

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
 /0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/5/2/2/8/1/ (8) /0/6/1/8/8/1/ (9)
 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On May 22, 1981, with the Unit in Mode 1 two snubbers were found inoperable on /
 /0/3/ / main steam pipe 32"-SHP-58-601 which leads from Steam Generator 1B to the 40" /
 /0/4/ / manifold. Snubber 1-SHP-HSS-226 had a loose nut on the connecting stud bolt and /
 /0/5/ / snubber 1-SHP-HSS-229 had the stud bolt missing from the front eye of the snubb- /
 /0/6/ / er. This is contrary to T.S. 3.7.10 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /
 /0/7/ / Since these snubbers were downstream of the Main Steam trip and Non-return /
 /0/8/ / valves, the health and safety of the general public were not affected. /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMP. COMPONENT CODE	VALVE SUBCODE
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LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.			
(17)	/8/1/	/-/	/0/4/5/	/ \ /	/0/3/	/L/	/-/	/0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME SUPPLIER	COMP. MANUFACTURER
/A/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/L/ (25)	/G/2/5/5/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The causes of the loose nut on 1-SHP-HSS-226 and the missing stud bolt on 1-SHP- /
 /1/1/ / HSS-229 are unknown. Within 72 hours of discovery, the loose nut was tightened /
 /1/2/ / and the stud bolt was replaced. /
 /1/3/ / /
 /1/4/ / /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
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/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /B/ (31) / Personnel Observation /

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
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/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
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/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
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/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
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/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
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/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Description of Event

On May 22, 1981, with the Unit in Mode I, two snubbers were found inoperable on Main Steam pipe 32"-SHP-58-601 which leads from Steam Generator 1B to the 40" manifold. Snubber 1-SHP-HSS-226 had a loose nut on the connecting stud bolt and snubber 1-SHP-HSS-229 had the stud bolt missing from the front eye of the snubber. Snubber 1-SHP-HSS-226 was changed from a 2½" to a 5" snubber on March 24, 1981 and 1-SHP-HSS-229 was changed from a 2½" to a 5" snubber on March 23, 1981 to comply with a recent design change.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Both snubbers are located downstream of the main steam trip and non-return valves in the Unit 1 Mechanical Equipment room. If a design basis earthquake had occurred and the steam piping had ruptured in the vicinity of these snubbers the plant and containment would be protected by the non-return valves. Hence, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

It is not known how the nut became loose on 1-SHP-HSS-226 between March 24, 1981 and May 23, 1981 nor how the stud bolt was removed from 1-SHP-HSS-229 between March 23, 1981 and May 22, 1981.

Immediate Corrective Action

Upon discovery of the incorrect mounting of these snubbers, Emergency Maintenance Requests were submitted and the corrections were made within the same day. All snubbers in Environmental Zone 4 (Service Building) were visually inspected and no additional problems were found.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The next surveillance interval for Hydraulic Snubbers Accessible for Visual Inspection during Reactor Operation will not be updated to reflect the inoperability of these snubbers since the snubbers themselves were operable but not capable of performing their intended function as a result of connection deficiencies. Vibration was determined not to be the cause.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.