Washington Public Power Supply System
A JOINT OPERATING AGENCY

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May 20, 1981
G03-81-2002

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
1990 N. California Boulevard
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. B. H. Faulkenberry
Chief, Reactor Construction Projects Branch

Gentlemen:

Subject: PROJECT NOS. 3 AND 5
NRC INSPECTION OF WNP-3 AND WNP-5
DOCKET NUMBERS 50-508 AND 50-509
FINAL REPORT OF POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e)
FIELD FABRICATED REINFORCING STEEL
NCR 3032 WRITTEN BY J. A. JONES

References: 1) Supply System Record of Telecon, J. C. Lockhart to D. Kirsch, dated April 28, 1981.

2) Supply System Record of Telecon, J. Puzauskas to R. Dodds and D. Kirsch, dated May 1, 1981.

3) Supply System Record of Telecon, J. C. Lockhart to D. Kirsch, dated May 12, 1981.

During an Ebasco audit of J. A. Jones in March of 1981 it was found that the contractor had not visually inspected all Field Fab Requests (FFR) of rebar as required by their QC procedure.

The contractor initiated a stop work order on March 24, 1981 and initiated NCR 3032. This NCR was received by Ebasco on March 26, 1981. On April 28, 1981, telecon, Reference 1, was made. On May 1, 1981, telecon, Reference 2, was made stating size of bars and that 16 concrete placements were involved.

Ebasco Engineering has now determined that this failure to inspect all field fab rebar is not reportable as defined by 10CFR50.55(e). This was based on the bulk of the bars being surface vertical and horizontal in mass concrete where bend lengths are not critical, some being used as radial bars where no bends were required on the bending machine, and others being simply tie bars to hold vertical and horizontal bars in place during concrete placing activities.

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Of the 480 bars identified on NCR 3032, only 34 are of critical nature by function. These bars were bent due to interference with embeds in respective placements. They are dowels provided as a part of embedment for upper bars in upper placements. In the analysis Engineering considered these bars to fail 100% at the bends and determined that these 34 bars do satisfy the design intended function without the bend lengths.

In addition to the above analysis all these bars were inspected for location, size and configuration before embedment. This would have prevented a bar with 100% failure from being embedded. In reviewing 12 FFRs where bars were bent and inspected, no defects were found, the Engineer deemed it safe to assume that probably no defect existed in any of the involved bars as there is no history of failing bars on the 12 FFRs reviewed that the Contractor QC had inspected.

Should you have any questions or desire further information, please feel free to contact me directly.

Very truly yours,

R. S. Leddick

R. S. Leddick
Program Director, WNP-3/5

cc: D. Smithpeter - BPA
Ebasco - New York
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