

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

OCT 3 1 1980

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In Reply Refer To: RII:JPO 50-302

> Florida Power Corporation ATTN: J. A. Hancock, Assistant Vice President Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Circular No. 80-23 which requires consideration by you with regard to your nuclear power facility.

Should you have any questions regarding this circular or the actions recommended therein, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

James P. O'Reilly

Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Circular No. 80-23 w/enclosure

2. List of Recently Issued IE Circulars

cc w/encl:

D. C. Poole, Nuclear Plant Manager

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UNITIED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

October 31, 1980

IE Circular No. 80-23 : POTENTIAL DEFECTS IN BELOIT POWER SYSTEMS EMERGENCY GENERATORS

BACKGROUND

This circular addresses a potential deficiency involving the field leads of generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems. It is known that the subject generators have been coupled with Fairbanks Morse diesel engines for use in nuclear power facilities; however, it is not known whether they have been coupled with other diesel engines for such use. Accordingly, the intent of this circular is to notify all nuclear power facilities of the potential defect and to assure that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if needed.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was first informed of the potential defect by a phone call from Mr. R. H. Beadle of the Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of Colt Industries to Mr. D. W. Hayes of Region III on September 19, 1980. On September 20, 1980, a conference call was held between the NRC Duty Officer, personnel from Prairie Island Nuclear Power Station, Mr. Beadle of Fairbanks Morse and Mr. C. Evenson of Beloit Power Systems, the principal spokesman. The purpose of this call was to describe an inspection method which Prairie Island personnel could use to examine the field lead assemblies of their generators for the potential defect. (We have since been informed by the Resident Inspector that the field lead assemblies of the Prairie Island generators did not have the suspected defects.)

In order to disseminate this information on a timely basis, the NRC Duty Officer at Bethesda called those operating facilities which he knew were using the suspect generators on September 20 and 21, 1980. The information conveyed included a description of the potential defect and a description of the aforementioned inspection method. The operating facilities called were:

FAC	ILITY	NO.	OF	UNITS	
Calvert	Cliffs 1 and 2		3		
Crystal			2		
Hatch 1			5		
Duane Ar			2		
North Anna 1 and 2			1.		
	e 1 and 2		3		
Robinson			2		
Prairie			2		
Vermont '			2		
	ttom 2 and 3		4		
	Nuclear One, Unit 2		2		
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