

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1 | L | Q | A | D | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

REPORT SOURCE: L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  
During the performance of QOS 1300-3 RCIC Motor Operated Valve Operability Test, the RCIC discharge isolation valve M0-2-1301-49 would not open from the Control Room. This caused RCIC to be inoperable. Also, while demonstrating HPCI operability, per Technical Specification 3.5.E.2., it was also found inoperable due to an oil leak. An orderly shutdown was initiated. Automatic Blowdown, LPCI, and Core Spray were available as back up systems.

SYSTEM CODE: C | E | 11 | CAUSE CODE: E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE: A | 13 | COMPONENT CODE: V | A | L | V | I | O | P | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE: X | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE: Z | 16

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 17 | 8 | 0 | 21 | EVENT YEAR: 8 | 0 | 21 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 | 3 | 1 | 24 | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 | 1 | 28 | REPORT TYPE: T | 30 | REVISION NO.: 0 | 32 | ACTION TAKEN: A | 18 | FUTURE ACTION: Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT: B | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z | 21 | HOURS: 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y | 23 | NPD-4 FORM SUB.: Y | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: L | 2 | 0 | 0 | 44

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  
Upon examination, a faulty torque switch was found on valve M0-2-1301-49. The torque switch was replaced and the limit switch on the operator was cleaned and checked for proper operation. The valve was exercised satisfactorily three times and RCIC was demonstrated operable before the 24 hour reactor shutdown requirement was reached.

FACILITY STATUS: E | 28 | % POWER: 0 | 9 | 9 | 29 | OTHER STATUS: NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Routine Test | 32

ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z | 33 | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA | 36

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER: 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE: Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION: NA | 39

PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER: 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION: NA | 41

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: TYPE: Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION: NA | 43

PUBLICITY ISSUED: N | 44 | DESCRIPTION: NA | 45

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- I. LER NUMBER: 80-31/01T-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On November 16, 1980, at 0030, during the routine monthly performance of QOS 1300-3, (RCIC Motor Operated Valve Operability Test), as required by Technical Specifications 4.5.E.1. and 4.5.A.1.d., it was discovered that MO-2-1301-49, RCIC Discharge Isolation to the Reactor Feedwater System, would not open from the Control Room. This caused RCIC to be inoperable.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

Per Technical Specification 3.5.E.2. continued reactor operation without RCIC availability is allowed for seven days, if all active components of HPCI are operable. Action was taken to verify HPCI availability by the performance of QOS 2300-2 and, QOS 2300-3, HPCI Pump Operability Test and HPCI Motor Operated Valve Operability Test. Generator load was reduced to 400 MWe for repair of MO-2-1301-49. While running HPCI, annunciator 902-3-G-10, HPCI Hi/Lo Oil Level, alarmed. This eventually led to HPCI being declared inoperable due to an oil leak in the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve. Since RCIC was also inoperable, per Technical Specification 3.5.E.3., an orderly shutdown was initiated to bring the reactor pressure to less than 90 psig within 24 hours if HPCI remained inoperable. RCIC was returned to service at 1020 and HPCI at 1145. The reactor was returned to normal operation and load was increased at 1340 on 11-16-80. At all times the unit was operated within the boundaries of the Technical Specifications. The availability of normal feedwater, Automatic Blowdown, LPCI, and Core Spray gives adequate safety protection in the case of this temporary loss of the RCIC and HPCI systems.

VII. CAUSE:

After examining the MO-2-1301-49 valve and its motor operator, it was found to be a faulty torque switch on the Limitorque Model SMB-000 operator that caused the valve to fail to open.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The torque switch was replaced, and the limit switches on the operator were checked for proper adjustment and their contacts were cleaned. MO-2-1301-49 was exercised three times at 1020 on November 16, 1980, and QOS 1300-2 (RCIC Pump Operability) was completed.