NORTHEAST UTILITIES

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June 17, 1981
MP-2-4817



Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director, Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Reportable Occurrence RO-50-336/81-20

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter provides notification of Reportable Occurrence 81-20 pursuant to the requirements of Millstone Unit 2 Appendix A Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.8.h. Based on information provided by Combustion Engineering, the following is forwarded concerning Millstone Unit 2's pressurizer safety valves.

Millstone Unit 2 was designed and constructed with 2-1/2 inch fittings immediately upstream of our Dresser Industries Model 31739A safety valves. These fittings nominally have an inside diameter of 2-1/8 inches or less. The Dresser interface requirement for this model valve is a minimum upstream inside diameter of 2-1/2 inches although this was not explicityly stated on their 1970 interface drawings.

The reduced inlet pipe diameter for these valves will reduce the valve discharge capability and invalidate the assumptions in plant overpressure protection reports and any safety analysis which result in actuation of the pressurizer safety valves. The degree to which pressures exceed those calculated will depend upon the extent of valve performance degradation. While it is not possible to precisely predict the change in discharge capacity, it is believed to be small since the actual bore diameter of the Model 31739A valve is only about 1-7/8 inches. Since the valve bore is the limiting flow area, the only effect a short length upstream restriction will have is to modestly reduce the pressure upstream of the flow nozzle, thereby modestly reducing the critical flow rate.

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Based on the licensing method for Millstone, the calculated required safety valve capacity is more than an order of magnitude below that specified for the plant. It is unlikely that the reduced valve capacity resulting from the smaller inlet piping could have a significant impact in light of the large design margin.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

E. J. Mroczka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/RAP:ws

cc: Director, Office of Management and Program Control, Washington, D. C. (2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, Washington, D. C. 20555