

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE CODE: 011 2 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
 LICENSE NUMBER: 14 13 23 25 37 38 39
 LICENSE TYPE: 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

REPORT SOURCE: 011 L 5 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 7 0 2 0 9 8 1 3 0 3 1 0 8 1 1 5
 SOCKET NUMBER: 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
 EVENT DATE: 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
 REPORT DATE: 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

012 At 2230 while performing SP-317, RCS System Water Inventory Balance, it was dis-
 013 covered that RC drain tank level indication was erratic and prevented determination
 014 of RCS leakrate within the required surveillance frequency. This created a condi-
 015 tion contrary to T.S. 3.4.6.2. Maintenance was initiated and the leakrate was de-
 016 termined at 0400 on 2/10/81, 5.5 hours beyond the surveillance frequency window.
 017 There was no effect upon the health or safety of the general public. This was
 018 the first occurrence of overdue leakrate surveillance and this was the first
 019 report under this Specification.

SYSTEM CODE: C I I 11
 CAUSE CODE: B 12
 CAUSE SUBCODE: A 13
 COMPONENT CODE: I N I S I T I R I U 14
 COMP SUBCODE: I 15
 VALVE SUBCODE: Z 16
 LER NO REPORT NUMBER: 17
 EVENT YEAR: 8 1 1 21 22
 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 1 0 1 9 24 25
 OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 3 28 29
 REPORT TYPE: L 30
 REVISION: 0 31
 ACTION TAKEN: X 32
 FUTURE ACTION: F 33
 EFFECT ON PLANT: Z 34
 SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 35
 HOURS: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 37 38 39 40
 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y 41
 APPROX FORMS: N 42
 PRIME COR SUPPLIER: A 43
 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: L I 1 1 3 1 0 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 The cause of this event is attributed to vapor condensation in the instrument
 111 sensing lines. The lines were blown down and operability was restored. A
 112 modification has been installed to prevent recurrence. (MAR 80-9-8)
 113
 114

FACILITY STATUS: E 23
 N POWER: 1 1 0 1 0 29
 OTHER STATUS: NA 30
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B 31
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Operator observation 32
 ACTIVITY CONTENT: Z 33
 RELEASED AT RELEASE: Z 34
 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA 35
 LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA 36
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: 0 1 0 1 0 37 38 39
 TYPE: Z 40
 DESCRIPTION: NA 41
 PERSONNEL INJURIES: 0 1 0 1 0 42 43 44
 TYPE: NA 45
 DESCRIPTION: NA 46
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: Z 47
 TYPE: NA 48
 DESCRIPTION: NA 49
 PUBLICATION: N 50
 DESCRIPTION: NA 51
 NRC USE ONLY: 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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8108160707

(SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SHEET)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Report No.: 50-302/81-009/03L-0

Facility: Crystal River Unit 3

Report Date: March 10, 1981

Occurrence Date: February 9, 1981

Identification of Occurrence:

Failure to determine Reactor Coolant System leakage within the surveillance frequency required by Technical Specification 4.4.6.2d contrary to Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 1 power operation (100%)

Description of Occurrence:

At 2230 while performing SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance, it was discovered that Reactor Coolant Drain Tank indication was erratic. This prevented accurate determination of the magnitude of the Reactor Coolant System leakrate. Maintenance was initiated and the leakrate was determined at 0400 on February 10, 1981. This was 5.5 hours beyond the allowable surveillance frequency window.

Designation of Apparent Cause:

The cause of this event is attributed to vapor condensation in the instrument sensing lines.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no effect upon the health or safety of the general public.

Corrective Action:

The lines were blown down and operability was restored. A modification has been installed to prevent recurrence. (MAR 80-9-8).

Failure Data:

This was the first occurrence of overdue leakrate surveillance, and this is the first event reported under this Specification.

/rc