NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	LICENSEE CODE: OHDBS1	②	LICENSE NUMBER: 00-00000-00	③	LICENSE TYPE: 41111	④	CAT:	⑤	
CON'T 01	REPORT SOURCE: L	⑥	DOCKET NUMBER: 05000346	⑦	EVENT DATE: 062780	⑧	REPORT DATE: 051581	⑨	

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

02 (NP-32-80-09) While evaluating the inaccessible piping systems as required by IE Bulle-
03 tin 79-14, pipe support HCB-40-B1 was found not installed and CCA-8-H15 was found mis-
04 located. Also stress calculation 10A found that loads for supports SR-11, EBB-1-H3, and
05 EBB-1-H4 exceeded their design load. It was determined that the found condition was less
06 conservative than assumed in the accident analysis of the safety analysis report and is
07 being reported under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i. There was no danger to the health
08 and safety of the public or station personnel.

	SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE		COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
09	XX	⑪	B	⑫	C	⑬	SUPORT	⑭	B	⑮	Z	⑯

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	80	—	048	/	01	X	—	2

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS ㉒	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
F	⑱	Z	⑲	Z	⑳	Z	㉑	0000	Y	㉓	N	㉔	Z	㉕	Z999	㉖

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

10 The cause of the 'not installed' and the 'mislocated' pipe supports was an initial
11 construction/installation error. Under FCR 80-091 Supplement 6, HCB-40-B1 will be
12 added and CCA-8-H15 will be designed and relocated to its original position under
13 FCR 80-131, Supplement 3. The problem with the remaining supports was corrected by the
14 addition of support SR-47 under FCR 80-079 Supplement 10.

	FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS ㉚	DISCOVERY		VERY DESCRIPTION ㉜
15	H	㉘	000	㉙	NA	D	㉛	IE Bulletin 79-14

	ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉟	LOCATION OF RELEASE ㊱
16	Z	㉝	Z	㉞	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION ㊴
17	000	㊲	Z	㊳	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER		DESCRIPTION ㊶
18	000	㊵	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸

	TYPE		DESCRIPTION
19	Z	㊷	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED		DESCRIPTION ㊺	NRC USE ONLY
20	N	㊹	NA	

8105220290

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-80-09

DATE OF EVENT: June 27, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Pipe supports HCB-40-B1 and CCA-8-H15 not installed as designed.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: While performing the walkdown and engineering evaluation for inaccessible piping systems required by IE Bulletin 79-14, the following was found:

Pipe support HCB-40-B1 on the component cooling water (CCW) supply to the control rod drive (CRD) mechanism coolers was not installed. This would have left approximately 21 feet of 3 inch pipe between the containment penetration and the isolation valve laterally unrestrained during an earthquake.

Lateral restraint CCA-8-H15 on the pressurizer relief inlet was located about 9 inches from its analyzed location. This discrepancy would have caused an overstressed condition in a welded attachment to this line during an earthquake.

1 On August 1, 1980, while reviewing stress calculation 10A for the main steam line outside of containment, it was found that the support loads for supports SR-11, EBB-1-H3, and EBB-1-H4 exceeded their design load.

During the detailed engineering evaluation of these discrepancies, it was determined that the found condition was less conservative than assumed in the accident analysis of the safety anaylsis report and is being reported under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the occurrence was an initial construction/installation error. HCB-40-B1 was never installed and CCA-8-H15 was mislocated.

1 The cause of the August 1, 1980, finding was a design error by the architect engineer Bechtel Power Corporation.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. These restraints do not affect normal unit operation. Pipe support HCB-40-H1 is only required to resist loads resulting from a design basis earthquake. Lateral restraint CCA-8-H15, in its as-found condition, would not have been overstressed except during a design basis earthquake, since 98% of the restraints design load is seismic.

The August 1, 1980, finding was a problem that was a result of the support loads not being printed out when stress calculation 10A was run for the as-built conditions. This is not a generic problem but unique to stress calculation 10A. Bechtel has reviewed all other stress calculations performed for IE Bulletin 79-14 and found no other calculations where the as-built support loads were not calculated.

Corrective Action: Pipe support HCB-40-B1 will be added under FCR 80-091 Supplement 6. Lateral restraint CCA-8-H15 will be redesigned and relocated to its original position under FCR 80-131 Supplement 3. These discrepancies will be corrected prior to startup from the current refueling outage.

2 A modification was designed and issued as Supplement 10 to FCR 80-079 that added support SR-47 to the main steam line outside of containment. This new support reduces the loads on supports SR-11, EBB-1-H3, and EBB-1-H4 to within acceptable limits.

Failure Data: There have been no previous reported findings where the installation was not per design.

Previous reported findings of pipe support design errors were reported in NP-32-79-08 (79-064), NP-32-79-13 (79-106), and NP-33-79-154 (79-133).

LER #80-048