U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE — LICENSE NUMBER — LICENSE TYPE — CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/4/2/0/8/1/ (8) /0/5/1/3/8/1/ (9)
DOCKET NUMBER — EVENT DATE — REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On April 20, 1981, with Unit I at 100% power, the pressurizer level channel I /
/0/3/ / (LI-1459A) indicated high and deviated from the average of the other level /
/0/4/ / indications by greater than 3.5%. Since the channel was placed in trip in /
/0/5/ / one hour as required by T.S. 3.3.1.1, and two redundant level protection /
/0/6/ / channels remained available for reactor trip actuation if needed, the public /
/0/7/ / health and safety were not affected. /
/0/8/ / /

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/I/A/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/A/ (13)	/I/N/S/T/R/U/ (14)	/T/ (15)	/Z/ (16)

	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17)		/8/1/ /-/	/0/1/9/	/0/3/	/L/	/-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/E/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/A/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/N/ (25)	/B/0/8/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The cause of this event was instrument drift, a root valve on the condensate /
/1/1/ / pot packing leak, and an isolation valve on pressure transmitter (PT1455) /
/1/2/ / leaking. The level transmitter was recalibrated, the root valve backseated and/
/1/3/ / the leaking isolation valve tightened. The affected transmitter was then /
/1/4/ / returned to service. /

	FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/E/ (28)	/1/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/A/ (31)	/ OPERATOR OBSERVATION /

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/	/Z/ (42)	/ NA /

	PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

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8105190263

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 81-019/03L-0

Description of Event

On April 20, 1981, with Unit I in Mode I at 10[illegible] power, the pressurizer level indication provided by level transmitter (LT-[illegible]9A) deviated by > 3.5% from the average of the other level transmitter indic[illegible]ions. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.3.1.1 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.a.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since two redundant protection channels remained available and the affected level channel was placed in trip within one hour, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

The causes for level transmitter 1459A reading high were the following three problems: instrument drift (worse case was 500 mv high); a root valve on the condensate pot packing leak, and a leaking isolation valve on pressure transmitter 1455. Both pressure transmitter 1455 and the affected level transmitter 1459A have a common tap which caused the leak on one to affect the other. No problems existed with pressure transmitter 1455 and no further problems were found with the affected level transmitter. Both channels were subsequently returned to service.

Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate action was to declare the affected channel inoperable and place it in a trip mode. Subsequent to placing channel I (L-1459A) in the trip mode, the affected transmitter was recalibrated and the leaking root valve on the condensate pot was backseated. Additional action taken prior to returning the loop to service included tightening a leaking isolation drain valve on pressure transmitter P-455.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further action is scheduled.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications to this event.