UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-321/80-40 and 50-366/80-40

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
270 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30303

Facility Name: Hatch

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos. DPR-57 and NFP-5

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, GA

Inspector: for L. D. Zajac — Date Signed: 10/17/80

Approved by: A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch — Date Signed: 10/17/80

SUMMARY

Inspection on September 24-25, 1980

Area Inspected

This routine unannounced inspection involved 12 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of: Examination of containment liner penetration welds per Bulletin 80-08; followup of two noncompliances concerning approval of the inservice inspection plan and certification of welding and NDE inspectors; and review of actions taken on inspector followup items concerning evaluation of a linear indication.

Results

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

   Licensee Employees

   *T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager
   *C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor
   *D. McCusker, QC Supervisor
   *P. Fornel, Jr., Senior QA Field Representative
   *S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations

   Other licensee employees contacted included 4 technicians.

   *Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

   The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 25, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

   a. (Closed) Deficiency (366/80-13-01) Failure to approve ISI plan. Georgia Power letter PM-80-247 of March 19, 1980 indicates that the ISI plan for Unit 2 has been reviewed and approved. Therefore, this item is closed.

   b. (Open) Infraction (366/80-13-02) Failure to certify welding and NDE inspectors. The inspector reviewed sample certification records for NDE personnel and found that certifications still do not comply with SNT-TC-1A as indicated below:

      (1) NDE personnel are not given examinations based on the Georgia Power written NDE procedures. Refer to paragraphs 9.3 and 9.6.1 d of SNT-TC-1A. This discrepancy applies to both NDE personnel employed by Georgia Power and NDE personnel employed by an outside contractor who perform NDE for Georgia Power.

      Although contracted NDE personnel are qualified to other activities procedures, those procedures do not necessarily contain the same requirements as Georgia Power written procedures. Thus, certification to Georgia Power written procedures is required.

      Georgia Power personnel are routinely trained and certified for NDE by an outside activity. Again this certification does not include examination based on Georgia Power written procedures.

      (2) Georgia Power NDE personnel have been trained and certified by an outside activity, but Georgia Power has not audited this activity to ensure such services are performed in accordance with SNT-TC-1A. Refer to paragraph 9.5 of SNT-TC-1A.

(3) Personnel qualification records do not include a description of the test specimen used for the practical examination. Refer to paragraph 9.6.1.f of SNT-TC-1A.

(4) Georgia Power procedure HNP-823 Rev. 5, "Qualification of Inspection Personnel" indicates that the testing program (para. D.1.b) shall consist of written or oral examination. This is not in compliance with SNT-TC-1A which requires a written and practical examination.

c. (Open) Unresolved Item (366/80-13-03) Review of licensee's final disposition of a linear indication. Several pieces of correspondence have been generated addressing this indication. A review of these reports and memorandum indicates that the indication was allowed to remain. Georgia Power memo PM-80-438 of April 22, 1980 specifies that the weld, adjacent to the subject indication, be included as part of future inservice inspections. However, the ISI plan has not yet been revised to include this weld (12BC/2B31-1RC-4AA) in future inservice inspections.

This item will remain open until the ISI plan includes the subject weld for inservice inspections and until NDE results of the weld are reviewed after the first inservice inspection.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.

5. Independent Inspection Effort

During review of the Georgia Power approval for the Unit 2 ISI plan, the inspector requested a copy of the approval letter for Unit 1 ISI plan. The licensee stated that Unit 1 was approved, but could not locate documentation for such. The licensee agreed to locate documentation and to file appropriately. This is Unresolved Item No. 321/80-40-01, Lack of documented evidence for approval of Unit 1 ISI plan.

Within the area inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Review of IE Bulletin No. 80-08, Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds

IE Bulletin 80-08 was forwarded on April 7, 1980 and requested licensees to determine if their facility contained the flued head design for penetration connections, or other designs with containment boundary butt welds between the penetration sleeve and process piping as illustrated in Figure NE 1120-1, Winter 1975 addenda to the 1974 and later editions of the ASME

Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code. If the licensee's facility does contain this design then the licensee was requested to determine if welds were made with a backing ring and whether or not volumetric examination was conducted by radiography. The Bulletin indicates that weld joints with a backing ring that have not been radiographed, are of particular interest as they are potentially defective.

In response to the Bulletin Georgia Power forwarded a letter dated August 5, 1980 which provides a partial listing of penetration welds. Fourteen (14) welds of this list are the backing ring type and were not radiographed.

During the visit to Hatch site the inspector requested detailed information for these 14 joints including diameter and wall thickness for the sleeve and process pipe, verification that a backing ring actually exists, and what, if any, obstructions exist that would preclude radiography of the weld. After a lengthy search, the records for only one penetration (X-17) could be located. The detailed information for this penetration indicates that double wall radiography is feasible.

The licensee was requested to radiograph the flued head weld of penetration X-17, and to gather the same detailed information for the other penetrations having backing rings. If radiography is feasible, the other thirteen (13) penetration welds should also be radiographed. The licensee should also complete the data collection requested by the Bulletin and submit to Region II for review and determination of any further work considered necessary.

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

NOTE: During discussions of the Bulletin information required of the licensee to submit to NRC, a question was raised concerning which items of Figure NE-1132.0-1 were required to be researched. The inspector advised that all penetration welds described, except items (a), (b), and (f).