NHC FORM 366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT 'JR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1(1) CONTROL BLOCK: 1 1 1 4 JOL 0 0 0 10 NCBEP 0 10 0 (2)C -1 LICINSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE CON'T 7)0 15 12 REPORT 10 13 12 14 11 18 K8) 01 0 10 1 5 0 1 (6) SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10 [From a review of the maintenance history associated with the 1" drywell nitrogen inlet] 012 isolation valve, 2-CAC-V48, it was determined and subsequently verified by testing 0 3 that the valve would not automatically close within the specified time limit. The 0 4 valve was found to automatically close in approximately 15 minutes instead of the 0 5 required closing time of within 15 seconds. The valve was closed and deactivated in 0 6 accordance with technical specifications. This event did not affect the health and 0 7 Technical Specifications 3.6.3, 6.9.1.9b safety of the public. 0 8 COMP CODE VALVE CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SIEI LIVIEIX F (15) E (16)C (13) V A (14) A (12) (11 0 REVISION OCCURRENCE REPORT SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO CODE TYPE NO. EVENT YEAR ER RO REPORT NUMBER 0 5 0 3 0 8 28 NPRD-4 SUPPLIER ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED EFFECT ON PLANT METHOD TAKEN ACTION HOURS (22 (24) 9 2 (21) 01 01 0 0 Y Y A A 4 9 (26)(25 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) An incorrect solenoid vent valve was installed on the valve operator which prevented 1 0 the operator from properly venting during an automatic valve closure. The correct 1 1 solenoid has been ordered and following receipt, V48 will be repaired and returned 1 2 All involved maintenance personnel have received counselling regarding co service. the significance of this event. 1 4 80 METHOD OF FACILITY (30) (32)OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION N. POWER B (31 Special Review G (28) 01 0 01 NA (29) 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 OF RELEASE RELEASED Z (34) NA 6 2 (33) NA 45 80 44 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER Z (38) 0 0 01 NA 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41 NUMBER 0 0 (40) NA 80 LOSS OF ON DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION TYPE 2 (42) NA PUBLICITY NHC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) SSUED (44) 11111 N NA 80.5 1194 8 106 23 1 (919) 457-9521 M. J. Pastva, Jr. PHONE -NAME OF PREPARER -

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: 5/21/81

The investigation of this event revealed that an incorrect solenoid valve had been ins ailed in the vent line of air operator of CAC-V48 during the last previous maintenance performed on July 11, 1980. CAC-V48 is an air-to-open type valve. 'he incorrect solenoid valve is a normally closed valve that fails closed when de-energized; however, the required solenoid valve, Model No. HP826C71, is a normally open valve that fails open when de-energized, allowing V48 to close on an automatic actuation signal. Interviews with involved maintenance personnel showed they were unaware the wrong solenoid valve had been installed. Following the installation of the wrong solenoid valve, the V48 had been successfully stroked by operator initiation and the valve had been declared operable with a closing time of less than 15 seconds. Although the operator initiated operation was considered acceptable, it has since been determined that the automatic closure feature would not have occurred within the minimum time requirement. This condition existed due to a situation where the manual actuation of the valve did not recreate exactly the same equipment configuration as the automatic signal.

CAC-V48 is a normally closed value which serves to isolate a 1" parallel nitrogen supply line for drywell nitrogen inerting to the normally used 18" supply line isolated by CAC-V6. Due to the unavailability of the required operator solenoid value, the V48 will remain closed and deactivated until a replacement solenoid value is obtained at which time V48 will be repaired, tested for proper actuation and closing capability, and returned to service.

As a result of this event, the involved maintenance personnel have received specific counselling pertaining to:

- 1. Ensuring that proper attention is given when installing replacement parts for existing equipment in accordance with approved, applicable procedures.
- The importance of adequate testing of equipment that has undergone maintenance to ensure the equipment can perform all of its designed functions.

In addition, a check of other similar primary containment isolation value operator solenoid value arrangements was performed which did not reveal any problems. A final corrective action will be to revise the periodic test so that the closure signal for the PT will duplicate the automatic closure signal equipment status. This change will detect the installation of the wrong solenoid.