


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

JCP&L / GPU

Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

December 2, 1980

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
641 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-50/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-50/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrack, Jr.
Vice President Generation

IRF:dh
Enclosures

cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

8012090466

5

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-50/3L

Report Date

December 2, 1980

Occurrence Date

November 6, 1980

Identification of Occurrence

The Containment Spray System high drywell pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C, and IP-15D tripped at a value greater than that specified in the Technical Specifications Table 3.1.1, item E.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters:

Power:	Reactor	1773 MWt
	Generator	592 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation	15.6×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater	6.5×10^6 lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

On Thursday, November 6, 1980, while performing the "Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test" (Surveillance Procedure 607.3.002), the IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C, and IP-15D trip points were found to exceed those given in the Technical Specifications. The surveillance test yielded the following data:

<u>Pressure Switch Designation</u>	<u>Desired Setpoint</u>	<u>As Found</u>	<u>As Left</u>
IP-15A	≤ 2 psig	2.27	1.94
IP-15B	≤ 2 psig	2.24	1.98
IP-15C	≤ 2 psig	2.05	1.98
IP-15D	≤ 2 psig	2.12	1.92

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence was attributed to instrument repeatability. The switches are set at 2.0 ± 0.1 psig and the long-term repeatability of the instruments is approximately 0.2-0.3 psig (2-3% of full range). It is therefore possible for the Technical Specification limit of 2.0 psig to be exceeded by as much as 0.3 psig, yet the instruments are still operating within their design accuracy.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Containment Spray System is made up of two independent cooling loops, each of which is capable of removing heat from the primary containment in the event of a loss of coolant accident. In order to initiate the Containment Spray System, a combination of a high drywell pressure signal plus a reactor low-low water level signal must be received.

Although the high drywell pressure switches would have tripped at a slightly higher pressure than the desired setpoint, their actuation would have only been delayed a fraction of a second (approximately 0.1 second from the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident). However, the reactor low-low water level setpoint is not reached until almost 4 seconds from the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident. Due to this fact, the delay in actuation of the pressure switches would not have affected the initiation of the Containment Spray System, and, therefore, the safety significance of the occurrence is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C, and IP-15D were adjusted to trip within the Technical Specification limit of ≤ 2 psig (note the "As Left" values for the switches in the Description of Occurrence). At the present time the problem of drifting associated with these pressure switches is being investigated. The manufacturer of the instruments has also been contacted for possible measures to alleviate the problem.

Failure Data

Manufacturer: ITT Barton
Model: 228A Indicating Pressure Switch
Range: 0-10 psig