LICENSEE EVENT REPORT EXHIBIT CONTROL SLOCK: | 1 1 1 1 1 IPLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL RECURED INFORMATION 213 3 3 3 10 101 - 1010101010101010 0 1 1 CONT REMORT Lis 0 | 1 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBAS While performing SP-320, Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps, DHV-111 012 "B" Decay Heat Pump Discharge Throttle Valve, would not control flow in automatic. 0131 This created an event contrary to Tech Spec 3.5.2. DHV-111 did respond in manual 014 control; Decay Heat Loop "A" provided redundancy. There was no effect upon the 015 general public health or safety. This is the first event of this type, and the 016 tenth report under this Specification. 317 013 CODE 1 F NI S 019 E 1(12) E. (13) FUSICA 013 CURS (22 0101010 (3 61 81 CRRECOVE ACTIONS (27 The cause is attributed to air in the sensing line. Operability was restored by 110 venting the sensing line and performing a functional check. The sensing line was 111 vented prior to surveillance for three (3) months; it will be vented monthly until 11:1 permanent corrective actio. ,s implemented. An engineering evaluation of DHV-111 1131 and DHV-110 control method is in progress. (Ref. REI 80-9-3) This revision corrects 114 cause and corrective action. -----CTHER STATUS (30) MARR -----101810 NA B () Operator observation 1 1 5 10 איזיעדע גם דאעבייא (3) NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (35) NA 1 18 10 215: 10 00 (39) 0 (33) ZI(3) NA 0 DESCRIPTION (4" 01(10) NA 1 1 2 11 HOUT (1) 10 NA 10 23. FT. Q. (45 NAC USE CALY NIC NA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 Name of Preparer: lictor D. Be (904) -6486 MONE (SEE ATTACEED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SELET)

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Report No.:	50-302/80-036/03L-1	
Facility:	Crystal River Unit 3	

Report Date: March 10, 1981

Occurrence Date: 27 August 1980

Identification of Occurrence:

Failure to nave two (2) independent ECCS subsystems operable contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 1 power operation (80%).

Description of Occurrence:

At 0300 during performance of SP-320, Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps, it was discovered that DHV-111 "B" Decay Heat Pump Discharge Throttle Valve would not control flow in automatic. DHV-111 did respond in manual control; maintenance actions were initiated.

Designation of Apparent Cause:

The cause is attributed to air in the sensing lines.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no effect upon the general public health and safety. Redundancy was maintained by the "A" Decay Heat Loop.

Corrective Action:

The sensing lines were vented and a functional check was completed. The line was vented prior to surveillance checks for three months; it will be vented monthly until a permanent corrective action is implemented. An engineering evaluation of the control system for DHV-111 and DHV-110 is currently in progress. (Reference REI 80-9-3). This revision corrects cause and corrective action of Revision 0.

Failure Data:

This is the first occurrence for DHV-111, and the tenth report made under this Specification.

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