NRC FORM 245 **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION** LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) (1)CONTROL BLOCK: 201 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 0 0 II ||| 0 0 GALE 0 LICENSE NUMBER 26 LICENSLE CODE CON'T REPORT 8 31 11 8 0 1 SOUNCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) [0] 2] [At 0645 hours with mode switch in RUN during initial startup following [0] refueling at 46% power, the Rx engineer observed CMFLPD to be greater than FRTP. Attempts to reduce the relative power or adjust the APRMs within 0 4 the required time limit were unsuccessful. The shift foreman was notified 0 5 and plans were made to be less than 25% power within 4 hrs if not cor-0 6 prected. Subsequently adjusted pattern and APRMs at 1004. There were no p 0 7 effects upon public health or safety. This is a repetitive event (LER 50-366/80-91). 0 8 COMP. VALVE CAUSE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE CODE CODE Z A (12) Z IZ X (13) Z 1(14) 1(15) (16) 212 (11 0 9 13 18 19 REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPORT LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO. 0 01013 18111 10 13 LI (17) REPORT NUMBER 32 31 COMPONENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP ACTION FUTURE SHUTDOWN METHOD TACHMENT EFFECT ON PLANT HOURS (22) SUBMITTED MANUFACTURER FORMSUB SUPPLIER 0 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N (24) Z 9 9 9 Z (21) Z (25 Z (20 E (18) H (19 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) [10] [The cause of the event has been attributed to time delays for adjusting [rods, running TIP scans, and processing time for the computer. The engineer continued to adjust the rod pattern and improve the computer 1 2 accuracy until 1004 CST when the APRMs were adjusted as required by Tech 3 Specs. All Rx engineers informed of event in effort to preclude recurrence. 1 4 80 METHOD OF FACILITY OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER Reactor Engineer Observation 0 4 6 29 A (31) C (28) NA 60 ACTIVITY CONTENT 45 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED OF RELEASE Z (33) NA Z (34) NA 80 10 44 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE NA Z 00 0 1 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 0 0 NA 80 LOSS OF OIL DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION 7 (12) NA 10 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY 810323175 DESCRIPTION (45) N f.H 1.13 141 912-367-7781 1 Congin, Sunt Plt

LER #: 50-366/1981-003 Licensee: Georgia Power Company Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report for LER 50-366/1981-003

On 2-23-81, at 0645 hours with the mode switch in RUN during initial startup following unit refueling, operations personnel were attempting to pull control rods to target pattern when the reactor engineer observed that CMFLPD was greater than FRTP. Attempts were made to raise overall power with respect to the local area of high peaking by pulling several rod groups. After updating the base distribution and obtaining a computer analysis the CMFLPD/FRTP was still excessive, and rod groups in the region were inserted to suppress the excessive peaks. At this point TIP traces were obtained from the adjacent channels, and a computer analysis was demanded; however, the two hour time limit required by Tech Specs 3.2.2 had expired. The engineer inserted these rods further and continued to improve the base distribution by TIP traces adjacent to the failed LPRM sensors, and at 1004 hours the APRMs were adjusted to CMFLPD to comply with Tech Specs.

There were no effects upon public health and safety due to this event. This event is repetitive as last reported on LER 50 366/1980 091.

Adjusting the rod pattern to change core parameters is an iterative process involving rod movements, TIP scans, and processing of the data by the computer to calculate the new values. In extreme cases one iteration of the process can take 45 minutes to one hour. Therefore, essentially the engineer has time for two adjustments before the two hour limit has expired. In some cases, as above, the rod pattern changes are insufficient to allow APRM adjustments. These situations generally occur during xenon free startups where less than optimum rod patterns are attained.

All the reactor engineers have been informed of the details of the event with suggestions to preclude further recurrence.