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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION I

Inspection Report No: 50-29/75-10 Docket No: 50-29

censee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company License No: DPR-3

20 Turnpike Road Priority:

Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Category: C

Safeguards Group:

cation: Rowe, Massachusetts

pe of Licensee: PWR, 600 MWt (W)

pe of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced

tes of Inspection: August 11-15, 1975

tes of Previous Inspection: July 29-31, 1975

porting Inspector: A B Davis 8/29/75
for J. F. Streeter, Reactor Inspector DATE

companying Inspectors: E. E. McCabe, Jr., for 8/29/75
R. O. Hurd, Reactor Inspector DATE

DATE

DATE

ther Accompanying Personnel: None DATE

viewed By: A B Davis 8/29/75
A. B. Davis, Senior Reactor Inspector, PWR Section DATE
Reactor Operations Branch

8011170 236

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Enforcement Action

A. Items of Noncompliance

None

B. Deviations

None

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

The licensee's corrective actions with respect to Items of Noncompliance identified in Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-14, Details 2.c(2) and 2.c(3), were reviewed by the inspector and were found to be acceptable. (Details 8 and 9)

Design Changes

The licensee is in the process of modifying his ventilation system to enable him to maintain all radioactive gaseous releases as low as practicable. (Detail 13)

Unusual Occurrences

1. The plant was tripped on May 13, 1975, from low steam generator water level as a result of losing a boiler feed pump when an electrical fault occurred on the distribution line. The plant was returned to power and phased on the grid 2-1/2 hours later after an investigation of the occurrence revealed that no trouble existed with plant equipment.

2. The plant was tripped on May 16, 1975, from low steam generator water level as a result of losing the boiler feed pumps on low suction pressure. The plant was returned to power and phased on the grid 5-1/2 hours later after an investigation of the occurrence revealed that no abnormalities existed in the condensate system.

3. During a controlled plant shutdown, the plant was inadvertently tripped on May 31, 1975, from 10% power during a nuclear instrumentation surveillance check.

4. The Vapor Container developed a leakage rate in excess of that allowed by the Technical Specifications. (Detail 18)

Other Significant Findings

1. Acceptable Areas

   a. Plant Operations except for Switching Log and Special Orders Log. (Detail 3)

   b. Surveillance. (Detail 4)

   c. Maintenance. (Detail 7)

   d. Ventilation System Modification. (Detail 13)

   e. Prevention of Flooding Due to Non-Safety-Related Equipment Failure. (Detail 14)

   f. New Fuel Receipt. (Detail 15)

2. New Unresolved Items

   a. Switching Log. (Detail 3.c(1))

   b. Special Orders Log. (Detail 3.c(2))

   c. Corrections to Reactor Containment Building Integrated Leak Rate Test. (Detail 5.b)

   d. Method of Conducting Type B Tests. (Detail 5.c)

   e. Abnormal Occurrence 75-7. (Detail 6.b)

   f. Use of the Term NA in Procedures. (Detail 17)

3. Licensee Identified Items of Noncompliance

   Contrary to Technical Specification D.2.e(8), containment isolation valve TV-209 would not go fully closed. This item is an Infraction. (Detail 6.a)

4. Status of Previously Identified Unresolved Items

   The following items have been resolved:

   a. ECCS Circuit Breaker Inspection Procedure. (Detail 11)

   b. Approved Vendors List. (Detail 12)

c. In-Plant Audit Procedures. (Detail 16)

More information is needed to resolve the following item:

Pressurizer Surge Line and ECCS Ring Header Hangers.

Management Interview

At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector held a meeting at the site with the following licensee personnel:

Mr. W. G. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent
Mr. J. H. Shippee, Instrument and Control Supervisor
Mr. J. L. Staub, Technical Assistant
Mr. N. N. St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent

The following summarizes the items discussed:

A. Purpose of the Inspection. (Detail 2.b)

B. Previously Identified Unresolved Items as Identified in "Status of Previously Identified Unresolved Items" Section of This Report.

C. Previously Identified Enforcement Items as Identified in "Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items" Section of This Report.

D. New Unresolved Items as Identified in "New Unresolved Items" Section of This Report.

E. Licensee Identified Items of Noncompliance as Identified in "Licensee Identified Items of Noncompliance" Section of This Report.

F. Plant Operations. (Detail 3)

G. Surveillance. (Detail 4)

H. Maintenance. (Detail 7)

I. Ventilation System Modification. (Detail 13)

J. Prevention of Flooding Due to Non-Safety-Related Equipment Failure. (Detail 14)

K. New Fuel Receipt. (Detail 15)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Yankee Atomic Electric Company

Mr. D. Army, Engineering Assistant
Mr. H. A. Autio, Plant Superintendent
Mr. E. D. Barry, Control Room Operator
Mr. R. L. Berry, Technical Assistant
Mr. W. D. Billings, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor
Mr. R. L. Boutwell, Engineering Assistant
Mr. T. P. Danek, Operations Supervisor
Mr. W. M. Ebert, Plant Reactor Engineer
Mr. J. A. Flanigan, Plant Health Physicist
Mr. W. G. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent
Mr. B. L. Kirk, Shift Supervisor
Mr. P. E. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor
Mr. L. L. Reed, Quality Control and Audit Coordinator
Mr. I. Seybold, Technical Assistant
Mr. J. H. Shippee, Instrument and Control Supervisor
Mr. J. L. Staub, Technical Assistant
Mr. N. N. St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent
Mr. M. J. Thayer, Engineering Assistant
Mr. M. D. Vassar, Assistant Operations Supervisor

2. General

a. Plant Status

The plant was operating at approximately 98% power during the inspection.

b. Inspection Purpose

The inspector stated that the purpose of the inspection was to review the areas of plant operations, abnormal occurrences, maintenance, surveillance, local leak rate testing, and outstanding items.

3. Plant Operations

a. The inspector reviewed the following logs and operating records:

Shift Supervisor Log, 6/13/75-6/25/75.
Rowe Station Log 1, 6/15/75-6/25/75.
Rowe Station Log 2, 6/15/75-6/25/75.
Primary Plant Log Sheets, 6/15/75-6/25/75.
Secondary Plant Log Sheets, 6/15/75-6/25/75.
Operating Memos 20-1; 2R-1; 2R-21; 2R-22; 2R-23.
Special Orders 254; 269; 271; 272; 273; 275; 278.
Bypass of Safety Function Jumper Control Requests 74-18; 75-24; 75-25 and Jumper Control Log.
Plant Information Reports 29; 30; 31; 32.
Switching Log Switching Orders T-3147; T-1532; T-26.

The inspector determined from his review of the above records that:

(1) Log sheets were filled out and initialed.

(2) Logs were being maintained and reviewed in accordance with plant procedures.

(3) Jumpers or bypasses did not result in operations contrary to the Technical Specifications.

(4) Plant Information Reports confirmed that problems addressed did not result in Technical Specifications being exceeded.

(5) Operating Memos and Special Orders did not conflict with the Technical Specifications.

b. The inspector toured selected areas of the plant on August 11, 12, and 13 and toured the reactor containment with the Shift Supervisor on duty on August 12. During the tours he determined that:

(1) Operator crew composition and Control Room manning were in accordance with the Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.54(k).

(2) Radiation controls were established in accordance with plant procedures.

(3) Selected monitoring instrumentation was monitoring Primary Coolant System parameters as required.

(4) No unusual fluid leaks or piping vibrations were observed.

(5) Seismic restraints in the pressurizer compartment were observed to have adequate oil levels in their reservoirs.

(6) Switch positions of selected valves in the Switchgear Cooling System were in agreement with the physical positions of the valves.

(7) Selected equipment tags were observed to be properly authorized and logged.

(8) The control room operators were aware of the reasons for lighted annunciators and had taken action specified in applicable alarm procedures.

(9) Plant housekeeping conditions were acceptable.

c. The inspector had the following comments in the area of plant operations:

(1) The format of the Switching Log is such that an individual cannot easily determine all of the outstanding equipment tags in the plant. The licensee had recognized this problem and had drafted a revision to procedure AP-0017, "Switching and Tagging Rules for Plant Equipment," to correct the problem. This is an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee's corrective action.

(2) The format of the Special Orders Log is such that an individual cannot easily determine all of the outstanding Special Orders. The licensee had recognized this problem and intends to correct the problem. This is an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee's corrective action.

(3) Entries made in the Shift Supervisor's Log concerning Abnormal Occurrences 75-6 and 75-7 were brief. The inspector stated that entries involving abnormal conditions such as these and subsequent corrective action should be more descriptive. The licensee stated that more descriptive entries would be made for abnormal conditions. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

4. Surveillance

a. The inspector reviewed surveillance data and witnessed portions of selected surveillance tests to verify that testing was being accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification requirements and that test results were being reviewed for acceptability

by someone other than the individual performing the test. Results of the following tests were reviewed:

Pressurizer Circulation and Surge Spray Valve Operation	OP-4219
Pressurizer Solenoid Relief Valve Set Pressure	OP-4219
Power Range Channel Adjustment	OP-4201
Control Rod Position Check	OP-7103
Reactor Coolant Flow Trip System	OP-4606
Nuclear Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor	OP-4704
Steam Generator Trip System	OP-4604
Emergency Boiler Feed Pump	OP-4211
Fire Pump	OP-4210
Diesel Fuel Inventory	OP-4207
Charging Pump and Fire Pump Breakers	OP-5755
Station Batteries	OP-4501
Emergency Diesel Generators	OP-4209
LPSI and HPSI Valves	OP-4203
LPSI and HPSI Pumps	OP-4204
VC Recirculation System Valves	OP-4212
VC Recirculation System Pump	OP-4213
VC Recirculation System Suction Header Strainer	OP-2100
Process Radiological Monitoring System	OP-4600
Accident Emergency Level Radiation Monitor	OP-4602
Accident Emergency Environmental Monitors	OP-4800
Inspection and Maintenance of Hydraulic Suppressors	DP-5106

The inspector verified that the test frequencies and results satisfied the applicable Technical Specifications and the test results were being independently reviewed.

b. The inspector reviewed the procedures associated with the above listed surveillance tests to determine if the procedures were approved in accordance with plant administrative requirements and to determine if the procedures specified prerequisites and test preparations, instrumentation calibration information, acceptance criteria, and appropriate operational checks prior to returning equipment to service.

The inspector had the following comment in the area of surveillance procedures:

> The inspector stated that procedure DP-5106, "Inspection and Maintenance of Hydraulic Suppressors," should provide quantitative information on fluid additions and mechanical

adjustments in order that trends of degradation could be detected. The licensee stated that the procedure data sheet would be revised to include quantitative information.

The inspector had no further questions in the above listed surveillance areas.

5. Type B and C Testing

a. The inspector reviewed the licensee's method of logging the results of Type B and Type C tests. The inspector found the licensee's practice of keeping a running total of Type B and C tests results to be effective in determining at any time how the plant stands relative to the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, requirement of .6 La for the summation of Type B and C test results.

b. The inspector reviewed selected Type B and C test result calculation sheets. The inspector found that the result from one test he reviewed was not included in the local leak rate summation listed in Summary Technical Report No. 1074, "Reactor Containment Building Integrated Leak Rate Test," dated May 1974. This report was submitted to the Directorate of Licensing on August 29, 1974. The change is only .00037 wt %/day and the corrected summary test results still easily meet Appendix J requirements.

The licensee pointed out two other errors in the report to the inspector. One report error was the results of the instrument error analysis for the 16 psig reduced pressure test: the report stated that the instrument error was $\pm$ 0.597% whereas the figure should have been $\pm$ 0.0597%. The other report error was that the report states that a Table II and Table III are attached which break the local leak rate data down by test class, year and component: the licensee is not required by Appendix J to report the detailed data and he chose not to.

The licensee stated that corrections to Summary Technical Report No. 1074 would be submitted to the Division of Reactor Licensing. This is an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's submission of the corrections.

c. The inspector reviewed the licensee's method of conducting and calculating the results of Type B electrical penetration leakage tests. Summary Technical Report No. 1074 states:

"Type B electrical penetrations are constructed as closed cylinders penetrating perpendicularly through the vapor container. They are tested by pressurizing the cylinder and therefore they can leak either into or out of the vapor container. Leak tests with a halide (freon) detector, bubble solutions, and sonic detectors were used to determine the direction of the leaks for these penetrations. For purposes of calculations, leaks from the electrical penetrations which only went into the vapor container were discounted. Leaks which either went only out of the vapor container or went both ways were calculated at full leakage value as leaks through the penetrations."

The inspector stated that the plugs (~ 1/2" OD with rubber O ring seal) removed from penetrations to allow attachment of the testing rig were never tested. For penetrations determined to be leaking into containment, the plugs would be subjected to containment pressure during an accident.

The inspector stated that the licensee's practice of discounting the leakage of electrical penetrations which only leak into containment and the licensee's assumption that penetration test plugs do not leak will be reviewed further by Region I. This is an Unresolved Item pending completion of the Region I review.

6. Abnormal Occurrence Review

Abnormal Occurrences 50-29/75-6 and 50-29/75-7 were reviewed to verify that:

--the cause was identified and details clearly reported;

--the corrective action described was taken to prevent recurrences;

--each event was reviewed and evaluated by the licensee; and

--safety limits, limiting safety settings, and limiting conditions for operations were not exceeded.

a. Abnormal Occurrence 50-29/75-6

References: Licensee letters to Region I dated July 25 and August 4, 1975

The following documents related to AO 75-6 were reviewed by the inspector:

--Licensee letters to Region I dated July 25 and August 4, 1975.

--Maintenance Requests 75-390 and 75-400.

--Job Orders 75-137 and 75-139.

--QC Inspections 75-137 and 75-139.

--PORC Meeting Minutes 75-41 (7/25/75) and 75-44 (8/7/75).

--Type C leakage test data.

--Procedure OP 6450, "Inspection, Repair and Stroke Calibration of V. C. Isolation SOV's and/or Trip Valve No. TV-209."

Abnormal Occurrence 75-6 concerned a containment drain line automatic containment isolation valve (TV-209) that failed to go fully closed during preparations to conduct a Type C leakage test due to corrosion buildup on the valve linkage. The inspector's review of facility records related to AO 75-6 revealed that the occurrence had been satisfactorily evaluated and corrected by the licensee.

The licensee stated in the referenced correspondence that failure of the valve to go fully closed was not significant because the drain line discharges into a normally closed system (Vapor Container Drain Tank) which is considered an extension of the Vapor Container. The inspector stated that the Vapor Container Drain Tank cannot be considered an extension of the Vapor Container since the Type A containment test was not conducted with the VCDT being exposed to accident pressure. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comment.

The inspector stated that the inability of valve TV-209 to go fully closed automatically would have prevented it from responding in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification D.2.e(8). This specification, which is considered to be a limiting condition for operation, requires that "valves in outgoing lines from the vapor container shall close automatically if at any time vapor container pressure increases above 5 psig." The inspector stated that exceeding this limiting condition for operation constituted an Item of Noncompliance and is considered to be an Infraction. Since this event has been adequately identified and addressed by the licensee, no response to this item is required.

b. Abnormal Occurrence 50-29/75-7

References: Licensee letters to Region I dated August 8 and 15, 1975

The following documents related to AO 75-7 were reviewed by the inspector:

--Licensee letters to Region I dated August 8 and 15, 1975.

--Maintenance Request 75-413.

--Job Order 75-144.

--QC Inspection 75-144-1.

--Procedure OP-5100, "Valve, Fitting or Pipe Section Replacement and/or Repair."

--Procedure OP-5261, "Testing of Charging Pump Relief Valves on the Test Stand."

--Procedure OP-5254, "Maintenance of Charging Pump Relief Valves."

--PORC Meeting Minutes 75-45 (8/11/75).

Abnormal Occurrence 75-7 concerned a nozzle to flange weld crack which resulted in a slight weeping of charging water. The inspectors review of facility records revealed that the occurrence had been satisfactorily corrected by the licensee; however, the licensee's evaluation of the occurrence to prevent recurrence is not yet complete. The licensee has concluded that the crack was caused by vibration and he is conducting an evaluation to determine a remedy for the vibration problem. This is an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee's evaluation and associated corrective action.

c. The inspector reviewed maintenance activities on the following components to determine if the circumstances should have been reported as abnormal occurrences:

No. 4 Loop Fill Valve (MOV-539) - Job Order 74-127.
No. 2 MCP Vent Valve - Job Order 74-111.

The inspector determined that these items were not reportable as abnormal occurrences.

7. Maintenance

Maintenance activities on safety-related systems were reviewed to verify that:

--limiting conditions for operation were met while the system or component was removed from service;

--administrative approval was obtained prior to initiating the work;

--maintenance was accomplished with approved procedures;

--required inspections or hold points were included;

--necessary functional testing and calibration was performed;

--quality control records were available; and

--maintenance was performed by qualified personnel.

The maintenance review included review of Maintenance Requests, Job Orders, plant procedures, and Technical Specifications. Maintenance work reviewed is tabulated below.

Component	Job Order
Pressurizer Level Indicator	74-128
No. 3 and 4 Main Coolant Loops Flow Detector DP Cell	74-250
Nuclear Instrumentation Channel 8	74-30
Intermediate Channel 4	74-31
Pressurizer Vent Valve	75-41
Steam Generator Blowdown Line Trip Valve	74-110
No. 2 Diesel Generator	74-161
No. 3 Diesel Generator	74-179 and 75-50
Waste Disposal Valve VD-V-983	74-145
Safety Injection Accumulator	74-123

The inspector's review of the above maintenance activities revealed that they were accomplished satisfactorily and the above inspection items were satisfied. The inspector stated that he detected a significant improvement in the documentation of maintenance evolutions since this area was last inspected.

8. Unauthorized Procedure Changes

The licensee issued Revision 1 of procedure OP-5204, "Main Coolant Pump Inspection and Repair," on June 13, 1975. This revised procedure incorporates revised torque and clearance values. This document resolves the Item of Noncompliance identified in Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-14, Detail 2.c(2).

9. Main Coolant Check Valve Modification - Acceptance Criteria

The licensee issued Revision 2 of procedure OP-5200, "Main Coolant Check Valve Repair," on June 13, 1975. This revised procedure incorporates acceptance criteria and resolves the Item of Noncompliance identified in Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-14, Detail 2.c(3).

10. Pressurizer Surge Line and ECCS Ring Header Hangers

During the tour of the Vapor Container, the inspector observed that the licensee had made hot setting adjustments to one spring hanger on the pressurizer surge line. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the positioning of the ECCS Ring Header Hangers and will adjust the cold setting of the Pressurizer Surge Line Hangers during the upcoming refueling shutdown. These remain as Unresolved Items pending completion of the licensee's actions.

11. ECCS Circuit Breaker Inspection Procedure

The licensee issued Revision 2 of procedure OP-4506, "Inspection of ECCS Circuit Breakers," on May 30, 1975. This revised procedure incorporates acceptance criteria and provisions for recording test equipment information. This document resolves the Unresolved Item identified in Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b(8).

12. Approved Vendors List

Revision 1 of Guideline No. 1, "Policy for Material Purchases, Design Changes, Repairs and Modifications," was issued in March 1975 and Revision 3 of procedure AP-0211, "Material and Service Purchase," was issued on May 16, 1975. These documents both require material to be purchased from vendors on the Approved Vendors List or from suppliers specifically approved by the Operational Quality Control and Audit Department. (The "Yankee Atomic Electric Company Operating Plants Approved Vendors List" was issued in May 1975.) These revised documents are consistent in the approach t procurement and resolve the Unresolved Item identified in Region Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 14.b.

13. Ventilation System Modification

The licensee is in the process of modifying his plant ventilation system in accordance with Engineering Design Request 74-3 to enable him to maintain all radioactive gaseous releases as low as practicable. This effort is expected to be completed during the refueling outage beginning in October 1975. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter at this time.

14. Prevention of Flooding Due to Non-Safety-Related Equipment Failure

The inspector determined from record review and visual observations that the licensee had taken the actions specified in a letter to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated February 14, 1975. The actions taken were to make modifications in the Primary Auxiliary Building and the Diesel Generator Building to provide protection of Motor Control Centers 1, 2, 3, and 4 against the postulated failure of a service water line. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

15. New Fuel Receipt

The licensee has received all 40 new fuel assemblies he intends to install during the refueling outage scheduled to commence October 18. All assemblies have been inspected by the licensee and placed in the New Fuel Storage Vault. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

16. In-Plant Audit Procedures

The in-plant audit program is now covered in two documents: Procedure OQA, SVIII-2, "In-Plant Audit Program," and Procedure AP-0208, "In-Plant Audits." These procedures resolve the Unresolved Items identified in Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 5.b(3), as follows:

a. OQA, XVIII-2 requires that the auditor review the most current discrepancy report for inclusion of outstanding items in the area to be audited.

b. AP-0208 requires that a time frame for resolution of audit discrepancies be included in the Plant Position Report.

c. OQA, XVIII-2 requires that the Manager of Operational Quality Control and Audit document his approval on audit checklists.

The inspector reviewed the latest In-Plant Audit Summary to determine if the plant was issuing Plant Position Reports in a timely manner after the audit reports are received. For audits conducted over the past year, most PPR's were issued in 15 days or less from the audit report issuance date and the longest time was 36 days. The licensee stated that he would revise his procedure AP-0208 to require PPR's to be issued within 30 days from the audit report issuance date. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

17. Use of the Term "NA" in Procedures

Use of the term "NA" (not applicable) has been observed by Region I at this and other facilities. It has been found, at another facility, that reviewers who had recently signed off a completed reactor start-up procedure as acceptable were unable to describe to the NRC inspector why specific steps were "NA." This situation has made it obvious that blanket use of the term "NA" by procedure performers can lead to inadequacies in review, in addition to providing a mechanism by which safety-related procedures can be inadvertently modified without the required reviews and approvals.

Region I evaluation of the use of the term "NA" is that such usage neither requires nor provides a determination that required procedure steps have been satisfactorily accomplished. It is a requirement of Criterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50 that safety-related activities be accomplished in accordance with prescribed procedures. Disregard of or deviation from procedural steps is not authorized for normal evolutions. This does not mean that unnecessary evolutions must be accomplished. For example, if a specific valve lineup is required, a recent establishment of that lineup incident to another procedure can be an acceptable reference for proper accomplishment of that lineup, provided that it has been determined that other evolutions which could have changed the lineup have not occurred in the meantime, and provided that such acceptance does not allow improper changing of the required lineup by performance of other evolutions. Administrative procedures should prescribe the conditions for, and limits over, acceptability of such procedure step accomplishment. If, however, procedure steps are to be modified, then the appropriate procedure change mechanism must be implemented.

In cases where only one portion of a procedure is to be performed, the reason for such limitation can be noted on the procedure. Steps which are not to be performed can be crossed out, with a reference to the reason placed in the margin. But it should be emphasized

that the reference for not accomplishing a step or series of steps needs to be clearly referenced on the procedure. Otherwise, conformance to one or more of the following Appendix B, 10 CFR 50 requirements may not be achieved.

a. The Criterion II requirement for a documented program which assures that all prerequisites for safety-related activities are accomplished.

b. The Criterion XIV requirement for identification of items which have satisfactorily passed required inspections and tests in order to preclude inadvertent bypassing of such inspections and tests.

c. The Criterion XVII requirement that records shall include the results of reviews, tests, audits, and monitoring of work performance; with such records to be identifiable and retrievable.

Conformance to the above identified regulatory requirements will be examined during a subsequent inspection.

18. Excessive Operational Containment Leakage Rate

The licensee informed the inspector on August 15 that the Vapor Container Continuous Leak Rate Monitoring system indicated that the containment had developed a leakage rate in excess of the operational limits in the Technical Specifications. Preliminary data indicated that the leakage rate experienced at 1.4 psig was roughly equivalent to .69 weight %/day whereas the allowable operational leakage rate is .4 weight %/day.

After the leak was detected, a controlled plant shutdown was commenced at about 10:30 a.m. in accordance with emergency procedure OP-3007, "Loss of Vapor Containment Integrity." The leak was located about 1:00 p.m. on a vent header flange and isolated. The shutdown was terminated and the plant was returned to 98% power.

Preliminary evaluation by the licensee of local samples, environmental monitors, and Vapor Containment environment indicates that the event represented no significant threat to the public. There was no indication of a release of radioactive material.

This event was subsequently reported to Region I as Abnormal Occurrence 75-08.