

BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY

MEMORANDUM

DATE: January 15, 1981

TO: R. A. Bari

FROM: W. T. Pratt *WTP*

SUBJECT: Some Very Preliminary Results of a Short-Term Analysis (3 week study) of Hydrogen Combustion during Degraded Core Accidents in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant in the Presence of Glow Plugs.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

At the request of the NRR Containment Systems Branch (through the Reactor Systems Branch) an evaluation has been performed on the consequences of H₂ burning during a wide range of degraded core accidents in a PWR ice condenser plant. Use is made of the MARCH computer code⁽¹⁾ to predict the containment response. A major aim of our analysis was to assess the potential benefits (in terms of containment loadings) that might result from the installation of ignition sources (glow plugs) in an ice condenser plant to ensure H₂ burning at low concentration levels. In connection with our analysis, we were specifically requested⁽²⁾ to assume that the installation of glow plugs would lead to the following combustion behavior:

- A. Hydrogen combustion would occur at either of two concentrations, namely, from 10% to completion and from 8% to 4% (both with oxygen concentration > 6.5%).

In addition, we were also requested⁽²⁾ to restrict our analysis to 75% Zr-steam reaction and assess the influence of the following input assumptions:

- B. Burn duration.
- C. Flame propagation between cells.
- D. H₂ source term.

Comparison is made with a study⁽³⁾ conducted at TVA related to the installation of glow plugs in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Sequoyah is a four-loop PWR with an ice condenser containment. The following conclusions of the TVA study are pertinent to the present work:

1. TVA was not able to identify any accident scenario that became worse due to the operation of the igniters (p. 9-2, Volume 2).

8103130177

2. Although the rate of H_2 release predicted for various accidents is very sequence-dependent, TVA considered that the ignition system should be effective for a wide range of accidents and associated release rates (p. 1-4, Volume 2).

Implicit in the first of the above conclusions is the assumption that the H_2 will eventually burn (due to the presence of random ignition sources) and that it is obviously better to ignite it at low concentrations rather than allowing H_2 to build-up to higher concentrations. In this context we were also unable to identify an accident scenario that became worse due to H_2 ignition at low concentrations as opposed to ignition at higher concentrations.

We are, however, unable to support the second of the above conclusions. The TVA analysis consisted of a series of scoping studies based on only one accident sequence, namely, an S_2D . The MARCH code was used to provide the steam and H_2 release rates from the primary system. The release rates were then used as input to the CLASIX⁽⁴⁾ computer code (developed by Offshore Power Systems) to predict the containment response. TVA found from their CLASIX analysis that H_2 burning at low concentrations (those given in Table 1) could be accommodated by the Sequoyah containment assuming the S_2D steam and H_2 release rates. The basic question is: Are the S_2D release rates typical of a wide range of degraded core accidents, hence confirming the effectiveness of the ignition system for a wide range of potential accidents?

From our analysis of a wider range of accidents, we are unable to confirm the typicality of the S_2D release rates. In fact, the TVA S_2D release rates represent a very specific accident sequence in which no passive ECC (as well as active) water was injected into the primary system. This was inconsistent with the fact that the primary system pressure fell below the set point necessary for UHI injection. This is an input option to the MARCH code discussed more fully in the following section. The release rates used by TVA therefore represent the minimum amount of water that can be released from the primary system before core uncover and the start of H_2 production.

The majority of accidents considered at BNL involved far greater steam release than that considered by TVA. Minimizing the steam release maximizes the quantity of ice available to mitigate the consequences of any H_2 burns in the lower compartment. The steam partial pressures in the lower compartment will also be minimized, which in turn makes it easier for the H_2 to attain low burning concentration. A key element of the TVA analysis requires burning of the H_2 as it is released in the lower compartment. To achieve this, low steam partial pressures are necessary together with a fresh supply of O_2 from the upper compartment. High steam partial pressures in the lower compartment can inert the atmosphere resulting in the H_2 burning downstream of the ice in the upper compartment. Also, any interruption of the return air supply from the upper to the lower compartment would prevent H_2 combustion in the lower compartment due to O_2 starvation. It is these basic differences between our analysis and the TVA study that lead us to the conclusion that the present TVA strategy for burning H_2 at low concentrations may not be effective for a wide range of degraded core accidents. In the following section we briefly describe the BNL analysis.

BNL MARCH Analysis

As a starting point to our analysis we obtained from BCL a MARCH input deck⁽⁵⁾ for an S₂D sequence in Sequoyah. This input deck was run at BNL and the output is presented in Figures 1-10. In addition to the specific requests⁽²⁾ noted in the previous section, we also selected a number of other input parameters (Table 1) that could significantly impact the accident progression and its consequences. It was requested⁽²⁾ that we analyze a wider range of accident sequences and Table 2 summarizes the accidents considered. With seven accident sequences under consideration and six critical input assumptions, a full sensitivity study was clearly unrealistic in the time frame available. Representative values were therefore selected for the six input variables (Table 3) and used to generate a base case for each of the accident sequences. For selected accident sequences we then varied some (but not all) input parameters. Table 4 summarizes the cases run at BNL and gives some indication of the ice remaining at the start of significant H₂ production. Detailed output for the cases is presented in Figures 1-140. Results beyond 75% Zr-steam reaction are included for information purposes only and are not used in this study. Note that in Case 1, H₂ was assumed to burn from 4% down to 0%, and that for all other cases the H₂ burn characteristics of Table 1 were used.

The major differences between our assessment and the TVA study are related to the quantity of ice remaining during H₂ generation and the mole fraction of steam in the lower compartment. An inspection of Table 4 shows that there are several accident scenarios in which the ice is completely melted before H₂ generation. A comparison of the detailed output (Figures 1-140) for the various cases also shows significantly lower steam mole fractions in the lower compartment of the S₂D sequence when compared with the other accidents. This is illustrated most dramatically if one compares the steam mole fraction in the lower compartment (Volume 1) for the BCL S₂D case (Figure 3) with the results for a TLMBS case (Figures 123 or 133). The lower steam mole fraction in the S₂D case allows similar rates of H₂ generation to reach a flammable concentration much earlier (and therefore burn smaller quantities of H₂) than for those cases with higher steam mole fractions. For a case with higher steam mole fractions when the H₂ finally does reach a flammable concentration, the total quantity of H₂ present is much larger, which result in a significantly more energetic burn. High steam mole fractions can also completely suppress burning in the lower compartment leaving the H₂ to accumulate and burn in the upper compartment.

It is for the above reasons that we predict higher pressurization of the containment building for certain cases (as seen in the figures) when burning at low concentrations than was calculated by TVA. Consequently, we are unable to confirm that, by ensuring H₂ burning (by use of glow plugs) at low concentrations in an ice condenser plant, containment loadings will be acceptable for a wide range of potential degraded core accidents.

When communicating⁽⁶⁾ the above results to NRC, the following two questions were raised regarding the BNL analysis:

1. UHI in MARCH is modeled as water addition to the bottom of the core when in fact the water is injected to the top of the core. How does this impact the predicted H_2 generation?
2. If ice remains in the chest, does MARCH neglect heat transfer to the spray droplets in the upper compartment?

With regard to the first question it should first be noted that the direction of UHI injection is only of importance to the S_2D sequence. For all other accidents*, the UHI occurs prior to core uncover and all subsequent ECC (both passive or active) is injected to the bottom of the core as modeled in MARCH. However, if we consider the S_2D sequence, the BCL case (Case 1) avoids the problem by preventing UHI injection (although the primary system pressure falls below the set point necessary for injection) after the core reaches its melt temperature. At BNL we allow UHI depending on primary system pressure, not core temperature. Supplying water from below during core uncover (MARCH model) maximizes H_2 generation rates. However, flooding from above (actual UHI) will produce steam in the upper region of the core and hence produce H_2 at a greater rate than if we assume no UHI. We consider that Case 1 (minimum H_2 generation rates) and Case 2 (maximum H_2 generation rates) bracket possible H_2 generation rates for the S_2D sequence. We again emphasize that the direction of UHI is only a problem for the S_2D sequence with an equivalent break area of 2 inches diameter. All other cases were modeled correctly. For example, an S_1D sequence with a 3 inch diameter break involves UHI prior to core uncover and accumulator injection at core uncover.

With regard to the second question, MARCH does indeed neglect heat transfer to the spray droplets in the upper compartment if (and only if) ice remains in the chest. H_2 burns in the upper compartment (if ice remains) may therefore be conservative because the heat sink associated with the water droplets is ignored. At a recent TA meeting⁽⁷⁾ we presented the effect on H_2 burning of spray operation. We summarize our presentation below to give an indication of the effect of considering heat transfer to the water droplets:

- 1) Adiabatic H_2 burn, $\Delta p = 64$ psi,
- 2) Similar burn in presence of spray, $\Delta p = 32$ psi.

However, the MARCH results may not be conservative in other regards. MARCH instantaneously equilibrates the pressures between two cells so that the pressures presented (Figures 1-140) during H_2 burns do not represent an adiabatic burn in an individual compartment. The pressure pulse is shared evenly over both the upper and lower compartments. Again, we emphasize that this question applies only to those cases in which ice remains at the point of H_2 generation. An inspection of Table 4 will indicate those cases in which H_2 burning may occur in the presence of ice.

*With the exception of the TMLB' sequence. In this case, UHI and Accumulator injection occurs after head failure.

We must emphasize that this is a very preliminary study carried out in only 3 weeks. We were not able to investigate the effect of burn duration or the H_2 source term. We consider that MARCH predicts a H_2 -steam release mixture that is weak in terms of H_2 concentration. This is because as the H_2 is generated in the core, it is mixed with the entire quantity of steam in the primary system. For a four-loop plant with a single break in one loop, one would expect the H_2 to mix (apart from diffusion) with steam only in a direct route from the core exit to the break point. If we consider mixing only between the core and break (neglecting the steam content of the other 3 loops), it is possible that the H_2 concentration released to the containment (as predicted by MARCH) could be increased by a factor of 2.5. The role of sequence-dependent diffusion of hydrogen in the primary system requires further investigation. Finally, we were also unable to examine the effect of the air return system (except complete failure - TMLBS, TMLB', and AB). If combustion is to be sustained in the lower compartment, a fresh supply of O_2 from the upper compartment is essential. Any interruption in the air return will suppress burning in the lower compartment leaving the H_2 to accumulate and burn in the upper compartment.

REFERENCES

1. R. D. Wootton and H. I. Avci, "MARCH (Meltdown Accident Response Characteristics) Code Description and User's Manual," NUREG/CR-1711, BMI-2064, October 1980.
2. Private Communication, R. A. Bari (BNL) and C. Tinkler (NRC).
3. "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Core Degradation Program - Hydrogen Study Volumes 1 and 2," TVA, September 1980.
4. A brief description of the CLASIX code is provided in Reference 3.
5. In this short-term study, we were unable to critically review this input deck. It is our understanding that this deck also provided the basis for the TVA analysis and, perhaps, related studies at Sandia National Laboratory. The MARCH code itself is undergoing review at BNL as part of our TA program. Thus, our many reservations, which were communicated to NRC, apply here as well. In addition, in this short-term study, R. D. Gasser made a very preliminary independent assessment of the ice condenser heat transfer performance for a few accident sequences and found that the results were consistent with MARCH code predictions.
6. Telephone Conversation: W. T. Pratt (BNL) and C. Tinkler (NRC); W. Butler, J. Meyer and J. Long of NRC also participating, on December 31, 1980.
7. "TA Role in Resolution of Issues Important to the Z/IP Mitigation Feature Program," Meeting held at NRC on October 28, 1980.

TABLE 1
INPUT PARAMETERS

H₂ BURN CHARACTERISTICS

- BURN CONCENTRATIONS:
 - 10% → 0%
 - 8% → 4%
- BURN DURATION
- FLAME PROPAGATION BETWEEN CELLS

PRIMARY SYSTEM MODEL

- ECC OPERATION (PASSIVE AND ACTIVE)
AFTER CORE REACHES MELT TEMPERATURE
- BREAK FLOW MODEL:
 - FLOW FROM STEAM SPACE
 - FLOW FROM WATER REGION

TABLE 2
ACCIDENT SEQUENCES CONSIDERED

SEQUENCE	COMMENTS
S ₂ D	SMALL BREAK LOCA (2 INCH DIA. EQUIV. BREAK) WITH FAILURE OF ECC SYSTEMS.
S ₁ D	SMALL BREAK LOCA (5 INCH DIA. EQUIV. BREAK) WITH FAILURE OF ECC SYSTEMS.
S ₂ H	SMALL BREAK LOCA (2 INCH DIA. EQUIV. BREAK) WITH FAILURE OF ECC IN RECIRCULATION.
S ₁ H	SMALL BREAK LOCA (5 INCH DIA. EQUIV. BREAK) WITH FAILURE OF ECC IN RECIRCULATION.
AB	LARGE BREAK LOCA WITH FAILURE OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO ESFs.
TMLB'	EXTENDED LOSS OF ALL AC POWER AND FAILURE OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER.
TMLBS	EXTENDED LOSS OF ALL AC POWER AND FAILURE OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER WITH INDUCED-LOCA THROUGH FAILURE OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS.

TABLE 3
INPUT PARAMETERS FOR BASE CASES

H₂ BURN CHARACTERISTICS

- H₂ BURN FROM 8% to 4% CONCENTRATION
- 6 SECOND BURN DURATION
- NO BURN PROPAGATION BETWEEN VOLUMES
- NO ADDITIONAL H₂ SOURCE TERM

PRIMARY SYSTEM MODEL

- INJECTION OF ECC AFTER CORE REACHES MELT TEMP.
- STEAM BREAK LOCATION

TABLE 4
CASES CONSIDERED

CASE No.	COMMENTS	ICE LEFT* START H ₂ GENERATION (LB)
1	S ₂ D BCL DECK	1.8×10^6
2	S ₂ D BASE CASE	0
3	S ₂ D BREAK FROM WATER SPACE. POWER RESTORED AT 89 MIN.	1.8×10^6
4	S ₂ D H ₂ BURN FROM 10% to 0%. BREAK FROM WATER SPACE. POWER RESTORED AT 89 MIN.	1.8×10^6
5	S ₁ D BASE CASE	0
6	S ₁ D BREAK FROM WATER SPACE	1×10^6
7	S ₂ H BASE CASE	0
8	S ₂ H BREAK FROM WATER SPACE	0
9	S ₁ H BASE CASE	0
10	S ₁ H BREAK FROM WATER SPACE	8×10^5
11	AB BASE CASE	6×10^5
12	TMLB BASE CASE	1.4×10^6
13	TMLBS BASE CASE	0
14	TMLBS POWER RESTORED AT 450 MIN.	,

*INITIAL ICE INVENTORY 2.45×10^6 LB.

SEQUOYAH MARCH ANALYSIS

CASE 1 - FIGURES 1-10
CASE 2 - FIGURES 11-20
CASE 3 - FIGURES 21-30
CASE 4 - FIGURES 31-40
CASE 5 - FIGURES 41-50
CASE 6 - FIGURES 51-60
CASE 7 - FIGURES 61-70
CASE 8 - FIGURES 71-80
CASE 9 - FIGURES 81-90
CASE 10 - FIGURES 91-100
CASE 11 - FIGURES 101-110
CASE 12 - FIGURES 111-120
CASE 13 - FIGURES 121-130
CASE 14 - FIGURES 131-140

THE FOLLOWING UNITS ARE USED IN THE OUTPUT


PRESSURE - PSIA

TEMPERATURE - °F

VOLUME NO. 1 IS THE LOWER COMPARTMENT.

VOLUME NO. 2 IS THE UPPER COMPARTMENT.

CASE I SEQUOYAH S2D (BCL DECK)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 1





FIGURE 3




VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 4

PLOT 1 11:58:48 WFO 15 JAN 1981 28-DIGITIZER, MONOMORPHIC DISK 8.2


CASE 1 SEQUOYAH S2D (BCL DETK)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 6

CASE 1 SEQUOYAH S2D (BCL DETK)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 7






FIGURE 8



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 10


SEQUOYAH S2D STEAM BREAK (CASE2)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 11


SEQUOYAH S2D STEAM BREAK (CASE2)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 13


SEQUOYAH S2D STEAM BREAK (CASE 2)



VOLUME NO 1

Figure 14

SEQUOYAH S2D STEAM BREAK (CASE 2)




VOLUME NO 1

FIGURE 15


PLOT 1 10 02 18 WED 17 DEC 1980 208-0130274, B000000000 BISSA-VER 8.3

SEQUOYAH S2D STEAM BREAK (CASE 2)



VOLUME NO. 2


FIGURE 16



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 17

SEQUOYAH S2D STEAM BREAK (CASE2)



VOLUME 19.2

FIGURE 18






FIGURE 19



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 20

SEQUOYAH S2D CASE 3



VOLUME NO 1

FIGURE 21





FIGURE 22

PL013 14.58.33 MON 28 DEC 1960 10.7mmHg 1.0000000 DISPLA 28 8.3

SEQUOYAH 52D CASE 3



VOLUME NO 1

FIGURE 23

SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 3





Figure 24

PLATE 3 14.55.56 NOV 28 DEC. 1960 20-1000000 015500000 0.2


SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 3



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 25

SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 3




VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 27

PL013 14 58 40 MON 24 DEC 1968 208-240000 - BOSTONIAN 0155ALN 276 8 3

SEQUOYAH S2D CASE 3



VOLUME NO 2

FIGURE 28

SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 4





FIGURE 31

SEQUOYAH 52D CASE 4




VOLUME NO 1

FIGURE 32

PLOT 5 14.57.00 MON 28 DEC. 1980 AIR-ZEROINT, BRIDGEMAN DISPLAY VIEW # 2


SEQUOYAH S2D CASE4



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 33

SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 4




VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 3-4

PL01 5 14.37 35 MON 29 JUL 1980 00:27:00, BGS/ANALYST: BGS/PLA v1.0 R.2

SEQUOYAH S2D CASE4




VOLUME NO 1

FIGURE 35


PLT 1 14 56 35 MON 28 DEC, 1980 208-2400001 - BODENSTEIN DISPLA REF 8.2

SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 4



VOLUME NO 2

SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 4




VOLUME: NO. 2

Page 37

PLOT 3 14.57.18 MON 24 DEC 1960 208-240002 - BOSTON-NEW DISCUSSION 8.2

SEQUOYAH S2D CASE 4




VOLUME NO 2

FIGURE 38

Plot 4 14.57.21 Nov 29 DEC. 1980 208-204002, BROWNSVILLE DISSEMINATED 8.2


SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE 4



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 39


SEQUOYAH S₂D CASE4



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 40


SEQUOYAH SID STEAM BREAK (CASE 5)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 4-2

SEQUOYAH SID STEAM BREAK (CASE 5)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 44

PLOT 5 08 08 00 14 0 17 DEC, 1980 J08-0130231 - RADON-WHEN DISPLAY VER B.2

SEQUOYAH SID STEAM BREAK (CASE 5)





Figure 4-5


SEQUOYAH SID STEAM BREAK (CASES)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 46


SEQUOYAH SID STEAM BREAK (CASE 5)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 48


SEQUOYAH SID STEAM BREAK (CASES)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 49


SEQUOYAH SID STEAM BREAK (CASE 5)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 50


SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASE 6)



VOLUME NO. 1


FIGURE 51

SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASE 6)



VOLUME NO. 1


FIGURE 52



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 53

SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASE C)




VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 54

PLOT 5 10.34.51 AM 01.14 PM 1981 200-0130208 - BRUNNEN DISPLA VER 6.2

SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASE 6)




VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 55

PLOT 1 13.50.31 WED 14 JAN 1981 208-0130702, Sequoyah Disposal Unit 8.3


SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASE 6)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 56


SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASEC)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 57


SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASE C)



VOLUME NO 2

Page 58

SEQUOYAH SID WATER BREAK (CASE C)



VOLUME NO 2

Figure 54





FIGURE 60


SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 61


SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 62


SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 63


SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 6A

SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)




VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 65

PLOT 1 09:07:00 TUE 23 DEC 1980 200-0150325 - MODIFIED DISPLAY VER 8.3


SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 66

SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)




VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 67

PLOT 3 08:07:02 TUE 3 23 DEC 1980 208-0130235 - BROOKHAVEN DISSEMINATION 8.3


SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 68


SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 69

SEQUOYAH S2H STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 70

PLOT 2 10.31.56 WD 14 JAN, 1961 200-0110128 - MONITORING DISCUSSION 8.2





Figure 72

PLOT 5 10.34.40 AM 01.11.1981 808-0130728 - BROMOMETHYL DISSOLVING 8.2


SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASE 8)



VOLUME NO 1

Figure 73


SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASE 8)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 74

SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASE 8)




VOLUME NO 1

Figure 75

19.3.108 WED 14 JUN 1968 20-01/1017W, 0135ZLH V(L) A.2


SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASES)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 7E

SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASE 8)




VOLUME NO. 2

Page 77

PLOT 3 13.31.05 40.0 14 mm. 1981 008-0150243, 8800000000 013500.0 0.2


SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASE 8)



VOLUME NO 2

Figure 78


SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASE 8)



VOLUME NO 2

Figure 79


SEQUOYAH S2H WATER BREAK (CASE 8)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 50


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 9)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure S1


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 9)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 32


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 7)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 83


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 4)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 84

SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 9)




VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 85

PLOT 1 ON 04-14 TUES 21 DEC, 1960 208-0150234 - BROWNSVILLE DISTRICT 8-2


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 1)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 26


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 1)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 88


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 9)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 89


SEQUOYAH SIH STEAM BREAK (CASE 1)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 10


SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 91

SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 92





FIGURE 93


SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 1

Case 94


SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 95


SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 96

SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 17





FIGURE 18


SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 99


SEQUOYAH SIH WATER BREAK (CASE 10)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 100

SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)




VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 101

PL01 2 09.12.12 14:01:17 DEC. 1980 200-0130265, 0000000000 0155000000 0.3


SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 102


SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)



VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 103

SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)




VOLUME NO 1

PAGE 104

PLOT 5 09.42.48 WED 17 DEC, 1960 JOB-D1507ES, BRONKHAVEN DISSEMINATION 8.2

SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)




VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 105

PLOT 2 03 44 40 MON 17 DEC 1980 246 51 50227 . 01594.8 V2# 8.2


SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)



VOLUME NO 2

Figure 107


SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 109


SEQUOYAH AB (CASE II)



VOLUME NO. 2

Page 110

SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE 12)




VOLUME NO. 1

Figure III


PL01 3 15.08.76 MON 23 DEC. 1980 800-013076J, BIRMINGHAM DISSEMINATED 8.3

SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE 12)



VOLUME NO. 1


FIGURE 112



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 113


SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE 12)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 114


SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE 12)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 115


SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE 12)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 116


SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE12)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 117


SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE 12)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 118


SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE 12)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 119

SEQUOYAH TMLB (CASE12)



VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 120

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE 13)





Figure 122

VOLUME NO. 1


SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE 13)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 123


SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE 13)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 124

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE 13)




VOLUME NO 1

CASE 125

Plot 2 10.04.07 WED 17 DEC 1980 208-0130780 - PROXIMITY DISPLAY VER 8.2

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE 13)




VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 127

PL 075 10-04-09 WD 19 DEC. 1980 JAH-01302AD, BARROW AREA N 0154N W 016 E 2

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE 13)




VOLUME NO. 2

Figure 128

PLOT 4 10 04 11 MTD 13 DEC, 1960 JMB-0110280 - BRIDGMAN DISSEMINATED 8.2

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE 13)




VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 129

PLOT 5 10.04.15 MED 17 DEC. 1980 XRB-01301260 , BROMOPHEN 015534A VER 8.2

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (CASE13)




VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 130

CASE 14

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 150 MIN)




VOLUME NO. 1

Figure 131

CASE 14-

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)




VOLUME NO 1

Figure 132

CASE 14


SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)



VOLUME NO. 1


Page 133

CASE 14 SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)



CASE 14

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)



VOLUME NO. 1

FIGURE 135









IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)












IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)



CASE 14-

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)




VOLUME NO. 2

PAGE 136

CASE 14

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)




VOLUME NO. 2

Page 137

CASE 14

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)



VOLUME NO. 2

FIGURE 138

CASE 14

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)




Figure 139

CASE 14

SEQUOYAH TMLBS (POWER RESTORED 450 MIN)




Figure 140

VOLUME NO 2

DISTRIBUTION FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION DATED

MAR 4 1981

(BN-81-03)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
LB#1 Rdg
DEisenhut/RPurple
BJYoungblood
RBirkel
MRushbrook
ASchwencer
JMiller
FMiraglia
RVollmer
TMurley
DRoss
FSchroeder
JKnight
VNoonan
RHartfield, MPA
OELD
OIE (3)
TERA
PDR
NSIC
TIC
ACRS (16)
HDenton/ECASE
PPAS (Thompson)
NHughes
Board Notification File(LB#1)
bcc:
WJDricks
VStello
EKetchen
SLewis
JScinto
DRoss
DEisenhut
TSpeis
WButler



BOARD NOTIFICATION
(McGuire 1-2)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel
Docketing and Service Section
Dr. John M. Barry
Diane B. Cohn, Esq.
Dr. Richard F. Cole
Robert M. Lazo, Esq.
J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
William Larry Porter, Esq.
Jesse L. Riley
Mr. David E. Smith
Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke

ACRS Members

Mr. Myer Bender
Dr. Max W. Carbon
Mr. Jesse C. Ebersole
Mr. Harold Etherington
Dr. William Kerr
Dr. Stephen Lawroski
Dr. Harold W. Lewis
Dr. J. Carson Mark
Mr. William M. Mathis
Dr. Dade W. Moeller
Dr. David Okrent
Dr. Milton S. Plesset
Mr. Jeremiah J. Ray
Dr. Paul G. Shewmon
Dr. Chester P. Siess

Mr. Roger Smith