

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | G | A | E | I | H | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T
01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 | On 4-28-81, the AE conducted a surveillance walkdown of pipe supports |
03 | per IEB 79-14, and it was discovered that supports B21-f30-H007 and |
04 | B21-f30-H004 failed the support functionality criteria for IEB 79-14. |
05 | This is a repetitive occurrence; see LER 50-321/1981-034. No system |
06 | operability was affected. There were no effects on public health or |
07 | safety. Unit 1 was already shutdown for a refueling/torus modification |
08 | outage. |

09 | C | C | 11 | E | 12 | B | 13 | S | U | P | P | O | R | T | 14 | B | 15 | Z | 16 | 20
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
17 | 8 | 1 | 21 | 22 | - | 23 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 24 | 26 | / | 27 | 0 | 1 | 28 | 29 | T | 30 | - | 31 | 0 | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
18 | X | 18 | A | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | Y | 23 | Y | 24 | A | 25 | B | 2 | 0 | 9 | 26 | 47
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The design requirements of the supports were exceeded. The spring in |
11 | support B21-f30-H007 bottomed out, and the U-bolts in support B21-f30- |
12 | H004 were overstressed. The supports will be modified or replaced as |
13 | necessary prior to Unit 1 startup such that the requirements of Tech |
14 | Specs 6.9.1.8.i are satisfied. |

15 | G | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | B | 31 | Surveillance of pipe supports | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

19 | Z | 42 | NA | 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

20 | N | 44 | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
ISSUED DESCRIPTION PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY
NAME OF PREPARER: C. L. Coggin, Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv. PHONE: 912-367-7851
8 0 5 1 3 0 2 3 6

LER #: 50-321/1981-039
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1981-039

On 4-28-81, with Unit 1 shutdown for a refueling/torus modification outage the AE conducted a surveillance walkdown of pipe supports per IEB 79-14. It was discovered that the spring in support B21-f30-H007 had bottomed out, and that the U-bolts in support B21-f30-H004 were overstressed; both supports, therefore, failed the support functionality criteria for IEB 79-14. This is a repetitive occurrence; see LER 50-321/1981-034. No system operability was affected. There were no effects on public health or safety.

The design requirements of the supports were exceeded. The AE is still conducting IEB 79-14 walkdown, and their final recommendations will be implemented. The supports will be modified or replaced as necessary prior to Unit 1 startup.