

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION . P.O. BOX 628 . WADING RIVER, NEW YORK 11792

TEL. (516) 929-8300

January 12, 1990

PM 90-009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is Shoreham Nuclear Power Station's Licensee Event Report, LER 89-011.

Sincerely yours,

Jack A. Notaro Plant Manager

JN/RP/jp

Enclosure

cc: William T. Russell, Regional Administrator
Frank Crescenzo, Senior Resident Inspector
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Records Center
American Nuclear Insurers

SR. A21.0200

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ABSTRACT /Limit to 1400 space 14. approximately fifteen single-space expountten lines (10

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SUPPLEMENTAL PIEPORT EXPECTED (14)

X NO

On December 22, 1989 at 1117 hours, an unplanned actuation of the Engineered Safety Feature Primary Containment Isolation System occurred. This event occurred when a System Layup Implementation Package (SLIP) for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was being implemented. This SLIP required two breakers to be opened to deenerigize area temperature monitoring elements in the HPCI These two breakers also supplied power to the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System isolation logic so when these breakers were opened, this system isolated. The two breakers were reclosed, the RWCU System was returned to its normal lineup at 1125 and plant management personnel were informed. This isolation of the RWCU System was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) and the NRC was notified at 1214. This Licensee Event report is being submitted per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). The cause of this event was an inadequate procedure. One corrective action was to change the required positions of the 2 breakers in the HPCI SLIP. Another was to modify the SLIPs for the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System and the Steam Leak Detection System to allow components in laid-up systems such as HPCI to be deenergized by removing their fuses and still leave power to components in operable systems.

YEAR

MONTH

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

DAY

* Reactor Defueled

NRC Form 2000

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/08

PACILITY NAMS (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)			LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (S)		
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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx].

IDENTIFICATION OF THE EVENT

Reactor Water Cleanup System isolation occurred while implementing a System Layup Implementation Package for the High Pressure Coolant Injection System.

Event Date: 12/22/89

Report Date: 1/12/90

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EVENT

Reactor Defueled - All fuel assemblies stored in the Spent Fuel Pool

Mode Switch - Refuel

RPV Pressure= 0 psig RPV Temperature = 86 Degrees F

POWER LEVEL - 0

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On December 22, 1989 a System Layup Implementation Package (SLIP) was being implemented on the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) [BJ]. This SLIP required opening two breakers to deenergize the 8 HPCI Equipment Area Temperature Elements (1E41*TE053, 054, 055 and 056 A and B). This action was required by the Protected System Component Power Supply Checklist section of the SLIP. However, these two breakers also supply power to the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) [CE] Leak Detection logic. When the two breakers were opened at 1117 hours, the deenergization of the RWCU isolation logic caused the RWCU containment isolation valves (1G33*MOV-033 and 034) to close. This was an unplanned actuation of the Engineered Safety Feature Primary Containment Isolation System and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). The implementation of the SLIP was stopped. The two breakers were reclosed and the RWCU system was restored to its normal lineup at 1125 hours. Plant management personnel were notified and the NRC was notified at 1214 hours. This Licensee Event Report is being submitted per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

NRC Form 386A (9-63)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION						U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/68					
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CAUSE OF THE EVENT

This event was caused by a procedural inadequacy. The Protected System Component Power Supply Checklist for the HPCI SLIP specified 2 breakers as being in the "open" position. This is consistant with the SLIP Program guidelines which specify "open" as the preferred breaker position. However, in this case, review of the HPCI SLIP was insufficient to determine that opening the breakers would deenergize the RWCU isolation logic. Thus the HPCI SLIP should have required the two breakers to be "closed" and the fuses to the HPCI Equipment Area Temperature isolation logic to be removed.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

There was no safety significance to this event. The plant is shutdown and has been defueled since August 1989.

The Primary Containment Isolation System performed as designed. Following the RWCU isolation the operators took the appropriate actions to restore the RWCU system to its normal lineup.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- A change to the HPCI SLIP was made to correct the position of 1. the 2 breakers.
- 2. The implementation of the HPCI SLIP was subsequently completed.
- 3. This event was reviewed by all SLIP preparers and reviewers to ensure that the preparation and review of SLIPs is thorough and accurate, especially when isolating control power supplies.
- 4. SLIPs for the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System and the Steam Leak Detection System have been prepared to allow components in laid-up systems such as HPCI to be deenergized by removing fuses and still leave power to components in operable systems such as RWCU.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

a. Manufacturer and model number of failed component (s)

N/A

b. LER numbers of previous similar events

None