

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
 /0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/9/0/8/8/0/ (8) /1/0/0/7/8/0/ (9)
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On September 8, 1980, with the Unit at 100% power, power to the 120 Volt A.C. /
 /0/3/ / Vital Bus 1-IV was lost contrary to T.S. 3.8.2.1 and reportable by /
 /0/4/ / T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. The incident is not generic. Since redundant instrumentation /
 /0/5/ / was available, the health and safety of the general public were not affected. /
 /0/6/ / /
 /0/7/ / /
 /0/8/ / /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
 CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /E/B/ (11) /X/ (12) /Z/ (13) /G/E/N/E/R/A/ (14) /F/ (15) /Z/ (16)
 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
 LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.
 (17) REPORT NUMBER /8/0/ /-/ /0/8/0/ / \ / /0/3/ /L/ /0/ /1/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
 TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
 /X/ (18) /Z/ (19) /B/ (20) /C/ (21) /0/0/0/6/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /S/2/5/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The supply breaker for the inverter which supplies power to Vital Bus IV was /
 /1/1/ / found in the "Open" position. How the breaker became "Open" could not be /
 /1/2/ / determined. Power to the Vital Bus was restored via the installed transformer. /
 /1/3/ / Power supply to the Vital Bus was later switched to the inverter. /
 /1/4/ / /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /A/ (31) / Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)

/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Description of Event

On September 8, 1980, with the Unit at 100% power, power to the 120 Volt AC Vital Bus 1-IV was lost. The loss of Vital Bus 1-IV caused the "A" steam generator (S/G) feedwater flow signal to go to zero which caused the feed reg. valve for "A" S/G to open. This reduced flow to "B" and "C" S/G's. The reactor tripped due to steam flow/feedwater flow mismatch with low S/G level in "C" steam generator. Loss of a vital bus is contrary to T.S. 3.8.2.1 and reportable by T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Other vital busses were powering redundant instrumentation and protection systems. In addition, protection systems powered by Vital Bus IV fail to a tripped condition and power was restored to Vital Bus IV within 5 minutes after being lost. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The cause of the loss of Vital Bus 1-IV was the opening of the supply breaker to the inverter for Vital Bus 1-IV. It could not be determined how the supply breaker became open but the switch was in the "OPEN" rather than the "TRIPPED" position. Cable pulling was in progress in the vicinity of the inverter at the time of the loss of the Vital Bus. Although it is possible for cable to have fallen on the inverter breaker and opened it, the electrician who was pulling the cable did not think that the cable had come in contact with the switch.

Immediate Corrective Action

Power supply to Vital Bus 1-IV was switched to the installed 480/120 Volt A.C. transformer which restored vital bus power. This was performed within 5 minutes of the loss of the vital bus. After verification by an electrician and an operator that the inverter was in a non-tripped condition with no apparent faults, the inverter was re-energized and loaded with Vital Bus 1-IV.

Scheduled Corrective Action

Since the occurrence is non-repetitive, no scheduled corrective action is required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

None required.

Generic Implications

None