



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA ST., N. W., SUITE 3100  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-395/80-29

Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company  
Columbia, SC 29218

Facility Name: V. C. Summer

Docket No. 50-395

License No. CPPR-94

Inspection at V. C. Summer near Winnsboro, SC

Inspector:

*J. L. Skolze*  
J. L. Skolze

*10/29/80*

Date Signed

Approved by:

*P. J. Kellogg*  
P. J. Kellogg, Section Chief, RONS Branch

*10/29/80*

Date Signed

#### SUMMARY

Inspection on September 1 - October 5, 1980

#### Areas Inspected

This routine unannounced inspection by the Resident Inspector involved 152 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of IEB and IEC followup, operating procedure review, 50.55e reports, Part 21 reports, independent inspection effort, preoperational test witnessing, and plant tour.

#### Results

Of the 8 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*O. S. Bradham, Plant Manager
- \*J. G. Connelly, Assistant Plant Manager
- \*S. Smith Maintenance Supervisor
- \*K. Woodward, Operations Supervisor
- \*A. A. Smith, Site QA Coordinator
- \*A. Koon, Technical Staff Engineer
- \*B. Croley, Technical Support Supervisor
- \*L. Storz, Operations Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, and office personnel.

\*Attended exit interview.

### 2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 5, September 19, and October 3, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The resident inspector attended the exit interview of D. Perrotti on 9/18/80.

### 3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item 395/80-10-06, Requirements for Qualification/Certification as Auditor. The inspector reviewed Section 17.2 of the FSAR and Quality Assurance Procedure No. 2, Indoctrination, Training and Certification. These documents have been revised to state more specifically what requirements exist for individuals to be qualified as auditors and/or lead auditors. The revision makes the qualification of auditors more objective and is considered adequate to close this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 395/80-10-07, Substitution of Surveillance for Audits. The inspector reviewed Section 17.2 of the FSAR, Quality Assurance Procedures (QAP) 10, Internal SCE&G/QA Audits and QAP 23, Surveillance of Site Activities. The procedures indicate that Type II surveillances are conducted identically to an audit except the surveillance is narrower in scope. They also indicate that Type II surveillances can be substituted for an audit by a qualified lead auditor who would perform an evaluation of the surveillances to be substituted. This evaluation and corrective action will be documented and reported to the appropriate management. This action is considered adequate to close this item.

### 4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Action on IE Bulletins

The inspector examined the applicant's records and interviewed personnel to verify that corrective action had been taken with respect to IE Bulletin 79-15 and 80-19.

79-15: This Bulletin dealt with deep draft pump deficiencies. The inspector reviewed the response, dated August 16, 1979 indicating the use of a different model pump than that discussed in the bulletin. The response is adequate and the bulletin is closed.

80-19: This Bulletin dealt with failure of mercury wetted relays in reactor protection logic matrix. The inspector reviewed the response dated August 27, 1980 indicating that no mercury wetted relays were used in matrix logic applications. Some mercury wetted relays are used in temperature channel test inputs from resistor thermal devices and are not used in scram circuits as described in IEB 80-19. The response is adequate and this bulletin is closed.

6. Operating Procedure Review

The inspector reviewed the following System Operating Procedure's (SOP's):

SOP-118	Component Cooling Water
SOP-212	Steam Generator Blowdown

The procedures were reviewed for technical adequacy. The procedures were considered adequate with the following exceptions:

SOP 118

- Step 3.6 states that the RCP motor bearing limit is 200°F. The Technical Manual states that the limit is 195°F.
- Step 4.1.1 refers to CCW surge tank level in percent. The gage reads out in feet.
- Step 4.1.3 should read RHR Hx A(B).
- Step 5.2.1.A states "NOTE - The SI, with loss of offsite power signal to the backup pump in the operating loop is locked out. Backup pump will start on low pressure." Section 9.2 of the FSAR states that the backup pump will not start on low pressure once the SI plus loss of offsite power has locked out the backup pump.
- The valve lineup needs to have many valves numbered instead of the "ROH" designation.
- Attachments to the procedure listing flowrates in the system under various operating conditions are out of date and list incorrect flowrates.

SOP 212

- Step 4.2.2 says that the blowdown holdup tank pump will start at the 50 percent level. Step 4.2.4 states this sump pump stops at the 50 percent level.
- Step 4.3.3 should reference FI 4702A, B, C instead of FI 4701A, B, and C.
- Step 4.1.5 should read 3062A, B, and C.
- On the nuclear blowdown panel, valves 6124 and 6127 have 'AUTO' positions but have no 'AUTO' functions.
- Steps 4.2.4.A and B state that during system operation, the filter differential pressure should not exceed 70 psid. There is no way to distinguish any differential pressure greater than 15 psid, which is the nuclear blowdown panel high differential pressure alarm.
- Steps 6.2.4.A.1.b-1 and 5.1.3.A reference incorrect steps.
- Step 5.2.2 references as indicator for valves MVG-6904A, B, and C on XPN-7-BR (Liquid Radwaste Panel). There are no indications of these valves on the panel.
- Attachment III is included as an attachment but never referenced in the procedure.
- Step 6.2.4.A.1.a says to "isolate the NB Processing System from the Blowdown System Sump, Sample Recovery Rank, Spent Resin Tank and S/G Blowdown". It is not clear what specifically is meant (i.e., what valves are closed).

The above items (SOP 118 and 212) will remain open (80-29-04) pending further inspector review.

The System Operating Procedures as well as Operational Administrative Controls are being revised by the applicant and will be reviewed by the inspector at a future date. This will be designated open item 80-29-06.

7. 50.55(e) Items

- a. (Open) Item 80-29-01, Centrifugal Charging Pump Operation Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture. This report describes a potential for damage to one or more centrifugal charging pumps during a Safety Injection due to a secondary side high energy break. Design modifications are needed to resolve the concerns of this item. This item will remain open pending receipt and review of the applicant's final report on this matter.

- b. (Closed) Item 78-25-01 APDMS Nonconservatism. This item dealt with "round off" errors causing some of the setpoints generated for the APDMS to be less conservative than the Technical Specification limits. Since the time the report was written it has been determined by Westinghouse that the plant can operate at 100% power without relying on APDMS. In a letter dated July 28, 1980 (CGWS-1054), Westinghouse informed the applicant that PDMS would not be required. However, some factors in the future, such as Fq being reduced below 2.32, could necessitate the use of APDMS. Due to the fact that the plant will startup without APDMS and would require a Technical Specification change to implement it in the future, this item is closed.
- c. (Closed) Item 80-10-01, Rosemount Pressure Transmitters. On April 29, 1980, a report was made concerning potentially erroneous readings from Rosemount Pressure Transmitters if the transmitters are significantly overranged or underranged. Subsequently, IEB 80-16 was issued, which dealt with similar problems with the transmitters. In a response to the Bulletin dated August 25, 1980, the applicant indicated that an evaluation of all Rosemount pressure transmitters (Models 1151 and 1152) used in safety related applications revealed no potential for over ranging or under ranging the instruments. However, the potential did exist in some non-safety-related applications. The response indicated that the plans were to modify or replace the transmitters and that a subsequent report would indicate the schedule for replacement. The report dated August 29, 1980 is closed, but the Bulletin (80-16) will remain open until a final report is submitted.

8. IEC Followup

The applicant has received, reviewed, evaluated, and is taking necessary action on information in the following Circulars:

IEC 79-25	Bergen Patterson Strut Assembly
IEC 80-03	Toxic Gas Hazard

These Circulars are closed.

9. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector reviewed the Emergency Feedwater Reliability Analysis dated August 15, 1980. The analysis contains a description of the system which includes features that do not presently exist in the system. The inspector will review the analysis at a later date to verify the system exists as described in this analysis. This will be designated open item 80-29-02.

The inspector reviewed a letter to the NRC discussion preoperational testing. The letter contains commitments concerning core loading instrumentation, air operated valves and Phase I alarm procedures. The letter also indicated that ICP 240.018 "Air Operated Valves - Generic" checks all air operated valves on loss of instrument air. The inspector found that this was not exactly correct

in that the procedure itself never verified the valves response to a loss of air. However, the technicians would attach an instrument data sheet on their own volition which would check the response on loss of instrument air. The inspector informed the management that it is important to be specific and accurate in stating whether a procedure contains certain actions. The commitments in the letter will remain open (80-29-03) pending future inspector review.

Open item 80-13-09 concerned FSAR discontinuities in Section 17.2. This item has been corrected and is closed.

The inspector found that numerous setpoint discrepancies existed on the MODUFLASH units in the control room (CCW and SW).

Discrepancies identified consisted of alarm setpoints not matching the instrument list, alarm setpoints too low for operating conditions and local alarms and MODUFLASH alarms not having the same setpoint even though the same point in a system is monitored. This item will remain open (80-29-05) pending review of the alarm setpoints.

Section 6.4 of the FSAR indicates that the control room envelope is equipped to sustain seven people for a period of seven days following an accident. This section indicates that a seven day supply of food will be kept in the control room, bottled water will be kept in an area immediately adjacent to the control room, and that chemical toilet facilities are available. These items do not exist at this time and this item will remain open (80-29-07) pending future inspector review.

#### 10. Prooperational Test Witnessing

The inspector witnessed portions of the following preoperational tests:

EF-1	MDEFP Flow Test
EF-3	EFW Water Hammer
RC-1	Hot Functional Testing

The tests were witnessed to verify they were being performed according to established procedures and to independently verify the test results.

Findings were acceptable.

#### 11. Plant Tour

The inspector toured the plant at various times to observe construction activities, housekeeping, maintenance, equipment preservation and log books. Findings were acceptable.