836

This is in response to your letter addressed to Mr. R. L. Haueter dated February 12, 1973 concerning certain Big Rock Point Plant license activities which are viewed as being in apparent noncompliance with certain AEC license requirements.

Specifically, Item 1 of that letter stated that the emergency condenser was not operable during the period from December 22, 1972 to January 10, 1973 when one of the two steam inlet valves was closed. The emergency condenser was considered operable because Section B6.2.1 of our Procedures Manual specifically states that "If one bundle should develop a leak during power operation, it will be permissible to valve it out until the next outage," thereby allowing for one loop operation. As noted in our letter to Mr. O'Leary dated January 16, 1973, the emergency condenser loops were isolated individually to determine which tube bundle was leaking.

The emergency condenser acts as a backup heat sink for reactor decay heat when the main condenser is unavailable. It will also back up the shutdown cooling system but only when the reactor head is bolted in place. The availability to operate with one emergency condenser loop out of service has been permissible in the Plant Operating Procedures since Big Rock Point became operational in 1962. It is based on our interpretation of Section 5.8.9 of the Final Hazards Summary report which states specifically that "A radiation monitor on the emergency condenser vent stack will detect a release of primary steam, as may occur in the event of a tube rupture and cause an alarm in the control room. Under this condition, the operator isolates the system by closing both condensate return valves and two motor-operated valves on the steam inlet lines to the condensing tubes. He can then reopen one system at a time to determine which tube bundle is still operative." Section 12.5.17 also states that "Failure of a tube in one of the condenser tube bundles would not interfere with the ability of the remaining tube bundle to cool the reactor. Any failed tube bundle can be isolated by manual actuation (from the control room) of the motor-operated valves"

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In summary, our interpretation is that Section 4.1.2(b) of the Technical Specifications is met if one loop of the emergency condenser is operable and available for automatic initiation.

Yours very truly,

Lalph B. Dewel

Ralph B. Sewell Nuclear Licensing Administrator

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