NORTHEAST UTILITIES
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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February 13, 1981

Docket No. 50-336
A00921

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

References: (1) B. H. Grier letter to W. G. Counsil, dated March 13, 1980, transmitting I&E Bulletin No. 80-06.
(2) W. G. Counsil letter to B. H. Grier, dated June 13, 1980.
(3) W. G. Counsil letter to B. H. Grier, dated October 20, 1980.

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2
I&E Bulletin No. 80-06 - Engineered Safety Features Reset Control

In Reference (1), the NRC Staff requested that Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) investigate concerns related to the reset logic of engineered safety feature (ESF) components.

NNECO responded to the Reference (1) concerns in Reference (2). Included in Reference (2) was a listing of the safety related equipment at Millstone Unit No. 2 and a determination whether the equipment met the Reference (1) acceptance criteria. The Reference (2) listing identified thirty three (33) components which had reset logic which did not conform to the recommendations of Reference (1).

Upon subsequent review of the Reference (2) list of safety related equipment, NNECO determined that the reset logic associated with certain components did not require modifications. These items are described in Reference (3) together with justification for their deletion from the Reference (2) listing.

The items are listed below:

| Item | Equipment Description | Equipment Number | ESF Signals/Channel |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | LPSI Pump | P-42A | SIAS/1 |
| 48 | LPSI Pump | P-42B | SIAS/2 |
| 132 | LPSI Pump | P-42A | SRAS/1 |
| 136 | LPSI Pump | P-42B | SRAS/2 |
| 180 | Steam Generator #1 Feedwater Isolation Valve | HV-5419 | MSI/1 |
| 187 | Steam Generator #2 Feedwater Isolation Valve | HV-5420 | MSI/2 |

In response to the Staff's verbal request, additional justification for the deletion of these items from the Reference (2) listing is hereby provided.

Items 6 and 48

Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps, P-42A and P-42B, start upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). Reset of this ESF accident signal causes no change in the operating mode of the LPSI pumps and is, therefore, of no operational concern. These logic circuits were inadvertantly included in Reference (2).

Items 132 and 136

LPSI pumps P-42A and P-42B are secured upon receipt of a Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal (SRAS). Reset of a SRAS signal will result in the restart of the LPSI pumps. The concern associated with the restart of these pumps would be inadequate suction resulting in pump damage.

NNECO has determined that the restart of the LPSI pumps on reset of a SRAS is not an operational concern. At the time of a SRAS, sufficient water will be available in the containment sump to provide for adequate suction and no pump damage would result.

In addition, as the SRAS occurs some forty (40) minutes into the postuated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the operator will be directly involved in the sequence of events at the time of the SRAS and he will initiate actions to secure the LPSI pumps upon reset of the SRAS. The appropriate operating procedures have been modified to appraise the operator of the equipment operational changes which occur upon SRAS reset.

Items 180 and 187

Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation Valves, HV-5419 and HV-5420, close upon receipt of a main steam isolation signal (MSIS). Reset of the MSIS results in the reopening of these valves.

NNECO has determined that reopening Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation valves HV-5419 and HV-5420 upon reset of the MSIS is of no operational concern. This is based on the fact that no main feedwater will be available to the steam generators as the main steam isolation valves, which also close on a MSIS, isolate steam flow to the main feedwater pump turbines. Loss of steam to the main feedwater pumps will result in the loss of feedwater to the steam generators. Subsequent opening of the feedwater isolation valves upon MSIS reset is, therefore, of no operational concern.

Appropriate operating procedures have been modified to appraise the operator of the equipment operational changes which occur upon MSIS reset.

For the reasons denoted above, NNECO has determined that circuitry modifications to Items 6, 48, 132, 136, 180, and 187 listed herein are not required.

We trust you find this information satisfactory.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

W. G. Counsil
Senior Vice President