

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION

February 17, 1981

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-81-16

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of an event of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by IE staff as of this date.

FACILITY: Tennessee Valley Authority
Sequoyah Unit 1
Docket No. 50-327
Chattanooga, Tennessee

SUBJECT: LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS

At 2:15 p.m. on February 16, Sequoyah Unit 1 experienced a Loss of Control Room Panel Annunciation for 50 minutes due to an external 120 volt power source affecting the annunciator system. The Unit was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) when the event occurred. Two operators were positioned at the control room panels to monitor plant parameters. During the 50 minutes, all annunciators were functioning in the "flashing alarm" mode. The plant computer alarm system was operable and monitored throughout the event. Normal annunciator function was restored at 3:05 p.m.

All control room annunciators are now functioning normally with the exception of three component alarms. These three alarms are not required for mode 5 operation. The licensee is continuing to investigate and trouble shoot the cause of the event.

Plant restart is now planned for March 4.

Media interest has occurred. Neither the licensee or NRC plans to issue a news release, but are responding to media inquires. The State of Tennessee has been informed.

The NRC Emergency Response Center received notification of this occurrence by telephone from the licensee at 2:53 p.m. on February 16. The information is current as of 11:00 a.m. on February 17.

Contact: R. Crlenjak, RII 242-5576; D. Quick, RII 242-5539

<u>Distribution:</u>	Transmittal H. St. <u>1:59</u>	
Chairman Ahearne	Commissioner Hendrie	S. J. Chilk, SECY
Commissioner Gilinsky	Commissioner Bradford	C. C. Kammerer, CA
	ACRS	(For Distribution)
<u>Transmitted:</u> NMBB <u>2:09</u>	P. Bldg. <u>2:11</u>	IE:XOOS <u>1:55</u> (IE:HQ Dist.)
W. J. Dircks, EDO	H. R. Denton, NRR	Landow _____ (6 min/page)
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J. J. Fouchard, PA	F. Schroeder, NRR	
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Applicable Resident Site 2:24
Regional Offices 2:21
Applicable Utility 2:41

Willste 2:15
J. G. Davis, NMSS
T. E. Murley, RES

Document Mgt. Br. (For PDR/LPDR)
S. Ebbin, NSOC

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION

Rank Nitrogen Supply System. The containment isolation valves on these systems are normally open during operation and may be required to be open during accident conditions.

If it is necessary to replace burned out lamps after the metallic plunger has been redesigned as described in corrective action 1 above, the following steps will be taken:

1. The touch plate with the burned out lamp will be removed and lamps replaced.
2. The glass cover on the HFA relay (panels behind north vertical board) associated with the valve in question will be removed and the relay held in place by depressing the insulated portion of the spring loaded relay plunger.
3. The touch plate with the replaced lamps will be inserted into the switch chassis.
4. The "open" switch of the valve in question will be depressed to assure that the circuit has been reset and the glass cover replaced on the HFA relay."

"If it is necessary to replace burned out lamps before the metallic plunger is redesigned, the replacement will be performed during an outage of sufficient duration when the affected system and valve can be removed from service. At that time, the procedural steps to be followed are identical to those established for the automatic containment isolation valves on non-essential systems discussed above. Until such time as the lamp can be replaced, the position of the affected valve can be determined by examining the system flow, pressure and temperature process instrumentation."

Recommended Actions for Holders of Construction Permits or Operating Licenses:

1. Determine whether your facility uses the subject Series 2 indicating push-button switches in any safety-related function. If there are no indicating pushbutton switches of this type in your facility, you need not pursue this matter further.
2. If the subject switches are used to perform safety-related functions at your facility, either replace them with qualified units or modify them to eliminate the deficiencies. Holders of operating licenses should take the appropriate action as soon as practical; construction permit holders should take the appropriate action prior to startup. (If the switches are to be modified, contact Honeywell Incorporated for assistance.)
3. Until the appropriate corrective action is completed, the following interim measures should be taken:

- a. If the design of the affected equipment permits its switch assembly to be deenergized for relamping, verify that the procedures specify that power is to be removed from the switch assembly during relamping. If the procedures do not so specify, revise them to include such a provision.
- b. If the design of the affected equipment does not permit its switch assembly to be deenergized for relamping, verify that the operator can determine the status of the affected equipment by alternate means. Towards this end, implement procedures to enable the operator to determine the status of the affected equipment by alternate means (e.g., acceptable method for inferring the position of a valve could include system flow, pressure, or temperature measurements). If alternate status indication methods are not available, relamping should be deferred until the next outage during which time the affected equipment can be removed from service. However, during the resulting blind time, rigid administrative controls should be implemented to provide the operator with reliable status information.

No written response to this circular is required. If you require additional information with regard to this subject, please contact the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

RECENTLY ISSUED
IE CIRCULARS

Circular No.	Subject	Date of Issue	Issued to
80-25	Case Histories of Radiography Events	12/5/80	All radiography licensees
80-24	AECL Teletherapy Unit Malfunction	12/2/80	All teletherapy licensees
80-23	Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency Generators	10/31/80	All power reactor facilities with OL or a CP
80-22	Confirmation of Employee Qualifications	10/2/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP architect-engineering companies and nuclear steam system suppliers
80-21	Regulation of Refueling Crews	9/10/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-20	Changes in Safe-Slab Tank Dimensions	8/21/80	All Part 50 and Part 70 fuel facility licensees
80-19	Noncompliance with License Requirements for Medical Licensees	8/26/80	All medical licensees
80-18	10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems	8/22/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
80-17	Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water Jet from Baffle Plate Corner	7/23/80	All holders of PWR OLs and PWR CPs
80-16	Operational Deficiencies In Rosemount Model 510DU Trip Units And Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters	6/27/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL or a CP
	Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown		facilities with an OL or CP

OL = Operating Licenses
CP = Construction Permit