APPLICATION NO. 59788 (AMENDED)
EXHIBIT NO.

WITNESS: | (SDG\&E - 101) |
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DATE: $\qquad$

# San Diego Gas \& Electric 

## 1982 TEST YEAR

## COST OF CAPITAL AND RATE OF RETURN

## INCLUDING PREPARED TESTIMONY

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

## EXHIBIT (SDG\&E-1)

COST OF CAPITAL AND RATE OF RETURN PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD KORPAN

1. O. Mr. Korpan, what is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
A. The purpose of my testimony in this proceeding is to demonstrate the increased cost of capital in 1982 and 1983 and to substantiate the need for an increase in the authorized rate of return from the level adopted In the Company's last General Rate Case Decision 90405 of June 5, 1979.
2. Q. Would you please explain how the cost of capital for Test Year 1982 was calculated?
A. The cost of capital for the 1982 Test Year was prepared using the same methodology included in the first phase of Application 59788, except that the return on equity was increased to a level necessary to give SDG\&E the opportunity to progress from its current financial situation towards a single $A$ bond rating level by 1984 . The ultimate achievement of this goal will require the completion of SONGS Units 2 and 3 as well as their inclusion in rate base.

The cost of long-term debt, preferred stock and bankers' acceptances were updated to reflect current sssumptions for money $\cos ^{\prime}$-s and happenings subsequent to the 1981 case. Historical data on the coste of capital are provided as background information for the cost estimates through 1983.

In addition, comparisons with the utility
industry by credit rating groups, measurements of market performance, comparisons to other industries, and other analyses and studies are included to substantiate the need for continued improvement in the Company's financial condition.
3. 0 . Mr. Korpan, in past proceedings, your Company has compared itself with other electric or combination companies of similar size for your comparable earnings test. Why have you chosen a different approach?
A. Given the generally mediocre financial condition of the utility industry today, particularly for Companies of comparable financial risk to SDG\&E, It would be ludicrous to measure this Company's financial results against an average of a score of companies which are also suffering. Even if their overall results are somewhat better than $S D G \&$ 's, improvement to that level would be inadequate in terms of the needs of SDG\&E and the industry as a whole.

I have heard the argument that utilities do not compete with industrials for the same investment dollar; that utility stocks are usually purchased strictly for their ct cent dividend and steady annual dividends growth. Industrial stocks, on the other hand, are evaluated for their potential appreciation in market price, with less emphasis placed on dividends, and therefore have a
different purpose in portfolios.
It is true that utility stocks are usually purchased strictly for their dividends and potential dividend growth. Utility investors are painfully aware that there has been little appreciation in stoc prices. However, investors insist on a return consistent with other investment opportunities and a risk premium consistent with their percedtion of the industry. Investors accomplish this return by valuing common stock to provide a yield to approximate opportunity costs, plus a risk premium.

This is a symptom of the industry's 111 s . Insufficient cash reinvestment gear after year results in investors having to rely solely on dividends for return. Exclusive reliance strictly on higher dividends to prop up the Company's stock price is dangerous. In order to continue dividend growth, return on equity must increase commensurately or there will be little earnings left for reinvestment. The resulting need to bolster common equity balances by the issuance of larger and larger numbers of common shares, compounds the dividend problem.

The point is, the utility industry must be in a position to compete with other segments of the financial marketplace or face an eventual financial breakdown.
4. Q. In general terms, Mr. Korpan, why do you think an
increase in the return on equity is necessary?
A. An increase in SnG\&F's authorized return on equity is definitely in order in light of (1) the continued erosion of earnings due to persistently high inflation, (2) increasing cost of money, and (3) the levels of rate of return and return on equity authorized for other California utilities in recent Commission decisions. As substantiated in the exhibits filed with SDG\&E's Amended Application, SDG\&E's financial results are inferior. With continuing earnings erosion, particularly under weak security market conditions, the measurement of a fair and reasonable return on equity on a traditional basis is no longer relevant. In order to finance its construction program at a fair and reasonable cost, the Company must substantally improve its financial condition.

Expeditious treatment of its request is essential to the financial wellbeing of SDG\&E. Substantial rate relief must be received by January 1 , 1982, in order to reverse the steep decline in financial condition profected for 1982 at present rates and in order to finance the necessarily large construction budge..
5. W. Would you please describe the general financial results the Company would achieve if its rate request for 1982 were granted?
A. Yes, Table 1 presents the primary statistics
relating to the Company's rate request. Total
revenues (Line 1) would increase $\$ 227.5$ million
based on the 1982 Test Year, assuming an annualized
increase of $\$ 103.1$ million from the 1981 Test Year
in 1982. The total rate of return on rate base
requested is $13.9 \%$ (Line 5) compared to the $10.59 \%$
currently authorized in D. 90405 . The requested
return on equity is $19 \%$, compared to the $14.50 \%$
allowed in $n .00405$. In view of the Company's poor
quality of earnings (earnings excluding non-cash
credits, such as AFDC), the increases in rate of
return and return on equity are necessary in order
to move toward the goal of improving the Company's
internal cash flow generation. Ultimately, with
regard to cash flow, the Company must be at least
on a comparable basis with the rest of the electric
utility industry. This should be accomplished
after SONGS Units 2 and 3 are in service and
included in rate base.
Weighted average rate base (Line 7 on Table 1)
includes about $\$ 16.4$ million for the debt and
preferred portions of average Construction Work in
Progress (CWIP) associated with the APS/SDG\&E
Interconnection Profect, during . 982 .
Embedded costs (lines 11-13) reflect the
financing assumptions detalled on subsequent
Tables. Higher interest rates will cause embedded
costs to increase through 1982.

The common equity ratio (Line 14) is lower than the Company's goal of reaching $40 \%$ (including leases) in its efforts to achieve a Single A bond rating.

This ratio on Line 14 does not reflect outstanding leases such as Encina 5 in the capital structure, which are considered debt by most analysts and investors. The rating agencies, in particular, include leases as a part of debt in the capital structure in their analysis of a company's bond rating level. As a rule, one would subtract about $3 \%$ from the common equity ratio to reflect the effect of leases for SDG\&E. This means that $43 \%$ is the Company's true goal for the proportion of common equity in the capital structure.
6. n. Mr. Rorpan, you stated that you propose to increase the return on equity from $14.50 \%$ to $19 \%$. Why an increase of this magnitude?
A. Rate base in proportion to total assets is becoming smaller and smaller. This is almost entirely due to the higher and higher proportion of CWIP the Company must carry. In 1975, the proportion of CWIP to rate base was $21 \%$. By 1979 the same ratio reached $41 \%$, and by the end of 1982 , without SONGS completed and in service, this ratio will reach $58 \%$. At the requested rate of return of $13.9 \%$, the real rate of return by 1982 w111 be only $8.80 \%$ in terms of cash return on assests. This means that the Company will receive no cash compensation
for a significant portion of it's capital cost during 1982. As a consequence, the Company must earn a significantly higher return to maintain an acceptable level of cash flow.
7. Q. Is the common equity ratio the only financial goal
to be achieved in your efforts to regain the Single A rating?
A. No. As will be discussed further, there are additional goals which must be reached. Specifically, they are 3 times pretax interest coverage, $40 \%$ internal generation of capital requirements, and maintainence of a steady, competitive dividend growth.

The interrelationship of these objectives has prompted the Company to stress the additional goal of holding its cash construction expenditures (exluding AFDC) to $10 \%$ of total capitalization or less. This is not expected to be achieved until SONGS Units 2 and 3 and the APS/SDG\&E Interconnection Profect are completed and in rate base.

Lower construction expenditures require a lower return on rate base over the long run to achieve the Company's financial goals. The result would be lower cost to the customer.
8. O. Mr. Korpan, would you please elaborate on the Company's past financial results?
A. Yes. Table 2 depicts dismal financial results over the last five years. These dismal results
reflect accelerating money costs, the cost of inflation, high customer growth and high capital needs. The Company's poor quality of earnings is evidenced by a high proportion of AFDC to earnings (Table 2, Line 1), a poor before tax interest coverage (Line 4), and low internal generation of cash (Line 7).

All other parameters are below par, flat, and without direction, with the exception of the common equity ratio (Line 9) which increased from $31.2 \%$ in 1975 (Column A) to $37.2 \%$ ( $34 \%$ including leasas) in 1979. This improvement was caused by (1) acceptable earnings results in 1977, which, although of poor quality, increased retained earnings, and (2) the Company's efforts to improve the ratio through the sale of common stock.

Poor coverage ratios (Lines 4-6), the prospect of high interest rates, weak markets and debenture Indenture restrictions, have sometimes limited debt financings. Improvement in the common stock ratio reduces the amount of leverage inherent in the capital structure. By leverage, I mean the combination of both the amount and cost of debt in the capital structure. These debt factors can change separately, or in combination, and affect the relative amount of leverage in the capital structure. I term this to mean the double leverage concept which points out the weighted cost as the most

Important factor. Reduced leverage decreases the risk associated with the debt and off-balance sheet debt (leases) outstanding and, therefore, improves the prospect of an upgrading. Moreover, the cost of these common sales below book value (see Line 13) is expensive to shareholders and customers alike, as substantiated in subsequent Tables.
9. Q. How would you view these results in terms of investor needs and expectations?
A. The investor view of an investment results from $a$ combination of his perception of past performance and future potential. Investors' expectations were relatively optimistic in the late sixties and early seventies. Results, as I have discussed, are less than satisfactory. No wonder, then, that investors are currently discounting the Company's, and the utility industry's, securities to account for a higher risk which they perceive in SDG\&E's financial future. This makes all security issues more expensive to both SDG\&E's customers and current investors.
10. O. Mr. Korpan, why cannot the Company meet the limitation of $10 \%$ cash construction expenditures to total capitalization?
A. The construction program is comprised of essentially five elements: 1) San Onofre Units 2 and 3 ; 2) connection of new gas and electric customers;
3) improvements in system reliability; 4) the APS/SDG\&E Interconnection Profect; and 5) the cost of mandated programs such as conservation, pollution control, and conversion profects. These components of the construction program cannot be reduced, while at the same time, allow SDG\&E to meet its customers' current and future needs, and satisfy regulatory compliance requirements.

Aside f:om the rising cost of inflation, utilities are faced with continuous additional pressures which impact heavily on the use of capital, including stricter environmental controls and more complex regulatory restrictions, requirements, and restraints. These are positive social needs, but they do little in terms of financial results.
11. 0 . Would you please describe the financial results for SDG\&E without rate relief and the results if the Company is allowed its rate request?
A. Table 3 shows the projected decline in the Company's financial results assuming no rate relief at present rates. From poor results in 1980, 1981 reflects disastrous results, and 1982 is, of course, worse. The 1982 Test Year at proposed rates (Column D) allows some improvement toward financial results comparable with Single A companies, but they still remain below the needed levels. For instance, the Company's financial goals -10-
include pretax coverage 0....times, $40 \%$ of cash construction expendicures generated internally and A common equity ratio of $40 \%$ ( $43 \%$ or more excluding leases). As I mentioned, with the requested relief, the pretax interest coverage shown on Line 4, Column $D$ is 2.98 X ; the percent internal generation is $28.4 \%$; and, the common equity ratio is $37.32 \%$. Sustained financial results at these levels would give the Company optimism for an eventual return to a Single A bond rating during 1984. Financial results at these improved, but sub-Single A bond raring levels, must become a reality (actually earned) in order to demonstrate healthy progress in the interim. The only way to turn investors' expectations around and reduce the element of risk perceived by investors in the Company's securities, is to improve financial results on a sustained basis. Return on equity must be improved dramatically to accomplish this.
12. Q. Ar. Korpan, what is the solution to SDG\&E's financial problems?
A. As 1 have mentioned, SDG\&E has kept its construction budget as low as possible, commensurate with its customers needs and has kept its operating expenses to a minimum. But, the Company's costs rise with the economy as in any other company or industry. This includes the rising cost of money. Return on equity must improve to change investor expectations
about $S D G \& E$ 's financial future. Investors must have evidence that $S D G \& E$ will be able to increase dividends at a competitive rate and support them with earnings. Further, the quality of earnings in terms of cash flow must also improve. The more cash ginerated internally, the less often the Company will need to go to the financial markets for cash.
13. Q. What specific steps is the Company proposing in this to Application improve cash flow?
A. 1) First, the Company has included the debt and preferred equity portions of CWIP for the APS/SDG\&E Interconnection Project in rate base. While the Commission has not, in the past, allowed CWIP in rate base, the Company feels its current proposal represents a new perspective. There are two primary reasons for this: first, the APS/SDG\&E Interconnection Project will have substantial beneficial impact on customer rates by reducing reliance on imported fuel oil, and second, omitting the common equity component of the capital cost creates an incentive to complete the project as expeditiously as possible. Including the debt and preferred equity portions of CWIP in rate base will help relieve the strain caused by the large capital budget by compensating SDG\&E for a portion of the carrying costs. This will also improve the Company's quality of earnings by reducing AFDC,
which provides no cash flow, and by improving internal generation of cash. The energy to be received through this transmission line will replace high cost, fuel oilbased generation which will have a beneficial impact on customer rates.

Other state regulatory bodies have recognized the need to include CWIP in rate base and the importance of providing adec":ate returns. This year, Utah POwer and Light was allowed CWIP in rate base and a $16.8 \%$ return on equity.
2) The second step for improving cash flow is the Company's proposal for a customer connection charge which would substantially reduce construction expenditures. This reduction in cash needs would require fewer and smaller financings over the long run. In addition, a lower level of general revenue would be necessary for the Company to achieve Single A financial results. Furthermore, the connection charge eliminates the need for current customers to pay for the construction cost of new customers. This reduction in construction expenditures would bring the ratio of the 1982 cash budget to total capitalization down from $13.8 \%$ to $11.0 \%$, which is much closer to the Company's 10\% goal.
3) Third, the Company is proposing an attrition allowance, effective January 1,1983, which will offset increases in the cost of doing business
during that year. The effect of the increase will
be ro partially offset the effect of attrition on
internal cash flow and to reduce the negqtive effect of attrition on earnings betweer rate case years.
4) Fourth, costs associated with the CVR Program, PURPA meters and load management (residential peak shift program) are treated in this Application as expense items and are not capitalized.

These items are excluded from rate base and will, therefore, not earn a return. Programs such as these have positive social benefits. But because of SDG\&E's current financial condition, these projects would not be included in the capital budget if they were not required by governing and regu', ting agencies.

The removal of these costs from the construction program will further the Company's objective of reaching a $10 \%$ proportion of cash construction to total capitalization which will in turn make it easier for the Company to reach its other financial objectives. Furthermore, the Company has done well in its conservation efforts and, therefore, should be rewarded with expense treatment for those costs.
5) Fifth, the Company is proposing a more liberal method of determining the depreciation lives of plant in service. Higher depreciation will bring
improved cash flow.
6) Sixth, the Company is proposing an increase in the return on equity, over and above the amount which would otherwise be found appropriate to compensate for the loss of return on rate base due to the sale and lease-back of the Encina 5 power plant.
14. Q. Mr. Korpan, would you please elaborate more on the penalties associated with nigher risk?
A. SDG\&E must compete for funds in the securities markets in order to finance its construction program. As I raentioned, risk manifests itself in the return the investor feels is necessary to safeguard investments.

With the higher costs of debt and preferred stock and saturated market conditions, the difficulties associated with the Company's financing efforts tend to compound. It is difficult, particularly for the lower rated utilities, to obtain 30-year debt nancing because of the investor's fear of risk associated with long-term financing. Interest rates on long-term securities are exhorbitant in weak markets, especially for the weaker rated companies, forcing them to go to shorter maturities in many cases. If at all possible, however, it is more prudent to obtain long-term financing in order to reduce refunding needs and more closely match the life of the assets with the
term of the financing. Shorter maturities mean higher capital refunding requirements sooner, thus compounding the Company's financing needs.
15. Q. Mr. Korpan, would you describe the current and projected financial market conditions and how they affect a Baa/BBB company's ability to finance?
A. In 1980, we have seen a period of historically high interest rates coupled with sharply increased volumes of new debt securities by both government and private sectors. In fact, interest rates are at their highest level since the Civil War when the country's financial environment was in a shambles.

The projected dollar volume of public debt by utilities in 1980 is up 47 percent from 1979, and 1981 is expected to attain the 1980 dollar volume. In addicion, the total public debt volume is up 53 percent over 1979 and is expected to increase further in 1981. This tremendous increase in new issues, coupled with a 42 percent increase in incremental government financing, places a strain on investors' ability to absorb this volume, particularly issues of the weaker rated entities.

The market's inability (or unwillingness) to absorb BBB securities can be demonstrated by several events. In late July 1980, both SDG\&E and Portland General Electric sold $\$ 75$ million of 30 year bonds. While SDG\&E issued at $13-5 / 8$ and had
a $100 \%$ initial reception, Portland General sold only two days later with a 25 basis point increase and had only a 50 initial reception.

In September 1980, four BBB utilities attempted to come to market within two days of each other. Only the first three, Connecticat Light and Power, Western Massachusetts Electric, and Alabama Power were sold. The third issue, Alabama Power, was sold at 80 basis points more than first issue and had only a 30 o initial reception. The fourth issue, Pennsylvania Power, was postponed due to lack of demand and high cost.

In addition to the thin markets for BBB securities, interest rates in 1980 have experienced two historically high peaks which illustrate that the first peak in March/April was not a one time aberration. SDG\&E had to issue 30 year bonds at 16\% in March 1980 and Alabama Power recently postponed a 30 year bond issue planned for December 10, 1980, which would have had a coupon between 17 and $18 \%$. The anticipated large public financings planned for 1981, coupled with doubledigit inflation projections, indicate that higher returns will continue to be required for the same levels of risk. Institutions in particular have begun shifting funds away from long-term debt securities and into equities, due to the large losses experienced on their debt portfolios.

These factors will serve to necessitate high rates for $\operatorname{SDG\& E}$ debt securities and require investors to demand even higher returns on equity in order to receive a premium for the additional risk. It also appears likely that high rates of :- arn for all securities will be necessary for 198? and beyond, even assuming more "normal" markets, since interest rates have continued to trend upward in each succeeding cycle.
16. Q. Before we continue with a more detailed explanation of your remaining Tables Mr. Korpan, do you have anything to add with respect to the Company's need for a higher return?
A. Only to sum up the benefits associated with a higher bond rating. With a higher rating the Company would benefit from lower rates for its customers, improved financing flexibility, improved ability to compete for funds at reasc nable rates, lower cost, and less financing.
17. Q. Mr. Korpan, would you elaborate on the various financial parameters necessary to achieve a Single A rating?
A. The most important parameter is the return on equity. Return on equity is closely associated with the other finarcial parameters, such as coverag?s, internal generation of cash, common equity ratio, and dividend growth, which must be improved in order to give DG\&E the opportunity to achieve a Single A bond rating.

The first, interest coverage, is the most important of the key financial parameters which investors, securities analysts, and rating agencies use to evaluate the financial viability of a company. Coverage is the ratio of earnings to interest and is stated as a multiple of the amount of interest a company pays in a year. Interest coverage represents the margin of safety - the ability to pay debt obligations - available to holders of long-term securities.

Table 4 shows before tax interest coverages on a historical and projected basis for Moody's, the First Mortgage Indenture, and the Debenture Indentures. The trend of Moody's before tax coverage (Column B) has declined since 1976 (Lines 2 through 5). This critical indicator will continue to decline in 1980-1982, as shown on Lines 6-8, unless substantial rate relief is granted in a timely manner, in this case, by January 1, 1982. Moody's before tax coverage it proposed rates on Line 9 is projected to be 2.98 times, and the after tax coverage is estimated at 2.31 times, which is well below the 2.7 times coverage found reasonable in Decision 90405.

In comparison to other utilities in the industry, SDG\&E's interest coverage has been below or at the level of the average of the lowest investment grade category since 1974. Chart 1
compares the pretax coverage experienced by the electric utility industry for the years 1974-1975 using the Utility Compustat II data base. This is the same pretax coverage computation used in Table 4, Column B.

As you can see, the average pretax coverage for straight Single A companies is bntween 2.8 and 3.0 times since 1976. 1974 and 1975 were particularly difficult years for the industry as the data suggests. Based on this data, the Company has established a financial goal of 3 times coverage as the level necessary to be maintained on a sustained basis. This would provide the Company with the opportunity to improve to an investment grade of Single A. Interest coverage can be improved through higher earnings, less leverage, and lower interest rates. As one of the most closely watched financial measures, the importance of interest coverage cannot be understated.
18. Q. Will you also elaborate on internal generation of cash which you also mentioned as important in obtaining a Single A rating?
A. Yes. Internal generation of cash is a parameter that the rating agencies consider crucial. The more cash generated internally, the less pressure there is on outside financing. This is particularly important when construction dollars are large in proportion to total capitalization. Lower outside for constant rate increases to compensate for the increased cost of capital.

Table 5 shows historical and projected capital expenditures and external and internal sources of funds. Since 1975, SDG\&E has averaged only 16 \% internal generation. This distinct lack of cash flow has placed considerable pressure on financing the Company's cash construction program shown in Column C.

The Company has not exceeded a level higher than 208 from 1975 to date, and, at present rates, the Company will not be able to fund all of its day-to-day operations internally, let alone finance its construction. This is evidenced by a negative 31 internal generation in 1981 and a negative 73 \% internal generation in 1982, at present rates.

At proposed rates, the requested rate increase is expected to provide internal generation of cash of $28 \%$ as shown on Line 10 , Column $F$.

This compares to an acceptable level of $40 \%$, as shown on Line 11, Column $F$. The percentage of internal generation which would result from approval of the Company's full rate request for 1982 , is below the optimum level. However, it is acceptable given the anticipated completion of SONGS Units 2 and 3. With SONGS Units 2 and 3 in rate base and earning an acceptable return, the Company should
be able to generate sufficient cash flow to fully achieve its financial goals by 1984. Retirements (Column B) are not included in the computation of the percentage, although to include them is the accepted methodology of the investment community. The amount of retirements in 1982, about $\$ 53$ million (Line 5), are higher than normal and are thus excluded.
19. Q. Mr. Korpan, how does SDG\&E compare with other companies in the industry with respect to internal generation of cash needs?
A. Chart 2 compares percent internal generation of cash for the electric utility industry with SDG\&E. As I mentioned earlier, percent internal generation for SDG\&E has averaged about $16 \%$ since 1974. This compares to a $47 \%$ average for straight AA rated companies and a $42 \%$ average for straight single A companies for the same period. Even straight BBB companits have averaged $30 \%$ over that time frame, which is almost twice the result for SDG\&E.
20. Q. Can you point to any specific reasons for SDG\&E's inordinately low performance during that time?
A. Yes. The primary causes for the low results are high construction budgets, the accelerating cost of money (interest rates on short-term debt in particular) and insufficient revenues to cover associated costs, all of which results in insufficient cash flow. Furthermore, insufficient cash
is also significantly impaired by two regulatory accounting methods used in California which disguise the lack of cash flow as part of earnings levels. The two methods are flow through tax accounting and the use of $A F D C$.

I should emphasize here that the Commission has taken several important regulatory steps to combat the negative effects of inflation and an unstable energy situation in order to give utilities in California a better opportunity to earn their allowed return on equity. Improved ECAC procedures and the Regulatory Lag Plan are examples. However, we have much farther to go.

Security analysts are fully aware of the problems and take into consideration arnings levels for companies which use flow through tax accounting and AFDC in making comparisons with companies which normalize income taxes and include CWIP in rate base. Using analyst language, those companies which normalize taxes and/or include all or a part of CWIP in rate base, generally have a better "quality" of earnings. This means that the cash flows for those companies more closely approximate their earnings levels.

There are two key indicators which are used by utility industry security analysts to evaluate earnings levels for flow through and AFDC companies. They are the effective tax rate and percent of AFDC
to earnings. For instance, SDG\&E's effective tax rate has averaged 38 since 1974. This compares to 178 for flow through companies and 338 for companies which normalize income taxes. SDG\&E's percent of AFDC to earnings has averaged 408 since 1974 in the face of its high level of construction expenditures. This compares to 36 for the rest of the industry during that time.

Another way to measure the effect of flow through tax accounting is to compare the average interest coverage and percent internal generation for those companies which follow this practice against those which normalize income taxes. Charts 3 and 4 clearly indicate the financial advantages of normalizing companies which fare better than flow through companies over the 19741979 time frame. It is easily seen that SDG\&E is well below the industry average.
21. Q. Mr. Korpan, what financial advantages are enjoyed by companies with higher proportions of their cash needs generated internally?
A. As I have discussed before, companies with better cash flow can finance in smaller amounts or less often, or both. This means lesser reliance on short-term debt, and the added ability to be more flexible as to the timing, amount, and type of securities in order to obtain permanent financing at the lowest rates possible. Further, the Company
has on occasion been required to finance securities at shorter maturities than desired. Thus, its capitalization turnover rate will be relatively high in the future. For instance, $\$ 220$ million of long-term debt will have to be refunded over the next decade. This amounts to $30 \%$ of the total long-term debt now outstanding. This relationship would seem appropriate at face value. However, brief analysis eveals that $30 \%$ is extraordinarily high. The proportion should be much lower given SDG\&E's heavy debt financing in recent years.

For various reasons, the Commission has not adopted CWIP in rate base or normalized income taxes; therefore, it is even more important that the return on equity be corrrespondingly higher for SDG\&E to reap the benefits of improved internal cash generation.
22. Q. Would you please elaborate on the common equity ratio which is the third financial parameter you mentioned as important in connection with achieving a single $A$ bond rating?
A. Yes. The common equity ratic is important in terms of a mazgin of safety for the Company's bondholders. Too much debt in the capital structure is an indication that a company is over-leveraged. This is particulary important during these times of high interest rates, especially for a BBB rated company which must pay relatively high
interest rates in any event. Chart 5 compares the common equity ratio for SDG\&E with the electric industry by bond rating groups from 1974-1979. The Company has improved its ratio dramatically since 1974. This was accomplished through the sale of more than 15 million shares of common stock from 1974 through 1979 representing a dilution of more than $100 \%$. The Company sold another 4.5 million shares in 1980 and plans to sell approximately 11 million more in 1981 and 1982. This represents an additional dilution of 358 for the years 1980 through 1982.

The causes for this need are several fold. The Company must continue to provide adequate protection for its debt securities holders in the face of the prospect of further dilution of common stock and the prospect of selling at prices well below book value. The Company is continuing to strive for a 40 \% common equity ratio including leases. Adequate protection means reduced leverage which involves both the amount and cost of debt. SDG\&E should be able to improve its equity ratio with a balanced contribution of earnings and common stock sales at reasonable prices. SDGEE's goal is to accomplish this in the future through more competitive earnings results.
23. Q. Mr. Korpan, can you quantify SDG\&E's historical and projected financings for the years 1975-1982?
A. Yes. Table 6 depicts SDG\&E's financings since 1974 and projected financings for 1980 - 1982. SDG\&E has issued $\$ 219$ million of common stock over the last five years. This amounts to $29 \%$ of long-term financing over that time. Over the next three years (1980-1982) SDG\&E must issue another $\$ 194$ million, about 378 of total financing. A11 of these issues will be below book value, even at proposed rates.

Table 6 also illustrates a disconcerting problem facing SDG\&E which is its high reliance on short-term debt. Since 1974, short-term balances have increased by $\$ 124 \mathrm{million}$. They are expected to increase another $\$ 145$ million, at proposed rates, by the end of 1982. One additional financial parameter which rating agencies watch closely is the proportion of short-term debt to total capitalization. Over-reliance on short-term debt reduces the Company's options because of maximum limits on short-term debt. The reduced financial flexibility can force the Company to market under unfavorable conditions. Rating agencies set a rule of thumb proportion of $5 \%$. The Company's ratio of short-term debt to total capitalization was 118 at the end of 1979 and is expected to be $16 \%$ at the end of 1982 at proposed rates. In view of the high anticipated cost of money
over the next four years, and in viow of the magnitude of financings SDG\&E will find necessary during that time, the Company must be able to compete in the market place for funds. This requires returns on equity at levels high enough to attract funds which would otherwise be invested in other industries.
24. Q. Mr. Kornan, would you comment on the fourth financial objective necessary to achieve a single $A$ bond rating, adequate dividend growth?
A. Yes. It is imperative to maintain soma level of dividend growth in order to keep the Company's common stock price at a competitive level with other companies in the industry, and, just as importantly, to improve its competitive level with other industries.

Public utilities have not provided the returns earned by other industries. A prudent, consistent policy of dividend growth is necessary simply to compete. Chart 6 compares percent dividend growth per share for SDG\&E, the S\&P 400, and the electric industry for the years 1974-1979.

The S\&P 400 represents a cross section of industries across the nation which as a group has not only increased its dividend rate dramatically since 1974 , it has approximated the rate of inflation during that time.

The straight BBB errpanies have shown improve-
ment in 1979, but as a group hyve been inconsistent. The high dividend growth for BBB rated companies in the last few years reflects pressure to sell common stock competitively.

The straight AA and A companies are the most indicative of industry dividend results since most of the companies fall into those two categories. Dividend increases have continued steadily over the time frame but have lagged far behind general inflation and other industries as exemplifieu by the S\&F 400 results. SDG\&E has attempted to stay in line with the electric industry since 1977 when the annual dividend rate was increased from $\$ 1.20$ to $\$ 1.36$ per year. The data shown on Chart 6 reflects dividends declared so that the full effect of that increase was not felt until 1978.
25. O. Mr. Korpan, what is dividend coverage?
A. Dividend coverage is a parameter used by security analysts to measure common dividend protection. The calculation is similar to interest coverage except that depreciation and AFDC are removed from earniny before finding a multiple of dividends paid.

As shown by Table 7, SDG\&E has experienced a decline in dividend coverage compared to the rest of the electric industry. Low dividend coverage increases investor's perception of the risk associated with an invest-
ment in SDCsE common stock, requiring a higher dividend yield to accommodate this risk in proportion to the industry as a whole. In other words, low dividend coverage indicates an impaired ability to pay future dividends.
$2 \epsilon$. Q. Are dividend increases the only way to raise common stock prices?
A. No. Improved earnings would improve investor expectations about the financial future of the Company. This would bring the risk premium portion of the yield downward and thereby increase the price of the stock. Of course, both approaches, higher dividends and better earnings, are used by utilities whenever possible. I am convinced that the market price of SDG\&E's stock would be even worse today if the Company had not also reduced leverage and construction expenditures, in addition to increasing its dividend.

Without adequate earnings, however, stock must be sold at any price to bolster common equity because of insufficient retained earnings. Without growth in market velue, that is, when dividend increases only are available for return oi: investment, a company's dividend payments increase rapidly because a larger number of shares must be issued to make up for the loss of retained earnings and to make up for a lower price per share. This often results in poor dividend coverage. Further,
the Company cannot expect to continue dividend increases indefinitely under these circumstances. The payout ratio, the proportion of dividends to earnings, has been unusually high in recent years due to inadequate earnings. Without sufficient rate relief in 1982 the payout ratio will be negative. This means the Company will, for all intents and purposes, be required to borrow to pay dividends and part of expenses as well.
27. Q. What quantifiable measures did you use to dete mine that the Company's common stock price is too low?
A. There are two basic measures to indicate whether a common price is higher or lower than it should be. The first is the relationship between the market price and book value, called the market to book ratio. If the ratio is below one, then investor expectations are interpreted to be pessimistic as to future results. Sales of common stock below book value are damaging to both investors and customers. Low stock prices require the sale of more stock to obtain the necessary proceeds and higher dividend requirements which lowers the amount of funds available to be reinvested in operations. Investors are aware that a portion of their equity share of the Company is diluted as sales below book continue. Therefore, new shareholders further discount market value knowing the risk to their investment. Conversely, higher
common stock prices avail the Company of additional cash per share, therefore, lowering the total necesaary dividend payments by lowering the number of shares needed to be sold.

Success feeds upon itself. Better earnings and of strong dividend policy will move up the price, making it less costly and less difficult to finance the Company's construction program.
28. Q. How does the Company compare to the utility industry and other industries in terms of market to book value?
A. Chart 7 compares market to book values since 1974 between SDC\&E, the utility industry by bond rating groups and the S\&P 400. The S\&P 400 has averaged better than one since 1974. Public utilities have fared worse in general, although the higher rated companies have fared better than the lower rated companies. This reflects the lower perceived element of risk in the higher rated companies. SDG\&E's market to book ratio has generally held up well in recent years mainly because a portion of SDG\&E's dividends are a return of capital for tax purposes (not currently taxable). In wther words, SDG\&E's price is supportec by poor financial performance. A financially healthy company would have no return of capital.
29. Q. Mr. Korpan, is there a way to quantify the cost to the Company's customers of selling below book
^. Yes, Tables 8 and 9 show the derivation of the reduction in revenue requirements assuming the sale of common stock at book value given the same proceeds from each sale. The proreeds to the Company (Line 3) are divided by the book value at the end of the month prior to the sale (Line 5) to derive the number of shares needed to accomplish a sale at book value. This result is then subtracted from the actual amount of shares sold to arrive at the decrease in shares needed to be sold at book.

The total number of shares needed for the sales at below book valve, given the same proceeds (Table 8, Line 8), multiplied by the dividend rate in 1982 (Line 9), provides the dividend savings with sales at book valve. To achieve the same cash flow to the Company (i.e., given the same internal generation) the Company would have been able to reduce rates by $\$ 18.8$ million on an annual basis in 1982 (Line 12) after grossing up for taxes. For the sake of simplicity, this illustration fails to account for the cumulative effect of the lower number of shares needed to be issued if sold at book value. Table 9 illustrates the savings on an annual basis for the projected common stock sales through 1982 using the same methodology. Revenues could be reduced by another $\$ 7.3$ million given sales at book value.
30. Q. Mr. Korpan, how can SDG\&E mitigate its financial difficulties in the future?
A. As I've mentioned, the Company has taken several steps to alleviate insufficient earnings and cash flow. The prinary solution, however, is to increase the return on equity to a level sufficient to improve interest coverage, the percent internal generation of cash, the common equity ratio, and dividend coverage.

Return on equity is the earnings measure which provides investors and analysts with insight into the dividend and earnings growth potential for any investor owned company. Historical returns are the primary basis for investors' expectations for future earnings and dividends.
31. Q. Mr. Korpa, does SDG\&E usually earn its allowed return on equity?
A. No. Table 10 sets forth the returns authorized by the PUC from 1975-1979 (Column B), the actual returns using the matrix method (Column $C$ ) and the financial return on equity (Column D). The financial return on equity is the ratio of common stock earnings (net income after deducting preferred dividend requirements) to the average of common equity at the beginning and the end of the year. SDG\&E has not been able to earn its authorized return on equity (Column C) in any year except 1977.

However, it should be noted that 1977 was just as weak as any of the other years in terms of quality of earnings and cash flow.

Financial return on equity, Column $D$, has declined steeply during the last two years in spite of rate relief during the middle of 1979.

1980 earnings will experience a further decline due to low sales, higher prices for goods and services, and a much higher than anticipated cost of money. Furthermore, approximately $219 \%$ of 1980 as expected earnings is AFDC, which reflects an impossibly low quality of earnings.

Return on equity at proposed rates (Line 9) is at or exceeds $19 \%$ on both a ratemaking and financial basis. Due to the Company's poor quality of earnings caused by high amounts of AFDC and tax flow through ratemeking policies, the financial return on equity must be increased to a higher level in order to bring cash flow in line on a comparative basis with other companies in the industry.

As I mentioned before, the fact that CWIP is generally not included in rate base requires a higher ratemaking return on equity in order to achieve the necessary cash flow. If rate base includes all or part of CWIP, a lower rate of return and return on equity would be necessary to achieve the same financial results.
32. O. How does SDG\&E's return on equity compare with other utilities and industries?
A. Chart 8 compares financial return on equity for SDG\&E and the electric utility industry by bond rating groups with return on equity for the S\&P 400 .

The S\&P 400 earned returns in excess of $14 \%$ in every year with the exception of 1975 , and reaches a high of $16.7 \%$ in 1979.

The electric industry categorized by bond rating groups have had generally little improvement since 1974. The industry therefore has fallen further behind other investment categories. Electric industry returns have not kept up with inflation, thus we can only expect investors to view electric industry securities as less attractive than other industries in the competition for funds.

The returns for $S D G \& E$ are even less impressive than the electric industry as a whole through 1979 and are expected to fare worse in 1980. Returns in 1981 and 1982 are obviously unacceptable at present rates.

The return on equity for 1982 of $19 \%$ is at the level necessary to achieve the interest coverage and internal generation necessary for the Company to progress toward comparability with Single A companies. In order for SDG\&E and the industry to successfully compete for funds, returns must be
increased to a level commensurate with other
33. Q. How does SDG\&E compare to other California utilities in terms of growth and associated risk?
A. $S D G \& E$ 's financial risk is greater than that associated with SCE and PGandE because it is a much smaller company with a faster growth rate.

SDG\&E has been faced with the financial difficulties associated with its very high customer growth over the last ten years, particularly compared to the larger utilities in California.

Table 11 compares the annual growth rates of SDG\&E, SCE, and PGandE from 1959-1979. In every category, except total operating expense for PGandE, SDG\&E has grown at a faster rate than both companies. The 43\% growth in AFDC for SDG\&E (Line 7) compares to $21 \%$ for SCE and 33\% for PGandE. This is indicative of the poor quality of earnings for SDG\&E compared to the larger utilities. Without AFDC the Company's financial return on equity would have been about 3\% lower compared to a $1 \%$ decrease for the others. SDG\&E's electric and gas sales and customers (lines 13-15) have grown at a substantially higher rate than those of the other companies. This rapid growth, which has occurred in coincidence with a highly inflationary economy, has burdened SDG\&E with a relatively higher financial risk in terms of building and paying for the facilities to meet
the higher demand.

## Lines 5 and 6 show the utilities' growth

 rates for operating revenues and expenses. Operating expenses have grown faster than operating revenues by an annual rate of at least one percientage point over the last ten years for all three companies.SDG\&E must achieve a higher return to accommodate the financial strain of a higher rate of growth.
34. Q. Mr. Korpan, what other methods have you used to analyze the reasonableness of the $19 \%$ return on equity requested for the 1982 Test Year?
A. One approach I used is based on the historical and projected rise in the embedded cost of debt. This approach is shown on Table 12.

It is generally considered that, in the mid-to-late sixties (1965-1969), public utilities were financially healthy and inflation did not pose a serious problem. During this period the inflation rate averaged $3.4 \%$. For the years 19651969, some of SDG\&E's key financial measures averaged as follows: return on equity, 11.78\%; market to book ratio, 1.69 times; before tax coverage, 4.62 times; and embedded cost of debt, 4. $27 \%$. Because of the relative financial stability during this period, the years $1965-1969$ were used as the base period for the analysis.

Debt holders have required higher returns as reflected in SDG\&E's increasing embedded cost of
debt. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that equity holders will at the very least require the same increases for their investment.

Column $C$ shows the difference between the average embedded cost of debt for the roriod 1965-1969 (4.27\%) and the historical and rojected increases in the embedded cost of debt for the period 1970-1983. This calculated difference is then added to the average return on equity for the period 1965-1969 (11.78\%), Column A. An adjusted rate of return is made by adding Columns $A$ and $C$ and is shown in Column D. In 1982, for example, the adjusted return is in the $18 \%$ range, which is a conservative estimate. Equity holders bear more risk than debt holders.

Also, the additional equity needed could be illustrated using the matrix method for calculating interest coverage. It has been shown that the rise in the cost of equity capital must be proportionally higher than the rise in the cost of debt to maintain the same level of interest coverage.

I also investigated the relationship of the authorized return and embedded cost of debt from the Company's 1979 Test Year Decision to our 1982 Test Year results. Lines 1 and 3 , Column B, Table 19, reference the Company's $14.5 \%$ authorized return on equity and the $8.10 \%$ embedded cost of debt. The projected embedded cost of debt for 1982 is $10.57 \%$,
as shown in Column B, Table 12. On this basis the embedded cost of debt is projected to increase by 30.5\%. A 30.5 \% increase in our authorized return on equity of $14.5 \%$ indicates a needed return on equity of approximately 19 for 1982.
35. Q. What return on equity is necessary to achieve the 2.7X interest coverage assumed in Decision 90405?
A. A 22.18 g return on equity, using the matrix method, is necessary to achieve the 2.7 X after tax coverge assumed in Decision 90405 as depicted by Table 13. The $19 \%$ return on equity requested in this proceeding provides a much lower 2.49x after tax coverage. This confirms that the requested $19 \%$ return is insufficient in itself to achieve the Company's goals, and is acceptable only in view of prospects for future improvement.
36. Q. How did you determine the dividend and interst rates for new preferred stock, long-term, and bankers' acceptances for your embedded cost projections?
A. Cost of new preferred stock, new long-term debt and bankers' acceptances are based on projections for 1982 published by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), a nationally known forecasting service. The money rate assumptions used here are based on forecasts included in DRI's monthly publication entitled "The Data Resources Review of the U.S. Economy", Jecember 1982.

The interest rates on new long-term debt are based on DRI's AA bond projections. I added 100 basis points to the projections to accommodate the higher risk associated with SDG\&E's BBB bond rating. For new preferred stock I added 12.5 basis points to the cost of new debt to accommodate the slightly higher cost of preferred stock.

For bankers' acceptances I added 75 basis points to DRI's 3-month prime commercial paper rate projections, once again, to accommodate the higher risk associated with SDG\&E's lower credit rating.

I should mention that the new money rate projections used in the embedded cost estimates described in more detail later in my testimony could be conservative. At about the time of this Application, short-term money rates exceed $20 \%$ and the costs of new longterm debt and preferred stock for triple $B B B$ companies exceed $17 \%$.

Money rates have now reached these levels for the second time this year. There are no real answers as to how long these conditions will last or as to how often these conditions will recur.
37. Q. Would you explain how you determined the embedded cost of preferred stock?
A. Table 14 lists the recorded cost of preferred stock for 1979 and 1980 through 1981 as expected. The embedded cost of preferred stock for 1979 was
8. 20 of shown on Line 15 , Column E. This is very close to the $8.21 \%$ adopted in D. 90405. No preferred stock is planned to be issued in 1980. In 1981, the Company tentatively plans to issue $\$ 25$ million of $\$ 14.375$ Series preference stock. The issuance of this series raises the projected embedded cost of preferred capital stock from the 1979 level of $8.20 \%$ to $8.85 \%$ in 1980 (Line 19, Column E).

In 1982, the Company tentatively plans to issue another $\$ 30$ million of $\$ 14.750$ Series preference stock raising the projected embedded cost to $9.52 \%$ at the end of the year (Line 21, Column E).
38. Q. Mr. Korpan, would you please explain how you arrived at the embedded cost of long-term debt?
A. Table 15 lists the embedded cost of long-term debt for December 31, 1979 recorded. There is no change in methodology in these calculations from previous general rate cases. The embedded cost of long-term debt for 1979 was $8.49 \%$ as shown on Line 29, Column E. This is substantially above the 8.10\% cost adopted in D. 90405. The primary reason for the increase was the 14.85 \% rate incurred on the Foreign Term loans which were issued in 1979.

As far as 1980 is concerned (Table 16), SDG\&E issued two series of First Mortgage Bonds in the amounts of $\$ 50$ million (Series $S$ ) in March, and
$\$ 75$ million (Series $T$ ) in August. The cost of these issues are $16 \%$ and $13-5 / 8 \%$, respectively. The Company also repaid $\$ 30$ million of the Foreign Term loans during 1980 (Line 6).

The embedded cost of long-term debt projected for year end 1980 is 9.18 \% as shown on Line 13, Column E.

In 1981, assuming receipt of the rate increase requested, SDG\&E anticipates only one $\$ 75$ million sale of bonds. The rate of this Series $U$ is assumed to be $14.125 \%$. The projected embedded cost of debt for year end 1981 is projected to be 9.66 (Line 22, Column E).

Table 17 lists the long-term debt financing activity assumed in 1982. The Company plans two \$75 million bond issues, Series V \& W, at coupon rates of 14.625 \% and 15.250 \%, respectively. The Company will also retire its Series $O$ \& $D$ bonds totaling $\$ 52$ million during the year. The projected embedded cost of long-term debt at the end of 1982 is $10.57 \%$ (Line 13, Column E).
39. Q. Would yau describe how you derived the capitalization ratios for common equity, preferred stock, long-term debt, and Bankers' Acceptances?
A. Yes. Table 18 shows the Company's historical capital structure from 1975 through 1979 and projected capita: structure for 1980-82. The proportion of Common Equity shows the same improve-
ment shown on Chart 5. Note the continuing increase in Bankers' Acceptances in proportion to total capitalization shown in Column I, Table 18.

Tables 19 and 20 iist the Company's rates of return as authorized in Decision 90405, 1979 actual results, 1980 and 1981 as expected results (present rates) and 1982 Test Year at present and proposed rates.

Despite the fact that all sales of common stock have been below book value since 1972, SDG\&E continues to issue substantial amounts of common equity. These issues are necessary to finance the Company's ongoing construction program. Specific issues of common stock, both historical and projected, are shown on Tables $8 \& 9$.

The common equity ratio for 1979 recorded, shown in Table 19, is $37.20 \%$ (Line 7 , Column A), compared to the $38.09 \%$ adopted in D. 90405. The major reason for this shortfall is the fact that the final decision came in the middle of 1979. Thus, the full impact of the increase in rates authorized was not experienced until mid1980.

Substantial increases in the cost of money and escalating expenses are projected to erode this ratio even further. Consequently, the common equity ratio calculated for the 1980 as expected is actually below that adopted for 1979 (Line 13 ,

Column $\wedge$ ).
The common equity ratio for 1981 as expected will further erode and the common equity ratio will drop to an obviously unacceptable 24.2 \% (Table 20, Line 1, Column A) in 1982 without rate relief in 1981 and 1982.

SDG\&E believes that the ratio of preferred stock should be in the 128 range and is, therefore, managing to that level. The major reason for this policy is an attempt to reduce the amount of risk inherent in the capital structure. SDG\&E plans preferred stock issues in 1981 and 1982 as I discussed.

As Table 19 demonstrates at Line 9, Column A, the ratio of long-term debt for 1979 recorded was 44.00\%. This is compared to the 44.99 of level adopted in D. 90405. The major reason for the decline is the fact that $\$ 150$ million in debt projected to be sold was cut back to $\$ 65$ million due to an adverse financial condition (i.e., insufficient debenture indenture coverage) in the latter half of 1979. By the end of 1982, the debt ratio is projected to be 43.26 \%. As in the case of common equity, this ratio is lower than adopted in D. 90405 because of the tremendous increase in the proportion of Bankers' Acceptances in the capital structure.

As shown on Table 20, Line 3, Column A, the
debt ratio is projected to increase to 52.32 z at present rates, leaving the Company with a negative matrix interest coverge of 0.56 X . Even at proposed rates, coverage would be only 2.49x.

In D. 90405 the Commission adopted a $10 \%$ cost of Bankers' Acceptances and a $2.76 \%$ proportion in the capital structure (Table 19, Line 4, Columns $B \& A)$. The impact of higher-than-anticipated costs of fuel not only causes cash flow problems but also skews the cost of capital and the rate of return. Therefore, the percentage of Bankers' Acceptances in the 1981 capital structure is $6.67 \%$ (Table 19, Line 16, Column A) and the cost of those acceptances is assumed to be 13.50\%. The resulting weighted cost is 62 basis points higher than the level adopted in D. 90405.

At the end of 1982, the proportion of Bankers' Acceptances in the capital structure is 8.00 at present rates (Table 20, Line 4, Column A) and 6.62 at proposed rates (Line 10, Column A). At the end of 1982, the weighted cost of Bankers' Acceptances is projected to be 74 basis points higher than authorized in 1979.
40. Q. What is the purpose of Table 21?
A. Table 21 teste the sensitivity of the rate of return to various returns on equity. Note that a 50 basis point change in return on equity equates to an 18-19 basis point change in rate of return.

As a rule of thumb, the relationship is about 2.5 to one. Also note that matrix interest coverage changes about 0.03 X for every 50 basis point change in return on equity. As I mentioned, the return on equity must exceed $22 \%$ in order to achieve the $2.7 X$ coverage found reasonable by the Commission in D. 90405.
41. O. Mr. Korpan, are there any other specific comments you would like to make with respect to rate of return?
A. Yes, in 1978 the Company sold and leased back its Encina 5 power plant facility for approximately \$130 million. The Company found it necessary to pursue an alternative source of financing in the face of debenture indenture coverage restrictions.

In fact, the Commission addressed this transaction in its Decision 90405, for the 1979 Test Year. In the discussion of rate or leturn on Page 67, the Commission said the following regarding rate of return and rate base treatments:
"The Commission recognizes also that such a transaction removes a substantial capital investment from utility ownership and therefore from rate base treatment. We do not believe that a company should be penalized because it is denied future earnings on rate base as a result of an action which was clearly beneficial to all parties. We therefore, recognize in setting SDG\&E's return on common equity the need to provide additional earnings to compensate for this loss."

The 1982 average depreciated rate base would have included $\$ 105$ million for Encina 5 if it had
been allowed in the 1982 Test Year. At the Company's requested rate of return of $13.9 \%$ in this proceeding, an additional $\$ 31$ million in revenues would be required using a 2.1 X gross up factor.

In my opinion, a fair and equitable compensation to SDG\&E for this loss would be a one-third share of the lost revenue or about $\$ 10$ million. This equates to about $\$ 4.75$ million in net operating income which requires an additional 0.34 g rate of return and $0,91 \%$ in additonal return on equity using a million. These amounts should be added to the rate of return and return on equity the Commission finds fair and reasonable for the 1982 Test Year. The Commission should also add the appropriate amounts to the rate of return and return on equity for the 1983 attrition allowance.
42. Q. Mr. Korpan, would you explain the financial ramifications of the connection charge which the Company is proposing in this Appli,cation?
A. Yes. SDG\&E's construction program is one reason for it's financial difficulties. As I have explained before, a smaller construction program will make it more feasible to achieve Single A results without additional expense to the ratepayer. As I have already testified at length, the Company's construction program is composed of elements which are needed to maintain the Company's ability to
serve, plus the undertaking of mandated programs.
As discussed in more detail in the connection charge Exhibit (SDG\&E-120), the construction program would be much lower except for the cost of current and anticipated customer additions. The Company is proposing to partially mitigate the financial burden of customer additions on its present customers by charging new customers for the overall cost of placing them in service.

Through this means, the Company will still have the opportunity to eventually achieve Single A results and achieve lower rates for its general customers at the same time. The cumulative effect of the benefit of lower financing needs will further reduce the amount and cost of future financings, lowering rates even further.

I must emphasize that SDG\&E does not expect to achieve Single A results through the connection charge during 1982 or 1983. The cumulative benefits of lower construction costs, combined with the inclusion of SONGS Units 2 and 3 in rate base when complete and in service, should bring the Company to the level of Single A results during 1984. This is assuming that the Company is authorized realistic returns and is able to earn them in the interim.
43. Q. Would you explain Tables $1-A, 1-B$, and $1-C$ included -49-
in the connection charge Exhibit (SDG\&E-102)?
A. Yes. These tables show the effect of the connection charge for 1982 at proposed rates and the effect of the connection charge on the 1983 attrition allowance. As discussed in the attrition allowance Exhibit (SDG\&E-119), the 1983 data reflected in all exhibits is for informational purposes only and does not reflect thee Company's proposed procedures and methodologies reflected therein.

Table l-A compares the nrimary ratemaking parameters (set forth at proposed rates), to the data which would be included in SDG\&E's submittal if connection charges were incorporated.

As shown in Line 3 , the requested annual base revenue increase without connection charges would exceed the requested annual increase with connection charges by about $\$ 32$ million in 1982 (Column E); and the requested annual base revenue increase without connection charges would exceed the requested annual increase with connection charges by about $\$ 16$ million in 1983 under the attrition allowance proposal (Column H). Base revenues are the amount charged to customers for energy usage, i.e., the amount associated with the customers' bills.

As reflected on Lines $4-6$, the reve aue request changes for all departments because the resulting rate of return is maintained the same for each. Since the Company's cash needs in relation to
cash construction expenditures are lower with the connection charge, the necessary rate of return and return on equity (Lines 7 and 8) are reduced by 1.21 \% and 3.138 (Column E), respectively. The 1983 rates of return and return on equity are reduced in about the same magnitude (Column $H$ ).

Embedded costs (Lines 13-15) do not change in 1982 because the difference in cash flow, with and without connection charges, does not necessitate a revision of the financing plan for 1982.

Note, however, the slight decrease in embedded cost in 1983 (Lines 13 and 14, Column H) as the need for financing decreases. These financial benefits will grow in later years as the cumulative effect of the connection charge increases, impacting favorably both the Company and its customers. Table $1-B$ compares earnings and capitalization data at 1982 Test Year proposed rates, with and without connection charges, and, for informational purposes, the 1983 attrition allowance with and without connection charges. To achieve the beneficial impact of reduced internal cash flow needs with connection charges, the Company would be able to trade off significant decreases in the returns on equity (Lines $2 \& 3$ ) and interest coverages (Lines 4-6). Internal generation as a percent of cash construction expenditures (Line 7) remains at $28.4 \%$ for 1982.

For 1983, ratemaking return on equity (Line 3) is held to 1982 levels. Internal generation (Line 7) decreases accordingly.

Construction as a percent of capitalization (Line 8) would decrease to a more favorable 11\% (Column B), and would also improve for 1983.

I must repeat that financial results are not at Single A levels. If these returns are earned, however, the Company stands an excellent chance of achieving Single A results in 1984, with SONGS Units 2 and 3 in rate base and earning a return. Table l-C (Line 14) shows the return on rate base with (12.69\%) and without (13.90\%) the connection charge in 1982, and with (12.90\%) and without (14.31\%) the connection charge in 1983 under the attrition allowance proposal.
44. Q. Mr. Korpan, would you please summarize your testimony and its overall financial implications?
A. Yes. The thrust of my testimony is to substantiate that $S D G \&$ must earn a $19 \%$ return on equity in order to achieve satisfactory improvement in SDG\&E's financial results. This is necessary in order to give SDG\&E the opportunity to achieve Single A performance during 1984, which is predicated on the completion of SONGS Units $2 \& 3$ on a timely basis and their inclusion in rate base and earning a return.

SDG\&E has rarely earned its authorized rate of return over the last 5 years and is not expected to earn its authorized rate of return in 1980 or in 1981.

The Company must suhstantially improve its financial results in order to competitively finance a high, largely inflexible construction budget which is beset by inflation and socially needed, but nonproductive programs.

Improved financial results involves the improvement of several key financial parameters with eventual attainment of Single $A$ results in the face of exorbitant interest rates. They are: interest coverage ( 3 X ), percent internal generation of cash construction (40\%), common equity ratio (438), sustained dividend growth, and a lower proportion of cash construction to total capitalization (10\%).

Cash flow has been a particular problem for SDG\&E due to a combination of insufficient financial results and accounting practices which have deteriorated SDG\&E's quality of earnings. This deterioration has caused poor acceptance of SDG\&E's securities in the marketplace. The poor reception is compounded by overwhelming competition from the rest of the industry, industrial companies, and government securities which have saturated the securities market.

As a BBB rated company, SDG\&E cannot hope to compete effectively except under the most favorable -53-
market conditions. Higher returns and improved cesh flow will allow the Company to offer securities less often and in smaller amounts, and thus improve its acceptance in the marketplace. Improved acceptance through lower perceived risk and fewer financings will improve the market to book ratio which would reduce costs for the Company's customers and shareholders alike.

This Commission has accomplished much to give the Company the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable rate of return, but much more needs to be done. Examples are (1) the inclusion of the debt and preferred equity portions of the APS/SDG\&E Interconnection Project in rate base, (2) approval of the connection charge proposal, (3) approval of the 1983 attrition allowance, (4) expense treatment for mandated conservation and load management programs, (5) approval of liberalized depreciation lives, and (6) approval of a return on ecaity which compensates SDG\&E for the loss of future earnings on the Encina 5 capital investment.

The final solution, however, is a substantial increase in the authorized return on equity for SDG\&E sufficient to attract funds at a reasonable cost in tomorrow's adverse financial marketplace. I am certain that the Commission will see the providence of this request and respond accordingly.
45. Q. Mr. Korpan, does that conclude your Prepared Direct
45. h. Mr. Korpan, does that conciude your prepared Direct Testimony?
A. Yes.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE CHART TITLE ..... PAGE
Introduction1 Pretax Interest Coverage ComparisonIndustry Bond Rating Groups vs. SDG\&E1974 - 1979 Historical, 1980 - 1982ProjectedCapital Expenditures \& Sources of Funds1975 - 1979 Historical, 1980 - 1982ProjectedPercent Internal Generation ComparisonIndustry Bond Rating Groups vs. SDG\&E1974 - 1979 Historical, 1980 - 1982Projected

3 Pretax Interest Coverage ComparisonIndustry vs. SDG\&E (Flow Through vs.Normalized) 1974 - 197984 Percent Internal Generation ComparisonIndustry vs. SDG\&E (Flow Through vs.Normalized) 1974-19799

5 Common Equity Ratio Comparison, Industry Bond Rating Groups vs. SDG\&E 1974-1979Historical, 1980 - 1982 Projected10
TABLE SHART TITLE ..... PAGE
6
Financings Required, 1975 - ..... 1979
Historical, 1980 - 1982 Projected ..... 11
6 Dividend Growth Comparison, S\&P400 and Industry Bond Rating Groupsvs. SDG\&E, 1974 - 1979 Historical,1980-1982 Projected12400 and Industry Bond Rating Groupsvs. SDG\&E, 1974 - 1979 Historical,1980 - 1982 Projected14
Common Stock Issues, Cost of Sales Below Book Value, 1973 - March, 1980 ..... 15
Common Stock Issues, Projected Cost of Sales Below Book Value, 1980-1982 ..... 16
Historical and Projected Return on Equity 1975 - 1979 Historical, 1980-1982 Projected ..... 178 Return on Average Equity ComparisonS\&P 400 and Industry Bond Rating Groupsvs. SDG\&E, 1974 - 1979 Historical, 1980 -1982 Projected18
California Utilities Comparison, Growth Rates, 1969 - 1979 ..... 1912Return on Equity - Embedded CostAnalysis, 1970 - 1979 Recorded, 1980 -1982 Projected2013 Computation of Return on Equity Necessaryto Attain 2.7X Interest Coverage, 1982Pre, osed Rates21
1415
Dividend Coverage Comparison, Electric Industry \& SDG\&E, 1971 - 1979 ..... 13
TABLE CHART TITLE ..... PAGE
10 Projected Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt, 1980 and 1981 ..... 24
17 Projected Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt, 1982 ..... 25
18
Capital Structure, 1975 - 1979 Recorded, 1980 - 1982 Projected ..... 26192021
1979 Authorized Rate of Return vs. 1979 Recorded, 1980 - 1981 As Expected ..... 27
Rate of Return, 1982 Test Year Present and Proposed Rates ..... 28
Cost of Capital at Various Returns on Equity, 1982 Proposed Rates ..... 29

## COST Oi "APITAL AND

 RATE OF RETURN
## INTRODUCTION

The following tables set forth the cost of capital for San Diego Gas \& Electric for the 1982 Test Year. Information is provided on the capital structure and the costs of the capital elements as recorded in 1979 and projected for 1980 As Expected, 1981 As Expected, and 1982 Test Year.

Historical data on the . of capital are provided as background information for the cost estimates through 1982. In addition, comparisons with the utility industry by credit rating groups, measurements of market performance, comparisons to other industries, and other analyses and studies are included to substantiate the need for continued improvement in the Company's financial condition.

A composite cost of capital is established in the exhibit. The requested rate relief is $\$ 227$ million. Realization of the requested rate relief in an expedited manner is essential to progress toward attainment of the Company's primary financial objective of regaining its Single " $A$ " bond rating.

Note: Projected data in these exhibits are based on the following:

1. Data at present rates exclude rate relief in 1981,
2. Proposed rates for 1982 include estimated rate relief in 1981 in the amount of $\$ 100$ million. This is necessary in order to avoid unrealistic skewing of certain financial data for 1982.

TABLE 1
1982 TEST YEAR PATE REQUEST SUMMARY (Millions of Dollars)

LINE NO.

TITLE

| 1. | Total Revenue Increase | \$ | 227.5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. | Electric | \$ | 200.9 |
| 3. | Gas | \$ | 26.4 |
| 4. | Steam | \$ | 0.2 |
| 5. | Composite Rate of Return |  | 13.90\% |
| 6. | Ratemaking Return on Equity |  | 19.00\% |
| 7. | Weighted Average Rate Base | \$ | 1,386.0 |
| 8. | Electric | \$ | 1,213.8 |
| 9. | Gas | \$ | 171.7 |
| 10. | Steam | \$ | 0.5 |
|  | EMBEDDED COSTS: |  |  |
| 11. | Preferred Stock |  | 9.52\% |
| 12. | Long-Term Debt |  | 10.57\% |
| 13. | Bankers' Acceptances |  | 15.41\% |
|  | CAPITALIZATION RATIOS: |  |  |
| 14. | Common Equity |  | 37. $32 \%$ |
| 15. | Preferred Stock |  | 12.80\% |
| 16. | Long-Term Debt |  | 43.26\% |
| 17. | Bankers' Acceptances |  | 6.62\% |
| 18. | Total |  | 100.00\% |

TABLE 2
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC EARNINGS AND CAPITALIZATION DATA 1975-1979


TITLE

1. AFDC \% Earnings
2. Financial Return on Equity (1)
3. Ratemaking Return on Equity
4. Before Tax Interest Coverage
$\underset{\sim}{\infty}$ 5. Debenture Indenture Coverage
5. Matrix Interest Coverage
6. \% Internal Generation(2)
7. Construction \% Capitailzation

CAPITALIZATION RATIOS
9. Common Equity
11. Bankers' Acceptances
12. Long-Term Debt
13. Market to Book Ratio

(1) Simple average.
(2) Percent internal generation of cash construction.

Source: 1979 Annual Report and Statistical Supplement.

TABLE 3
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC
PROJECTED EARNINGS AND CAPITALIZATION DATA
1980-1982

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { LINE } \\ & \text { NO. } \end{aligned}$ | TITLE | $\begin{aligned} & 1980 \\ & \text { AS EXPECTED } \\ & (\mathrm{A}) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1981 \\ \text { AS EXPECTED } \\ (\mathrm{B}) \end{gathered}$ | 1982 TEST YEAR PRESENT RATES $(\mathrm{C})$ | $1982$ <br> TEST YEAR PROPOSED RATES (D) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | AFDC \% Earnings | - | (2.57\%) | (26. ${ }^{-}$ | 51\% |
| 2. | Financial Return on Equity | 3.23\% | (2.57\%) | (26.89\%) | 19.87\% |
| 3. | Ratemaking Return on Equity | 2. $22 \%$ | (12.84\%) | (49.60\%) | 19.00\% |
| 4. | Before Tax Interest Coverage | 1.39X | 1.05 X | 0.33X | 2.98 X |
| 5. | Debenture Indenture Coverage | 1.83X | 0.87 X | (0.15X) | 3.61X |
| 6. | Matrix Interest Coverage | 2.19 X | 2.08X | 1.74X | 2.49X |
| 7. | \% Internal Generation(1) | (11.1\%) | (31.4\%) | (72.8\%) | 28.4\% |
| $\delta$. | Construction \% Capitalization | 11.6\% | 13.1\% | 16.9\% | 13.8\% |
|  | Capitalization Ratios |  |  |  |  |
| 9. | Common Equity | 34.77\% | 32.19\% | 24. $20 \%$ | 37. $32 \%$ |
| 10. | Preferred Stock | 13.07\% | 13.89\% | 15.48\% | 12.80\% |
| 11. | Long-Term Debt | 45.26\% | 47.25\% | 52.32\% | 43.26\% |
| 12. | Bankers' Acceptances | 6.90\% | 6.67\% | 8.00\% | 6.62\% |
| 13. | Market to Book Ratio | 79\% | 103\% | 153\% | 82\% |

(1) Percent internal generation of cash construction.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { LINE } \\ & \text { NO. } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | MOODY'STIMES INTEREST EARNED |  |  | CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | BEFOR | AFTER | IST MORT. | DEBENTURE |
|  | RECORDED | TAX | TAX | INDENTURE | INDENTURE |
|  | (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |

1. 
2. 

1975

1. 66 X
1.76X
2. 38 X
3. 25 X
4. 

1976
1977
2. 20X
2. 22 X
2. 25X
2.17X
2.18X
2.11X
2. 33X
1.66\%
2. 98 X
2.53X
2. 83 X
2. 20X
4.

1978
1979
3. 79 X
2.42 X
5.
(x) atin

PROJECTED PERIOD WITHOUT RATE RELIEF
6.
7.
8. $1982^{(2)}$
1.39X

1. 39 X
3.17X
2. 83X
$1980^{(1)}$
3. 88 X
0.87 X
4. 

1981
(1)
1.05X
1.06X
6. 88
0.80 X
(0.15X)

TEST YEAR AT PROPOSED RATES
9.

1982
2.98X
2. 31X
5. 24X
3.61 X
10. Rating Agency

Guideline 3.00X
(1) As Expected.
(2) Test Year at Present Rates.

CHART :


CAPITAL EXPENDITURES \& SOURCES OF FUNDS 1975-1979 HISTORICAL \& 1980-1982 PROJECTED

|  | $\frac{\text { CAPITAL EXPENDITURES }}{\text { (Millions of Dollars) }}$ |  |  |  | SOURCES OF FUNDS |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LINE | YEAR M | MANDATORY | CONSTRUCTION |  | PERCENT | PERCENT ${ }^{(2)}$ |
| NO. | $\frac{\text { RECORDED PERIOD }}{(\mathrm{A})}$ | $\frac{\text { REFUNDINGS }}{(\mathrm{B})}$ | $\frac{\text { EXPENDITURES }}{(\mathrm{C})}$ | $\frac{\text { TOTAL }}{(D)}$ | $\frac{\text { EXTERNAL }}{(\mathrm{E})}$ | $\frac{\text { INTERNAL }}{(\mathrm{F})}$ |
| 1. | 1975 | \$ 1 | \$128 | \$129 | 87\% | 13\% |
| 2. | 1976 | 1 | 170 | 171 | 80 | 20 |
| 3. | 1977 | 2 | 199 | 201 | 83 | 17 |
| 4. | 1978 | 13 | 207 | 220 | 85 | 15 |
| 5. | 1979 | 53 | 205 | 258 | 85 | 15 |
| 6. | Average | 14 | 182 | 196 | 84 | 16 |
| 7. | 1980 As Expected | 3 (3) | 177 | 180 | 111 | (11) |
| 8. | 1981 As Expected | 3 | 210 | 213 | 131 | (31) |
|  | 1982 Test Year: |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9. | At Present Rates At Proposed Rates | 54 54 | 269 269 | 323 323 | 173 72 | $(73)$ 28 |
| 11. | Rating Agency Guideline - Single A |  |  |  | 60 | 40 |

(1) Exclusive of AFDC.
(2) Percent internal generation of cash construction.
(3) This does not include $\$ 30.0 \mathrm{M}^{2}$ of variable interest rate foreign term loans which were voluntarily refunded in July, August, and September of 1980.

CHART 2



CHART 4



TABLE 6
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC
FINANCINGS REQUIRED
1975-1979 HISTORICAL \& 1980-1982 PROJECTED
(Dollars in Millions)

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { LINE } \\ & \text { NO. } \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{\text { YEAR }}{(A)}$ | LONG-TERM DEBT $(B)$ | LONG-TERM PREFERRED STOCK <br> (C) | FUNDS COMMON STOCK (D) | $\frac{\text { TOTAL }}{(E)}$ | BANK LOANS (F) | SHOR <br> COMMERCIAL <br> PAPER <br> $(G)$ | M FUNDS BANKERS' ACCEPTANCES (H) | $\frac{\text { TOTAL }}{(\mathrm{I})}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | RECORDED PERIOD |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. | 1975 | \$ 62 | \$ - | \$ 15 | \$ 77 | \$ 12 | \$ 5 | \$ 33 | \$ 50 |
| 2. | 1976 | 54 | 26 | 30 | 110 | 15 | 10 | (3) | 22 |
| 3. | 1977 | 94 | 30 | 50 | 174 | (27) | 22 | 16 | 11 |
| 4. | 1978 | 186 (1) | 26 | 72 | 284 | - | (46) | (23) | (69) |
| 5. | 1979 |  | - | 52 66 | 122 166 | - | $\begin{gathered} 74 \\ (35) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 36 \\ & 53 \end{aligned}$ | 110 18 |
| 6. | 1980 As Expected | $100{ }^{(2)}$ | - | 66 | 166 | - | (35) | 53 |  |
| 7. | 1981 As Expected | 75 | 25 | 65 | 165 | 15 | 140 | 2 | 157 |
|  | 1982 Test Year: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8. | At Present Rates | 150 | 30 | 79 | 259 | 324 | 7 | 24 | 355 |
| 9. | At Proposed Rates | 1.0 | 30 | 79 | 259 | - | 55 | 24 | 79 |

(1) Includes $\$ 131.6 \mathrm{M}^{2}$ from sale of Encina 5.
(2) This amount is net of $\$ 30.0 \mathrm{~m}^{2}$ of variable interest rate foreign term loans which were voluntarily refunded in July, August, and September of 1980.


## TABLE 7

## DIVIDEND COVERAGE COMPARISON BETWEEN ELECTRIC INDUSTRY AND SDG\&E <br> 1971-1979

| LINE NO. | $\frac{\text { YEAR }}{(A)}$ | $\frac{\text { INDUSTRY }}{(\mathrm{B})}$ | $\frac{S D G \& E}{(C)}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | 1979 | 2.6X | 1.4X |
| 2. | 1978 | 2.8 | 1.9 |
| 3. | 1977 | 2.9 | 1.0 |
| 4. | 1976 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| 5. | 1975 | 2.9 | 1.8 |
| 6. | 1974 | 2.6 | 3.0 |
| 7. | 1973 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| 8. | 1972 | 2.8 | 3.2 |
| 9. | 1971 | 2.5 | 3.3 |

Source: Salomon Brothers Stock Research Industry Analysis, June 16, 1980.


TABLE 8
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC COMMON STOCK ISSUES COST OF SALES BELOW BOOK VALUE

1973 - March, 1980
(Dollars in Thousands Except
Per Share Amounts)

LINE COLUMN

1. Date of Sale
2. Number of Shares (Thousands)
3. Proceeds to Company (Thousands)
4. Proceeds Per Share
5. Book Value Per Share
6. Ratio of Proceeds to Company Per Share to Book Value Per Share
7. Decrease in Shares if Sold at Book Value (Thousands)
8. Total Extra Shares Sold
9. Times 1982 Dividend Rate
10. Total Loss of Cash Flow
11. Times Gross Up factor
12. Annual Cost to Customers

| $\frac{1973}{(A)}$ | $\frac{1974}{(B)}$ | $\frac{1975}{(C)}$ | $\frac{1976}{(D)}$ | $\frac{1977}{(E)}$ | $\frac{1978}{(F)}$ | $\frac{1978}{(\mathrm{G})}$ | $\frac{1979}{(H)}$ | $\frac{1980}{7:)}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 12/04/73 | 11/19/74 | 05/06/75 | 07/15/76 | 10/18/77 | 05/18/78 | 12/05,78 | 07124179 | 93:27:80 |
| 2,000 | 2,000 | 1,500 | 2,000 | 3,000 | 2,500 | 2.000 | 3.000 | 2,500 |
| \$26,810 | \$21,630 | \$15.570 | \$26,000 | \$45.270 | \$36,325 | \$28,960 | \$43,500 | \$27, 100 |
| \$13.405 | \$10.815 | \$10.38 | \$13.00 | \$15.09 | \$14.53 | \$14.48 | \$14.50 | 510.84 |
| $\begin{array}{r} \$ 17.89 \\ 11 / 30 / 73 \end{array}$ | $\$ 18.19$ $10 / 31 / 74$ | $\$ 16.84$ $04 / 30175$ | $\begin{array}{r} \$ 17.01 \\ 06 / 30 / 76 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \$ 17.49 \\ 08 / 31 / 77 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \$ 17.73 \\ 05 / 31 / 78 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \$ 17.86 \\ 11 / 30 / 78 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \$ 17.25 \\ 06 / 30 / 70 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 517,22 \\ 02 ; 28 / 80 \end{array}$ |


| 74.9\% | 59.4\% | 61.6\% | 76.4\% | 86.3\% | 82.0\% | 81.1\% | 84.1\% | $63.8 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 501 | 811 | 575 | 471 | 412 | 451 | 378 | 478 | $\begin{array}{r} 904 \\ \underset{\sim}{3} \\ \underset{\square}{3} \end{array}$ |

Source: Prospectuses of respective issues SDG\&E operating reports

TABLE 9
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC COMMON STOCK ISSUES PROJECTED COST OF SALES BELOW BOOK VALUE (Dollars in Thousands Except Per Share Amounts)

LINE
NO.

1. Month of Sale
2. Number of Shares (Thousands)
3. Proceeds to Company
4. Proceeds Per Share
5. Book Value Per Share
6. Ratio of Proceeds to Company to Book Value Per Share (\%)
7. $2 \%$

376
8. Total Extra Shares Sold
9.
10. Total Loss of Cash Flow 11. Times Gross Up Factor 12. Annual Cost to Customers
7. Decrease in Shares if Sold at Book Value (Thousands)

| $\frac{1980}{(A)}$ | $\frac{1981}{(B)}$ | $\frac{1981}{(\mathrm{C})}$ | $\frac{1982}{(\mathrm{D})}$ | $\frac{1982}{(\mathrm{E})}$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| September | Apri1 | October | March | October |
| 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 3000 | 2000 |
| $\$ 27.020$ | $\$ 26,500$ | $\$ 26.750$ | $\$ 39.375$ | $\$ 26.250$ |
| $\$ 13.51$ | $\$ 13.25$ | $\$ 13.38$ | $\$ 13.13$ | $\$ 13.13$ |
| $\$ 16.64$ | $\$ 15.73$ | $\$ 15.84$ | $\$ 15.85$ | $\$ 16.54$ |

84. 2\%
85. 4\%
86. 8\%
$79.4 \%$

315
311
516
413

1,931
$\$ 1.80$
$\$ 3,476$
2. I

57,299

TABLE 10
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED RETURN ON EQUITY (1975-79 HISTORICAL AND 1980-82 PROJECTED)

HISTORICAL

RATEMAKING
RETURN ON EQUITY
LINE NO. $\frac{\text { YEAR }}{(\mathrm{A})}$

1. 1975
2. 1976
3. 1977
4. 1978
5. 

1979
(Authorized)
12. $38 \%$
12.38
13.03
13.03
14.50

RATEMAKING
RETURN ON EQUITY

4.07\%
12.06
14.58
12.66
11.00

FINANCIAL
RETURN ON EQUITY
(Actual) (D)
5. $93 \%$
12.92
12.99
11.35
10.28

## PRESENT RATES

| 6. | 1980 As Expected | 2.22 | 3.23 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 7. | 1981 As Expected | $(12.84)$ | $(2.57)$ |
| 8. | 1982 Test Year | $(49.60)$ | $(26.89)$ |

## PROPOSED RATES

9. 1982 Test Year
$19.00 \%$
$19.87 \%$

CHART 8


TABLE 11
FINANCIAL DATA
CALIFORNIA UTILITIES COMPARISON
GROWTH RATES 1969-1979

| LINE NO. |  | SDG\&E | GROWTH RATE | SCE GROWTH RATE | PG\&E GROWTH RATE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | NET UTILITY PLANT |  |  |  |  |
|  | (Exciuding CWIP) |  | 8.6\% | 5.0\% | 4.6\% |
| 2. | CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PROGRESS |  | 45. $2 \%$ | 17.5\% | 28.3\% |
| 3. | TOTAL ASSETS |  | 15.1\% | 8.8\% | 9.7\% |
| 4. | TOTAL CAPITALIZATION |  | 14.4\% | 8.0\% | 8.4\% |
| 5. | TOTAL OPERATING REVENUES |  | 18.2\% | 14.8\% | 15.2\% |
| 6. | TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES |  | 19.2\% | 16.3\% | 21.8\% |
| 7. | ALLOWANCE FOR FUNDS USED DURING |  |  |  |  |
|  | CONSTRUCTION |  | 43.2\% | 21.1\% | 33.4\% |
| 8. | AFDC AS A \% OF COMMON EARNINGS |  | 29.0\% | 8.2\% | 22.1\% |
| 9. | TOTAL INTEREST CHARGES |  | 20.3\% | 11.6\% | 13.1\% |
| 10. | EMBEDDED COST OF DEBT |  | 6.2\% | 4. $2 \%$ | 5.4\% |
| 11. | EMBEDDED CCST OF PREFERRED |  | 6.0\% | 3.9\% | 4. $\%$ |
| 12. | AVG. SHARES OUTSTANDING |  | 11. 3\% | 4.7\% | 5.8\% |
| 13. | ELECTRIC SALES - Kwh |  | 6.3\% | 3.4\% | 4.0\% |
| 14. | GAS SALES - Therms |  | 1.7\% | - | (0.1\%) |
| 15. | TOTAL CUSTOMERS |  | 4.4\% | 2.6\% | 2.7\% |
| 16. | PEAK LOAD - Kw |  | 5.2\% | 4.8\% | 4.3\% |

Source: Annual reports and statistical supplements of respective companies.

TABLE 12
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC RETURN ON EQUITY - EMBEDDED COST ANALYSIS 1970-1979 RECORDED 1980-1983 ESTIMATED

(1) Average of SDG\&E's embedded cost of debt 1965-1969.

> TABLE 13
> SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC COMPUTATION OF RETURN ON EQUITY NECESSARY TO ATTAIN $2.7 \times$ INTEREST COVERAGE 1982 PROPOSED RATES

| LINE |
| :--- |
| NO. |


| CAPITALIZATION <br> RATIOS | COST <br> FACTORS | WEIGHTED <br> COSTS |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $\frac{(\mathrm{B})}{(\mathrm{C})}$ |  |

PER FILING:

| 1. Common Equity | $37.32 \%$ | $19.00 \%$ | $7.09 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. Preferred Stock | 12.80 | 9.52 | 1.22 |
| 3. Long-Term Lebt | 43.26 | 10.57 | 4.57 |
| 4. Bankers' Acceptances | $\frac{6.62}{100.00 \%}$ | 15.41 | $\frac{1.02}{13.90 \%}$ |
| 5. Total |  |  |  |

6. COVERAGE: 2.49 X

3X COVERAGE:

| 7. Cormon Equity | $37.32 \%$ | $\underline{22.18 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 2 8 \%}$ |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | :---: |
| 8. Preferred Stock | 12.80 | 9.52 | 1.22 |
| 9. Long-Term Debt | 43.26 | 10.57 | 4.57 |
| 10. Bankers' Acceptances | $\frac{6.62}{100.00 \%}$ | 15.41 | $\frac{1.02}{15.09 \%}$ |
| 11. | Total |  |  |

12. COVERAGE:
2.70X

A return on equity of $22.18 \%$ is required to eictain a 2.70 X interest coverage ratio.

TABLE 14
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC EMBEDDED COST OF PREFERRED CAPITAL. STOCF RECORDED 1979 AND PROJECTED 1980-1982
(Thousands of Dollars)

| LINE <br> NO. | TITLE | $\frac{A M O U N T}{(A)}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NET COST } \\ & \text { OF ISSUE } \\ & \hline \text { (B) } \end{aligned}$ | PROCEEDS OF SALE $(\text { Cols. } A-B)$ <br> (C) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ANNUAL. } \\ & \text { DIVIDEND } \\ & \text { (D) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { EFFECTI:E } \\ & \text { COST (\%) } \\ & \frac{(\text { Cols.D.C) }}{(E)} \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cumulative Preferred Stock |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. | 5.00\% Series | \$ 7,500.0 | \$( 196.2) | \$ 7.696.2 | \$ 375.0 | 4.87\% |
| 2. | 4.50\% Series | 6,000.0 | ( | 6,000.0 | - 270.0 | 4.50 |
| 3. | 4. $40 \%$ Series | 6,500.0 | ( 103.5) | 6,603.5 | 286.0 | 4.33 |
| 4. | 4.60\% Series | $7,500.0$ | $\begin{array}{r}53.3 \\ \hline \text { (236.5) }\end{array}$ | 7,446.7 | 345.0 | 4.63 |
| 5. | Total Preferred Stock | 27,500.0 | ( 246.4) | 27,746.4 | 1,276 0 | 4.60 |
| Preferred Stock (Cumulative) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6. | \$9.84 Series | 16,000.0 | 314.6 | 15,685.4 | 1,574.4 | 10.04 |
| 7. | \$7.80 Series | 20,000.0 | 321.7 | 19.678 .3 | 1,560.0 | 7.93 |
| 8. | \$7.20 Series | 15,000.0 | 222.6 | 14.777 .4 | 1.080 .0 | 7.31 |
| 9. | \$7.325 Series | 30,000.0 | 115.6 | 29.883 .4 | 2.197 .5 | 7. 35 |
| 10. | \$8.25 Series | 25,000.0 | 100.6 | 24.899 .4 | 2.062 .5 | 8.28 |
| 11. | \$2.68 Series | 25,000.0 |  | 26,215.9 | 2.680 .0 | 10.22 |
| 12. | \$9.125 Series | 30,000.0 | (191.7 | 29.808 .3 |  | 9.18 |
| 13. | \$2.475 Series | 25,000.0 | $(1,359.2)$ | 26,359.2 | $\begin{array}{r}2,475.0 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 9.39 |
| 14. | Total Preference Stock | 186,000.0 | (1,307.3) | 187,307.3 | 16,366.9 | 8. 74 |
| 15. | Total 12/31/79 | 213,500.0 | $(1,553.7)$ | 215.053 .7 | 17.642 .9 | 8. 20 |
| PROJECTED CHANGES DURING 1980-1982: ${ }^{(1)}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16. | No Issue in 1980 | - | - | - | - | - |
| 17. | Projected 12/31/80 | 213,500.0 | (1,553.7) | 215,053.7 | 17,642.9 | 8.20 |
| 18. | \$14.375 Series | 25,000.0 | 187.5 | 24,812.5 | 3,593.8 | 14.48 |
| 19. | Projected 12/31/81 | 238,500.0 | (1,366.2) | 239.866 .2 | 21,236.7 | 8.85\% 「 |
| 20. | \$14.730 Series | 30,000.0 | 225.0 | 29,775.0 | 4,425.0 | 14.86\% |
| 21. | Projected 12/31/82 | \$268,500.0 | \$(1,141.2) | \$269,641.2 | \$25,661.7 | 9.52\% |

TABLE 15
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC EMBEDDED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT RECORDED DECEMBER 31, 1979
(Thousands of Dollars)


## FIRST MORTGAGE BONDS

4-5/8\%, Due 1/15/84 $42 \%$, Due 9/1/94 Total Sinking Fund Debentures $\begin{array}{r}-15,600.0 \\ 24,600.0 \\ \hline\end{array}$

```
34% Series "D", Due 4/1/82
2-7/8% Series "E", Due 4/1/84
3%% Series "F", Due 10/1/85
4-7/8% Series "G", Due 10/1/87
4-5/8% Series "H", Due 10/1/90
5\zeta%% Series "I", Due 3/1/97
7% Series "J", Due 12/1/98
8-3/4% Series "K", Due 2/1/00
8% Series "L", Due 9/1/01
8-3/8% Series "M", Due 1/1/04
10.7% Seriss "O", Due 5/1/82
10% Series "F", Due 7/15/06
8-3/4% Series "Q", Due 3/15/07
9-3/4% Series "R", Due 5/1/08
    Total First Mortgage Bonds
```

| $\$ 12,000.0$ | $\$ 390.0$ | $\$(2.8)$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $17,000.0$ | 488.8 | 11.7 |
| $18,000.0$ | 585.0 | 8.1 |
| $12,000.0$ | 585.0 | 3.5 |
| $30,000.0$ | $1,387.5$ | 10.1 |
| $25,000.0$ | $1,375.0$ | $(4.5)$ |
| $35,000.0$ | $2,450.0$ | 12.0 |
| $40,000.0$ | $3,500.0$ | 5.0 |
| $45,000.0$ | $3,600.0$ | 12.6 |
| $75,000.0$ | $6,281.2$ | 30.0 |
| $40,000.0$ | $4,280.0$ | 85.1 |
| $45,000.0$ | $4,500.0$ | 20.1 |
| $50,000.0$ | $4,375.0$ | 38.1 |
| $50,000.0$ | $4,875.0$ | 21.0 |
| $494,000.0$ | $38,672.5$ | 250.0 |


|  |  |
| ---: | :--- |
| $\$ 87.2$ | $3.23 z$ |
| 500.5 | 2.94 |
| 593.1 | 3.30 |
| 588.5 | 4.90 |
| $1,397.6$ | 4.66 |
| $1,370.5$ | 5.48 |
| $2,462.9$ | 7.04 |
| $3,505.0$ | 8.76 |
| $3,612.6$ | 8.03 |
| $6,312.1$ | 8.42 |
| $4,365.1$ | 10.91 |
| $4,520.1$ | 10.04 |
| $4,413.1$ | 8.83 |
| $6,896.0$ | 9.79 |
| $\mathbf{3 8 , 9 2 2 . 5}$ | 7.88 |

## SINRING FUND DEBENTURES

## OTHER LONG-TERM DEBT

19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 

23
24.

25
26
27
28.
3.

Foreign Term Loans
Pollution Control
Pollution Control
Term Loan (8-3/4\%)
Sundesert Properties
N.M. Rothchild o So
Promissory Notes
General Electric (
W.D. Cannon (7.49\%)
Other (7.72\%)(2)
Total Other Long-
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT Outstanding amount in pounds $\times 5.5 \% \times$ Dec. 31,1979 exchange rate ( $\$ 2,232 /$ pound).
(2) Various amounts at various interest rates and maturities.

TABLE 16
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC
PROJECTED EMBEDDED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT 1980 and 1981
(Thousands of Dollars)


TABLE 17
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC
PROJECTED EMBEDDED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT 1982

## (Thousands of Dollars)

## LINE <br> NO.

1. PROJECTED DECEMBER 31, 1981

PROJECTED CHANGES DURING 1982:
First Mortgage Bonds:
$145 / 8 \%$ Series " $V$ ", Due $5 / 12$
15 1/4\% Series " $W$ ", Due $10 / 12$
$31 / 4 \%$ Series "D", Retired
10.7\% Series " 0 ". Retired

Sinking Fund Debentures :
4 5/8\% Retired
4 1/2\% Retired
Other Long-Terw Debt:
Sundesert Properties
N.M. Rothschilds \& Sons Ltd. . Prom. Notes W. D. Cannon

Other
Projected December 31, 1982

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { PRINCIPAL } \\ & \frac{\text { AMOUNT }}{(A)} \end{aligned}$ | ANNJAL INTEREST PAYMENT <br> (B) | AMORT. OF PREM. DISC. \& EXPENSE <br> (C) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$811,491.6 | \$77,958.2 | \$403.2 |
| 75,000.0 | 10,968.8 | 36.0 |
| 75,000.0 | 11.437 .5 | 36.0 2.8 |
| (12,000.0) | ( 390.0 ) | 2.8 |
| ( $40,000.0$ ) | (4, 280.0) | (84.7) |
| $375.0)$ | ( 17.3) | (0.2) |
| ( 400.0 ) | 18.0) | (0.2) |
| 643.8) | ( 48.3) | - |
| 774.4) | ( 72.6 ) | - |
| $63.8)$ | ( 4.8 ) | - |
| 29.6) | ( 1.9) | - |
| \$907, 205.0 | \$95.531.6 | \$392.9 |


| EXPENSE <br> $($ Cols. B+C) <br> (D) | COST (\%) <br> $($ Cols.D/A) |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\$ 78.361 .4$ | $9.66 \%$ |

$11.473 .5 \quad 15.30$
$(387.2) \quad(3.23)$
$(4.364 .7) \quad(10.91)$
$\left.\begin{array}{ll}\left(\begin{array}{ll}17.5) & (4.67) \\ 18.2\end{array}\right. & (4.55\end{array}\right)$

| ( | 48.3) | ( 7.50) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ( | 72.6) | ( 9.38) |
| ( | 4.8) | ( 7.52) |
| $($ | 1.9) | ( 6.42) |
|  | 924.3 | $10.57 \%$ |

TABLE 18
SAN diego gas \& Electric
CAPITAL STRUCTURE (1)
1975-1979 RECORDED - 1980-1982 PROJECTED
(Dollars in Millions)

(1) Excludes leases

TABLE 19
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC 1979 AUTHORIZED RATE OF RETURN VS. 1979 RECORDED, 1980-1981 AS EXPECTED

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { LINE } \\ & \text { NO. } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | CAPITAL $\frac{\text { RATIOS }}{(A)}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \begin{array}{c} \text { COST } \\ \text { FACTORS } \end{array} \\ & (\mathrm{B}) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WEIGHTED } \\ & \frac{\text { COST }}{(\mathrm{C})} \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1979 AUTHORIZED ${ }^{(1)}$ |  |  |  |  |
| 1. | Common Equity | 38.09\% | 14.50\% | 5. $52 \%$ |
| 2. | Preferred Stock | 14.16 | 8.21 | 1.16 |
| 3. | Long-Term Debt | 44.99 | 8.10 | 3.64 |
| 4. | Bankers' Acceptances | 2.76 | 10.00 | 0.27 |
| 5. | Total | 100.00\% |  | 10.59\% |
| 6. | Coverage |  |  | 2.71X |

## 1979 RECORDED

| 7. | Common Equity | 37.20\% | 10.97\% | 4.08\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 8. | Preferred Stock | 14.68 | 8.20 | 1. 21 |
| 9. | Long-Term Debt | 44.00 | 8.49 | 3.74 |
| 10. | Bankers' Acceptances | 4.12 | 12.45 | 0.51 |
| 11. | Total | 100.00\% |  | 9.54\% |
| 12. | Coverage |  |  | 2. 24 X |

1980 AS EXPECTED

| 13. | Common Equity | $34.77 \%$ | $2.21 \%$ | $0.77 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| 14. | Preferred Stock | 13.07 | 8.20 | 1.07 |
| 15. | Long-Term Debt | 45.26 | 9.19 | 4.16 |
| 16. | Bankers Acceptances | -6.90 | 13.99 | $\underline{0.97}$ |
| 17. | Total | $100.00 \%$ |  | $6.97 \%$ |
| 18. | Coverage |  |  | 1.36 X |

## 1981 AS EXPECTED

19. Common Equity
20. Preferred Stock
21. Long-Term Debt
22. Bankers' Acceptances
23. Total
24. Coverage
25. 19\%
(12.83\%)
(4.13\%)
13.89
47.25
6.67
$100.00 \%$
1.23
4.56
0.90
2.56\%
0.47 X
(1) Per Decision 90405.

TABLE 20
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC RATE OF RETURN 1982 TEST YEAR PRESENT AND PROPOSED RATES
LINE
NO.

1982 Test Year Present Rates

1. Common Equity
2. Preferred Stock
3. Long-Term Debt
4. Bankers' Acceptances
5. Total
6. Coverage

1982 Test Year Proposed Rates

## 7. Common Equity

8. Preferred Stock
9. Long-Term Debt
10. Bankers' Acceptances

Total
12. Coverage

11

CAPITAL RATIOS
(A)

COST
FACTORS
(B)

WEIGHTED COST (C)
24. $20 \%$ 15.48
52.32
8.00
100.00\%
(49.55\%)
9.52
10.57
15.41
(3.76\%)
(0.56X)
37. $32 \%$
12.80
43.26
6.62
$100.00 \%$

| $19.00 \%$ | $7.09 \%$ |
| :---: | :--- |
| 9.52 | 1.22 |
| 10.57 | 4.57 |
| 15.41 | 1.02 |

13.90\%
2.49X

TABLE 21
SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC COST OF CAPITAL AT VARIOUS RETURNS ON EQUITY

1982 PROPOSED RATES

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { LINE } \\ & \text { NO. } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{array}{r} \text { SAN DIE } \\ \\ \hline \text { OF CAPITAL A } \\ 1982 \mathrm{P} \end{array}$ <br> CAPITALIZATION $\qquad$ <br> (A) | BLE 21 GO GAS \& T VARIOU ROPOSED | ELECTRIC <br> RETURNS <br> RATES | ON EQUITY |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\frac{\text { RATES }}{(\mathrm{B})}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WEIGHTED } \\ & \frac{\text { COSTS }}{(C)} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CAPITALIZATION } \\ & \text { RATIOS } \\ & \text { (D) } \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{\text { RATES }}{(\mathrm{E})}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WE IGHTED } \\ & \frac{\text { COSTS }}{(\mathrm{F})} \end{aligned}$ |
| 1. | Common Equity |  | 37.32\% | 18.00\% | 6.72\% | $37.32 \%$ | 18.50\% | 6.90\% |
| 2. | Preferred Stock | 12.80 | 9.52 | 1.22 | 12.80 | 9.52 | 1.22 |
| 3. | Long-Term Debi | 43.26 | 10.57 | 4.57 | 43.26 | 10.57 | 4.57 |
| 4. | Bankers' Acceptances | 6.62 | 15.41 | 1.02 | 6.62 | 15.41 | 1.02 |
|  | Rate of Return |  |  | 13.53\% |  |  | 13.71\% |
| 6. | Coverage |  |  | 2.42X |  |  | 2.45 X |
| 7. | Common Equity | 37.32\% | 19.00\% | 7.09\% | 37.32\% | 19.50\% | 7.28\% |
| 8. | Preferred Stock | 12.80 | 9.52 | 1.22 | 12.80 | 9.52 | 1.22 |
| 9. | Long-Term Debt | 43.26 | 10.57 | 4.57 | 43.26 | 10.57 | 4.57 |
| 10. | Bankers' Acceptances | 6.62 | 15.41 | 1.02 | 6.62 | 15.41 | 1.02 |
| 11. | Rate of Return |  |  | 13. $90 \%$ |  |  | 14.09\% |
| 12. | Coverage |  |  | 2.49 X |  |  | 2.52X |

