


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

**JCP&L** **GPU**

Jersey Central Power & Light  
Company is a Member of the  
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

October 7, 1980

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region I  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
641 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-42/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-42/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.(1) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ivan R. Fierrock, Jr.".

Ivan R. Fierrock, Jr.  
Vice President Generation

IRF:dh  
Enclosures

cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)  
Office of Management Information and Program Control  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

License Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-42/3L

Report Date

October 1, 1980

Occurrence Date

September 11, 1980

Identification of Occurrence

Containment Spray System high drywell pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B and IP-15C tripped at a value greater than that specified in the Technical Specifications Table 3.1.1, item E.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.(1).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Plant parameters at the time of occurrence were:

Power: Core 1872 MWt  
Electrical 612 MWe

Flow: Recirculation  $15.0 \times 10^4$  gpm  
Feedwater  $6.93 \times 10^6$  lb/hr

Description of Occurrence:

On Thursday, September 11, 1980, while performing the "Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test", the IP-15A, IP-15B and IP-15C trip points were found to be less conservative than those specified in the Technical Specifications. Surveillance testing on the High Drywell pressure switches for the Containment Spray System revealed the following data:

<u>Pressure Switch Designation</u>	<u>Desired Setpoint</u>	<u>As Found</u>	<u>As Left</u>
IP-15A	<2 psig	2.1	1.95
IP-15B	<2 psig	2.05	1.94
IP-15C	<2 psig	2.18	1.93
IP-15D	<2 psig	1.98	1.98

### Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence was attributed to instrument repeatability. The high alarm switch setpoints are set at  $2.0 \pm 0.1$  psig and the long term repeatability of the instruments is approximately 2-3% (.2-.3 psig) of full range. Therefore, although the instruments will be operating within design accuracy, the technical specification limit of 2.0 psig can be exceeded during surveillance testing.

### Analysis of Occurrence

The Containment Spray System consists of two independent cooling loops, each capable of removing fission product decay heat from the primary containment after a postulated loss of cooling accident. The containment spray system automatically initiates upon receipt of two high drywell pressure and two reactor low-low water level signals in either of two trip systems.

The safety significance of this event is considered minimal since the high drywell pressure switches would have actuated but at a slightly higher pressure than the required setpoint. This function would have been delayed by only a small fraction of a second (approximately 0.1 seconds from the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident). Since the reactor low-low water level setpoint is not expected to be reached until approximately 4 seconds from the start of the design basis accident, the delay in actuating the high drywell pressure switches would have had no effect on initiating the containment spray system.

### Corrective Action

Pressure switch IP-15A, IP-15B and IP-15C were adjusted to trip with the Technical Specification limit of  $\leq 2$  psig. It is recognized that there is a drift problem associated with the new snap-action switches which were recently installed during the 1980 Outage to upgrade its seismic qualifications. The manufacture has been requested to evaluate the drift problem.

### Failure Data

Manufacturer - ITT Barton  
Model - 228A Indicating Pressure Switch  
Range: 0-10 psig