NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	O H D B S 1 (2)	Ø Ø - Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø - Ø Ø (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)
		LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	CAT

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE	L (6)	Ø 5 Ø 0 Ø 3 4 6 (7)	Ø 3 Ø 9 8 1 (8)	Ø 4 Ø 7 8 1 (9)
			DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-81-16) On 3/9/81 at 1225 hours during the routine performance of Quarterly

0 3 Valve Test ST 5051.13, operators determined that the Train 2 High Pressure Injection/

0 4 Low Pressure Injection (HPI/LPI) Cross-Connect Isolation Valve DH 63 would not open

0 5 from the control room. The Train 2 cross-tie was declared inoperable from the control

0 6 room. The station entered the action statement of T.S. 3.5.2.a. There was no danger

0 7 to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. There would be adequate

0 8 time to manually open this valve locally with a handwheel had it been required.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	S F (11)	E (12)	B (13)	V A L V O P (14)	A (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 1	—	Ø 1 7	/	Ø 3	L	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	N (24)	L (25)	L 2 Ø Ø (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause was a faulty torque switch in the valve operator of DH 63. The switch

1 1 operated in an erratic manner causing a torquing out of the valve with less than the

1 2 setpoint torque applied. Under Maintenance Work Order 81-1770 the switch was replaced.

1 3 At 1500 hours on 3/11/81, ST 5051.13 was successfully performed and control room

1 4 operation of DH 63 was declared operable.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E (28)	Ø Ø 8 (29)	NA	B (31)	Surveillance Test ST 5051.13

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	Ø Ø Ø (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	Ø Ø Ø (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	NA	

DVR 81-034 8104130313

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-16

DATE OF EVENT: March 9, 1981

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: High Pressure Injection (HPI)/Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Cross-Connect Isolation Valve DH 63 inoperable from control room

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 222 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On March 9, 1981 at 1225 hours during the routine performance of ST 5051.13, Exercising of Testable Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Valves Quarterly Test, operators determined that the Train 2 HPI/LPI Cross-Connect Isolation Valve DH 63 would not open from the control room. ECCS Train 2 LPI/HPI cross-tie was declared inoperable from the control room. The station entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.a which states that the inoperable ECCS train must be restored to operable status within 72 hours or the plant must be placed in a hot standby condition within the next 12 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause for the failure of DH 63 was a faulty torque switch. The torque switch operated in an erratic manner, causing a torquing out of the valve with less than the setpoint torque applied to the valve.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Train 1 ECCS was operable. Train 2 was also operable except that it could not be placed in the "piggy-back" mode from the control room. There would be adequate time to manually open this valve locally with the handwheel should that mode be required.

Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work Order 81-1770, the torque switch was replaced. At 1500 hours on March 11, 1981, ST 5051.13 was satisfactorily completed and DH 63 was declared operable. At that time the station was removed from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.a.

Failure Data: A previous torque switch failure was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-79-33 (79-030).

LER #81-017