U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMA 1) CONTROL BLOCK:](1)0 0 0 0 0 0 1(2) Ø Ø 0 Ø O H D B S 0 LICENSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE CON'T REPORT 0 - 0 3 4 6 7 1 2 0 8) 0 1 Ø 51 (6)JOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10 (NP-33-80-115) On 12/5/80 at 1730 hours during surveillance testing, the setpoint for 0 2 the Borated Water Storage Tank low level bistable BA312 was found out of tolerance. 0 3 On 12/6/80 at 0750 hours during testing, the setpoint for the containment pressure 0 4 bistable BA309 was also found out of tolerance. Both occurrences placed the unit in] Action Statement 9 of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1. There was no danger to the 0 6 health and safety of the public or station personnel. The remaining three Safety 0 Features Actuation System channels were operable. 0 8 80 COMP. VALVE SUBCODE SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE S (15 (16) R U (14) Z E (13) N SI T E 0 9 B REVISION OCCURRENCE REPORT SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO. EVENT YEAR LER/RO 03 1 0191 Ø L 8 | Ø REPORT NUMBER PRIME COMP. COMPONENT NPRD-4 METHOD ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED EFFEC FORM SUB SUPPLIER HOURS ON PLANT 560 Z (21 Y A (25 C 01010 Ø Y (24) (23 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27 The cause of these occurrences can be attributed to a component failure. The bistables are subject to instrument drift. Upon finding BA312 and BA309 out of calibration. they were immediately recalibrated as per the test (ST 5031.01) procedure to within the technical specification limit. The voltage between common and ground will be checked on a monthly basis to ensure an AC voltage does not go undetected. 4 80 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32 (30)OTHER STATUS % POWER B (31) Surveillance Test ST 5031.01 Ø NA Ø 80 44 46 ACTIVITY CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) (35 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE 164) NA NA 80 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) UMBER TYPE 0 (37) Ø Z (38) NA Ø 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) Ø \$ (40) NA Ø 80 DES DE ON DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) Z (42) NA NRC USE ONLY PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION (45) N(44) NA 68 69 8102230 647 PHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 230 Tom Islev DVR 80-205 & 20 ANE OF PREPARER

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-115

DATE OF EVENT: December 5, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Bistables Out of the Technical Specification Allowable Value

<u>Conditions Prior to Occurrence</u>: The unit was in Mode 3 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On December 5, 1980 at 1730 hours during the performance of the SFAS Monthly Test, ST 5031.01 on SFAS Channel 3, the setpoint for the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) low level bistable (BA 312) was found to be out of tolerance. The bistable as found value was 0.552 V and the allowable value is less than or equal to 0.551 V.

On December 6, 1980 at 0750 hours, ST 5031.01 was performed on SFAS Channel 3 to verify operability after troubleshooting to find the cause of the 120 VAC potential between power supply common and ground (see Licensee Event Report NP-33-80-113). The containment pressure 38.4 psia bistable (BA 309) was found out of tolerance. The bistable as found value was 1.428 V and the allowable value is less than or equal to 1.427 V.

See attached tables for additional information.

Both occurrences placed the unit in Action Statement 9 of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1. The action statement requires the inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within one hour. Both bistables were immediately recalibrated per the test procedure (ST 5031.01), removing the station from the action statement.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of these occurrences can be attributed to a component failure. The bistables are subject to instrument drift. The instrument drift was probably aggravated by the 120 VAC problem on the cabinet common.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The remaining three SFAS Channels were operable and capable of performing their designed function.

Corrective Action: Upor finding the BWST level bistable BA 312 and the containment pressure bistable BA 309 out of calibration they were immediately recalibrated as per the test (ST 5030.01) procedure to within the Technical Specification limits.

To be sure that an AC voltage on common does not exist for an extended period of time the voltage between common and ground will be checked on a monthly basis per ST 5031.01, SFAS Monthly Test.

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Failure Data: There have been three previous similar occurrences of bistable drift, see Licensee Event Reports NP-33-78-84 (78-070), NP-33-78-140 (78-119) and NP-33-79-50 (79-045).

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CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BA 309 (After 120 VAC Removed)

	Pressure (psia)	Volts (1)		
Full Range	60	2.00		
As Found	38.55	1.428		1.1
Allowable Value (TS)	∠ 38.52	1.427	△1.875 in. (0.3125%)	(1.25%)
Trip Setpoint	≤ 38.4	1.425		
Trip Setpoint	2 37.65	1.404		1
Zero	0	0.4		

Worst case drift 1.5%

(1) $V = \left(\frac{\text{psia}}{60} \times 1.6\right) + 0.4$

BWST LEVEL (BA	312) (With 120 VAC	on Common)
	Level (inches)	Volts (1)
Full Range	600	2.00
As Found	57	0.552
Allowable Value (TS)	∠ 56.7	0.551
Trip Setpoint	∠ 55.0	0.547
Trip Setpoint	<u>2</u> 49.5	0.532
Allowable Value (TS)	2 48.3	0.529
Zero	0	0.4



Worst case drift 1.25% of full scale

(1)
$$V = \left(\frac{1 \text{ evel (in)}}{600} \times 1.6\right) + 0.4$$