LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
1 1 0 H D B S 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CON'T O 1
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) [0] [NP-33-80-106) On 10/27/80 at 1545 hours, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 1
[0]3 tripped on a shutdown/bypass high pressure trip. Since the non-nuclear instrumentation
[0]4 reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure input signal comes from RPS Channel 1, a chain of
os events occurred which caused RCS pressure to drop to 640 psig. The station entered the
0 6 action statement of T.S. 3.3.1.1, and the failed channel was placed in the tripped con-
0 7 dition within one hour. There was no danger to the public or station personnel. There
was no release of primary coolant and pressure remained within limits.
SYSTEM CODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
17 REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 COMPANY
ACTION PUTURE SHUTDOWN HOURS (22) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER B 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 Ø Ø Ø Ø Y Y 23 N 24 N 25 R 3 6 9 26 B 18 Z 19 35 36 37 40 41 3 42 43 43 44 47 47 47 47 47
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) [1 0 The cause was a loose solder connection in the lead coming from the pressure detector
[1] [element. The lock nut on the pipe between the detector housing and amplifier housing
was loose. The housing had rotated with respect to each other putting a stress on the
wiring soldered connection. Apparently the housing had been bumped by construction
personnel during the past outage. The connection was repaired and RPS Channel 1 operable
7 8 9 FACIL TY STAT JS POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
1 5 C 28 Ø Ø Ø Ø 29 NA ACTIVITY CONTENT ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA NA NA 44 A5
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 1 7 Ø Ø Ø 37 Z 38 NA
7 8 9 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41
1 8 Ø Ø Ø Ø AO NA 80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION 1 9 Z 42 NA
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 8012090533
7 8 9 10 10 Fyt 231 9
DVR 80-192 NAME OF PREPARER John Werner PHONE 419-239-3000, Ext. 231

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-106

DATE OF EVENT: October 27, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Reactor Protection System (RPS) Pressure Transmitter

Failure

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On October 27, 1980 at about 1545 hours, the RPS Channel I pressure indication failed high causing RPS Channel 1 to trip on a shutdown/bypass high pressure trip. Also, because the non-nuclear instrumentation (NNI) reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure input signal was coming from RPS Channel 1, the following occurred: The pressurizer heaters turned off, the spray valve opened, and the power operated relief valve (PORV) received an open signal. Since the PORV block valve, RC11, was closed, the PORV did not open. Upon indication of decreasing RCS pressure due to the open spray valve, the operators manually closed both the spray valve and its block valve. RCS pressure dropped to about 640 pounds. The unit was placed in Action Statement 3 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 which required the failed RPS channel to be tripped within one hour. The channel was tripped in about 30 minutes.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the occurrence was a loose solder connection found in the Channel 1 pressure detector signal lead coming from the pressure detector element. Investigation revealed that the lock nut on the connecting pile between the detector housing and the amplifier housing was loose, enabling one to be rotated with respect to the other. This would put a rotational stress on the soldered connections.

There had been scaffolding installed near the detector during the refueling outage. It appears that construction personnel may have bumped the housing on the detector or amplifier causing a weakening of the soldered connection.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. There was no release of primary coolant and pressure remained in the allowable operating band at all times.

Corrective Action: Within 30 minutes the NNI RCS pressure input signal was changed over to RPS Channel 2, thus restoring all NNI functions lost. Under Maintenance Work Order IC-720-80, the locknut was tightened, the broken pressure transmitter lead was discovered and repaired, a transmitter calibration and time response performed, and the channel returned to service, thus removing the unit from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1. All other containment pressure transmitter locknuts were checked tight, and none found loose.

RPS Channel 1 was declared operable at 0330 hours on October 30, 1980.

LER #80-078

Failure Data: There .ave been no previous failures of this type.

LER #80-078