NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Field	Value
Licensee Code ②	I L Q A D 2
License Number ③	0 0 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 0 0
License Type ④	4 1 1 1 1
CAT ⑤	
CON'T — Report Source ⑥	L
Docket Number ⑦	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5
Event Date ⑧	1 2 3 0 8 0
Report Date ⑨	0 1 2 2 8 1

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

At 0840 while attempting to transfer water from the Suppression Chamber to the main condenser hotwell using the "A" RHR loop, valve MO-2-1001-34A failed to open from the Control Room. The B loop of RHR was demonstrated operable and surveillance was started to demonstrate adequate core cooling capability in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.B. The A loop of RHR containment cooling was operable at 1100 December 30, 1980.

System Code ⑪	Cause Code ⑫	Cause Subcode ⑬	Component Code ⑭	Comp. Subcode ⑮	Valve Subcode ⑯
C F	E	A	C K T B K R	B	Z

LER/RO Report Number ⑰	Event Year		Sequential Report No.		Occurrence Code	Report Type		Revision No.
	8 0	—	0 3 9	/	0 3	L	—	0

Action Taken ⑱	Future Action ⑲	Effect on Plant ⑳	Shutdown Method ㉑	Hours ㉒	Attachment Submitted ㉓	NPRD-4 Form Sub. ㉔	Prime Comp. Supplier ㉕	Component Manufacturer ㉖
A	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	Y	N	G 0 8 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

The cause of MO-2-1001-34A not opening was corroded electrical contacts on the auxiliary contactor in the valve breaker. The contacts were replaced and MO-2-1001-34A was operated three times satisfactorily.

Facility Status ㉘	% Power ㉙	Other Status ㉚	Method of Discovery ㉛	Discovery Description ㉜
E	0 7 6	NA	A	Operational Event

Activity Released ㉝	Content of Release ㉞	Amount of Activity ㉟	Location of Release ㊱
Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

Number ㊲	Type ㊳	Description ㊴
0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

Number ㊵	Description ㊶
0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸

Type ㊷	Description
Z	NA

PUBLICITY

Issued ㊹	Description ㊺	NRC USE ONLY
N	NA	

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I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 80-39/03L-0

II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station

III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two

IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265

V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On December 30, 1980, at 0840 hours, the Control Room operator began to transfer water from the suppression pool to the main condenser hotwell via the condensate demineralizers per procedure QOP 1000-10, using the A loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR System. Motor operated valve MO-2-1001-34A in the A loop of the RHR System would not open from the Control Room. At 0845 hours, the operator transferred suppression chamber water to the main condenser hotwell via the condensate demineralizers using the redundant B loop of the RHR System until 0905 hours.

Per Technical Specification 3.5.B., verification of Core Spray valve operability was started to demonstrate the availability of adequate emergency cooling capability. At 1100 hours, after corrective maintenance was performed, MO-2-1001-34A was tested satisfactorily three times and containment cooling A loop of the RHR System was returned to service. The Core Spray valve operability testing was then terminated.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The containment cooling mode of the RHR System is provided to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. The containment cooling mode of the RHR System consists of two loops. Loss of one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR System leaves one remaining system to perform the containment cooling function. The operable loop was demonstrated to be operable immediately. In addition, valve MO-2-1001-34A in the A loop could have been opened manually, if necessary. Thus, there were no safety implications related to this occurrence.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of valve MO-2-1001-34A not opening from the Control Room was corroded electrical contacts in the auxiliary interlock contactor located in MCC 28-1B. The interlock contactor prevents the operator from reversing the motor direction when it is running to protect the electric motor.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The faulty contact was replaced with General Electric contact kit 500E17. The valve was operated three times successfully, and the A loop of the RHR System was returned to service at 1100 hours on December 30, 1980.