U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-77)	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT	
CONTROL BLOCK:	
0 1 N C B E P 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 0 57 CAT 58 5 7 8 9 L CENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE J0 57 CAT 58 5	
CON'T REPORT L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 0 0 9 0 5 8 0 8 1 0 0 3 8 0 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10	
0 2 During normal surveillance, the "Reactor Low Water Level Initiation" annunciator	
0]] alarmed while all reactor level indications showed normal readings. An immediate	
0 4 investigation revealed the annunciator RPS actuation relay, K7A, was picked up by	
0 5 [reactor level indication switch, 2-B21-LIS-NO31A-1, therefore the "A" RPS trip channel	
0 6 was manually tripped as required by technical specifications. This event did not	
0 7 affect the health or safety of the public.	
Technical Specifications 3.3.3, 6.9.1.9b 7 8	
O 9 10 B 12 B 13 I N S T R U	
. 17 LEBIRO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.	
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)	26
[10] An extensive investigation revealed that excess wire protruding past the switch	
termination was grounded to the switch housing cover. The excess wire was trimmed to	
12 prevent contact with the switch housing cover and the switch and the relay were re-	
1 3 turned to normal operation.	
FACILITY STATUS NOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 1 5 C 28 0 0 2 29 NA A 31 Operator Surveillance	
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) 1 6 7 (33) 7 (33) 7 (33)	
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES (20)	
I <thi< th=""> I I I I<td></td></thi<>	
7 8 9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)	
19 2 42 10 NA 80	
PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY	1-926
7 8 9 10 68 69 80- NAME OF PREPARER A. C. TULLISON, JR. PHONE: 919-457-9521 80-	10 045

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-80-64

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: 9-5-80

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The excess wire protruding past the switch termination of 2-B21-LIS-NO31A-1 was grounded to the switch housing cover.

It is believed a spurious ground in the plant DC electrical system, positive side, produced a closed loop in the relay electrical flowpath that allowed a current flow to bypass the switch contacts and pickup the K7A relay. The K7A relay, which is normally picked up by 2-B21-LIS-NO31A, performed all its required functions, therefore this event occurred in the conservative direction.

The calibration P.T. for this type level switch will be revised to inspect for sufficient clearance between the switch terminal strip and the switch housing cover.

These type switches are functionally tested on a monthly basis and are calibrated quarterly to ensure dependable operability.

This instrumentaton is scheduled for replacement with analog-type instrumentation during a future outage.