	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1	T N S N P 1 7 0 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 0 0
CON'T	SOURCE L 6 0 5 10 0 0 3 2 7 7 0 0 3 2 3 8 1 8 0 5 1 5 8 1 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10
0 2	With Unit 1 at 97% power, pressurizer level channels 1-L-68-339, 1-L-68-325C, and
0 3	1-L-326C declared inoperable when erroneous indications were observed. On 4/2/81,
0 4	[1-LI-68-339 was again declared inoperable. On 4/17/81, 1-LI-68-325C and 1-LI-68-326C
0 5	were again declared inoperable. On each occasion, the plant entered the applicable
0 6	laction statement: LCO 3.3.1.1 (7) and LCO 3.3.3.5 (a). There was no effect upon
0 7	public health or safety. No previous occurrences.
0 8	9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
0 9	I A 1 B 12 B 13 I N S T R U 14 T 15 Z 16
	LERIRO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. 17 REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 76 27 28 29 30 31 31 32 32 32 32 34 36 31 31 32 32 33 30 31 32 32 32 34 36 31 31 32 32 33 30 31 32 32 33 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
1 0	The apparent cause of the error was an increased static head in a common sense line due
11	to a condensate reservoir modification made under ECN L5392. When corrective actions
1 2	taken (work plan 9117) failed to correct the conditions, the instrument sense line
1 3	configuration was returned to the original configuration (prior to ECN L5392) and the
110	loops were returned to service.
1 5	STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 DISCOVERY DESCRI
	LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 Z 33 Z 34 NA PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 44 45
7 8	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 30 NA PERSONNEL INJURIES 13
8	O O O O NA
119	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION NA NA
10	PURLICITY SSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NAC USE CIVLY NA 68 69
	Name of Preparer A. M. Wilkey/M. R. Harding Phone (615) 842-8317
81	15190448

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION SQRO-50-327/81041 REVISION 1

During a channel check performed on March 23, 1981, pressurizer level loop 1-L-68-339 was discovered to be indicating approximately 15% lower than redundant channels. The loop was declared inoperable and the associated reactor protection bistable was tripped in accordance with action 7 of LCO 3.3.1.1. Since auxiliary control room loops 1-L-68-325C and 1-L-68-326C shared a common sensing line with 1-L-68-339, they were also checked. After verifying that the two auxiliary control loops were also indicating approximately 15% low, the plant entered action statement "a" of LCO 3.3.3.5.

The error was diagnosed as an increased static head in the common reference leg for the loop transmitters. A modification to this leg had been performed (ECN L5392) to improve the performance of the condensate pot in the reference leg to ensure that the reference leg was maintained. The 15% error was attributed to an accumulation of water in the tubing added by ECN L5392.

To compensate for the increased static head, the pressurizer high level trip bistable setpoint was shifted from 92% to 76%. In addition, temporary scales were installed on main control room indicators to enable operators to obtain direct readings. The auxiliary control room loops were retubed to the sensing line for 1-L-68-335, which did not have the sense line modification (ECN L5392).

On April 2, 1981, a channel check of 1-L-68-339 revealed that loop to be indicating approximately 8% high. Since this indicated that previous corrective action was not adequate, the loop was declared inoperable and the associated bistable tripped in accordance with action statement 7 of LCO 3.3.1.1. A return to the premodification configuration was planned for the next unit outage.

On April 17, 1981, auxiliary control room loops 1-L-68-325C and 1-L-326C were observed to be reading approximately 15% high. The plant again entered action statement "a" of LCO 3.3.3.5.

During the subsequent unit outage, the sense lines for 1-L-68-339, 1-L-68-325C, 1-L-68-326C were returned to their premodification configuration. Since this configuration is susceptible to variations in the reference leg static head, the loops will be monitored closely and refilled as necessary. Since losses of condensate in the reference leg result in higher (than actual) pressurizer level signals, the limiting safety system setting of \$93% will not be compromised.

A design change request has been initiated for a permanent solution to the condensate pot deficiencies for the pressurizer loops.