NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

(2) LICENSEE CODE: OHDBS1 | (3) LICENSE NUMBER: 00000000000 | (4) LICENSE TYPE: 4111 | (5) CAT 58:

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 050-0346 (7) | EVENT DATE: 11/03/80 (8) | REPORT DATE: 12/02/80 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(NP-33-80-100) On 11/3/80 at 1035 hours while performing testing, the control rod drive trip breaker "C" did not trip. This failure put the station in Action Statement 7 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The breaker was manually put in the tripped condition by an operator within five minutes of the failure. Had rod insertion been needed, the rods could have been tripped from the control room since breaker "A" was still operable.

SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
IA	X	Z	CKTBRK	A	Z

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17)	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
	80	080	03	L	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
X	X	Z	Z	0000	Y	N	Z	Z999

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The cause for the breaker failure has not been determined. During troubleshooting under Maintenance Work Order 80-3697 the breaker was manually and electrically cycled in all positions several times and no problems could be located. Breaker "C" was declared operable and then swapped with breaker "A" to determine if the problem is internal to breaker "C".

FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
C	000	NA	B	Performance of testing, PT 5155.02

ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
000 (37)	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
000 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
Z	NA

PUBLICITY

ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)
N	NA

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NRC USE ONLY

DVR 80-185 NAME OF PREPARER James Rudolph PHONE 419-259-5000, Ext. 253

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-100

DATE OF EVENT: November 3, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Control rod drive trip breaker "C" failed to open

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 2 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On November 3 1980 at 1035 hours during the performance of PT 5155.02, Anticipatory Reactor Trip System Monthly Functional Test, the control rod drive trip breaker "C" did not trip.

This failure put the station in Action Statement 7 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1. This technical specification requires that the reactor protection system (RPS) be available with four control rod drive trip breakers operable. The action statement requires that the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within one hour; or remove the power supplied to the control rod trip device associated with the inoperative channel. The breaker was manually placed in the tripped position within five minutes of the failure.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause for the breaker failure has not been determined. Extensive investigation found no apparent problems with the breaker. During troubleshooting, the breaker was manually and electrically cycled in all positions several times and no problems could be located. A General Electric field engineer was also called in to troubleshoot and no problems could be found either at the breaker or at the interfacing systems.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The breaker was manually put in the tripped condition by an operator. Had rod insertion been needed, the rods could have been tripped from the control room since breaker "A" was still operable.

Corrective Action: Maintenance Work Order 80-3697 was issued to troubleshoot the problem. The undervoltage device was changed at the breaker but the new coil later failed. The original device which was inspected and declared operational was put back on the breaker and satisfactorily tested. Control rod drive trip breaker "A" was swapped with breaker "C" to see if the problem follows the breaker in the future.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar reportable occurrences.

LER #80-080