
PART 21 IDENTIFICATION NO	50- 232-001 COM	PANY NAME Industries, Inc.
DATE OF LETTER 11/14/60		
DATE DISTRIBUTED 12200	p.m. ORIGINAL REPORT	SUPPLEMENTARY ¥
DISTRIBUTION:	*	3
REACTOR (R)	FUEL CYCLE &	SAFEGUARDS (S)
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LOEB / MPA MNB 5715	NMSS / FOMS SS-395	NRR/DOL
AEOD MNB 7602	LOEB / MPA MVB 5715	NMSS / SG SS-881
NRR/DOE	AEOD MNB 7602	LDEB / MPA MVB 5715
NRR/DSI	ASLBP E/W 450	AEOD MNB 7602
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FOLLOWUP AS SHOWN BELOW:		
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## nps industries, inc.



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one harmon plaza secaucus, new jersey 07094 2011 865-6550 telex 14-1435 November 14, 1980 DGH-714 File Reference: NPSI/NRC-01-001

80-232-001

NEC Part ZI ID =

50-329 330

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement Washington, DC 20555

Attention: Victor Stello - Director

Subject: Reporting of Defect & Noncompliance

Reference: NPSI Letter DGH-573, dated June 16, 1980 Southern Bolt & Foundry

Gentlemen:

This letter will serve as a follow-up to the reference letter which informed you of a potential defect of Noncompliance under the rules of Federal Register 10 CFR Part 21.

At the time of our report on June 16, 1980, preliminary investigations had revealed the potential defect. Since that time a very thourough investigation by Bechtel, NPSI, and Southern Bolt & Foundry has been conducted. The results of that investigation is detailed in Attachments I & II. Additional documents are on file and available for review if necessary. Both Consumers Power and Bechtel-Midland Project have been kept informed of the status during the investigation.

Defective materials have been identified and corrective action has been completed with the exception of final teplacement of the materials at the site. As identified in SEF cover letter (Attachment II) the replacement materials are awaiting heat treatment processing. The date for completion of that process and final source inspection by NPSI is expected to be approximately December 1, 1930. A final report will be forwarded to you after the replacement materials have been installed or received at the site and the defective materials have been returned to SEF.

" uld you have any questions regarding this report, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

NPS INJUSTRIES, INC.

Donald Harbison Corporate Mgr. of Quality Assurance

ENC

cc: New Jersey

Austin

Portland

J. Barton - President L. Hovi - Sr. Vice President F. Sugar R.G. Normand L. Walker J. Takeuchi A. Halamay K. Hanna

R. Alexander - Southern Bolt & Foundry

### SOUTHERN BOLT

& FASTENER CORPORATION P. O. BOX 7196 301 MONTGOMERY TELEPHONE AREA (318) 221-4251 SHREVEPORT, LOUISIAN



July 9, 1980

NPS Industries, Inc. 10420 Metric Blvd. Austin, TX 78758

ATTN: Mr. Don Harbeson

Re: SBF letter to NPSI dated 6/11/80

Dear Don:

Enclosed please find a copy of the completed SBF investigation of the defective material covered by our MTR No. 5795. As agreed to earlier, we conducted a thorough in-house investigation of the events surrounding the occurrence, and are now satisfied with the conclusions drawn by the investigators.

Upon your review of the report (attached to the NCR No. 157-A), please immediately advise me should you have any questions. Also, please be advised that the report for the defective material described by MTR's 6370, 6371, 6372, 6373, 6374 shall be sent next week under separate cover as it has a different NCR assigned to it. Our estimate of completing this investigation apparently did not allow ample time for the paperwork to get done. Please accept our apologies.

Sincerely, FASTENER CORPORATION

Vice President

RLA/skc

cc: SBF QA Department E.W. Nelson, Jr. - SBF J.F. Barton - NPSI (Secaucus, NJ)

Attachments: NCR No. 157-A with its accompanying Report No. 157-A.

ATTACHMENTT PAGE 1 OF 7

LARGE BOLTS & NUTS CAMETERS STAINLESS & ALLOY

NOTE: SEE REPORT ATACHED FOR ADDITIONAL INFO PROD'NO. - 1849-010 CUSTOMER 9/8 NPS INDUSTRIES NAME HTE = 5795 AVY HEX BOLTS 18 x614" PART DESCRIPTION ASTM 4540; GR. B23; CL.3 72 PCS ORDERED AND SHIPPED TO CUSTOMER QUANTITY 3 PCS RETURNED BY CUST. FOR ANALYSIS QUANTITY CHECKED 1- DEL. BY D. HARBESON ) LAB TEST 12. RET. BY FIELD 3 NUNCONFORMING MATERIAL RETURNED RETURNED MATERIAL DESCRIPTION OF NONCONFORMANCE BOLTS REJECTED BECAUSE OF UNACCEPTABLE TEST RESULTS OBTAINED (PER ASTH SPEC) ARE CLASSED DEFECTIVE METS. INSPECTED BY: W. JOW - 6-9-80 TRANSMITTED FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION TO: R.L. ALEX. ARE CLASSED TOCFR 21 Not SPECIFIED BY PO. CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT ADVISED (6. 10-E. CHIST TO LYANT AS RECEMPTING VIA CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT ADVISED (6. 10-E. CHIST TO LAND ADVISED (6. 10-E. THENE AND BY LTR TO RETURN ALL MATE D. HATELON 6/100 LLR INVESTIGATION SHALL BE COMPLETED CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIRED INVESTIGATION SHALL BE COMPLETED AS TO CAUSE OF DEFECT, LIMIT, AND ALL MATERIAL THAT IS AFFECTED DETERMINED AT ONCE. FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION ATTACHED, TO, TH BE COVERED IN WRITTEN REPORT NATURE OF REFORK ATTREAM 61 NO YES 1. WHOLE ORDER REJECTED NO YES PART OF ORDER REJECTED - REPLACEMENT NO. NOT ASSIGNED ISSUED REPLACEMENT PRODUCTION ORDER NO. YET - QU (M. ASSIGNED ONLY WHEN RECEIPT OF REPAY MENT CUST. R.C.) YET - QUANTITY -DEFECTIVE PARTS REWORKED AN PUT IN STOCK NO YES NA QUANTITY PRODUCTION ORDER NO. ISSUED NO DEFECTIVE PARTS PUT DIRECTLY INTO STOCK YES NO YES DEFECTIVE PARTS TOTALLY SCHAPPED -6-9-80 Sout DATE: INSPECTED 3. NA - PARTS WELE FETURNED BY QUSTAMER PRODUCTION MANAGER Dy -QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER TQA AdmiNISTERTOR) Upon completion of form return to Quality Assurance. ATTACHMENTI

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SB-27 Rev. 1

# SEF QA NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO. 157-A DATE 6-9-80

DEFECTIVE MATERIAL <u>NPSI P.O. NO. FDX 9478N</u> 72 pcs.--1-1/8": ASTM A-540 Gr. B23 Cl. 3 HVY HEX BUL. LOT #359)

- PROBLEM: Bolts described above and furnished to NPSI do not meet all the specified requirements, as purchased, of the ASTM specification. Bolts were manufactured by SBF and heat treated in SBF Ht. Lot No. 359. Representative samples of other bolting materials heat treated in this lot were checked and found to be acceptable, but the NPSI bolts (MTR No. 5795) were found to be unacceptable and therefore classified as defective.
- INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS MADE AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM: The 2. cause of the defect as described above is believed to be that the wrong material type was used. Chemical and physical tests and analysis were conducted from representative samples of the bolting materials heat treat in SBF Ht. Lot No. 359. All those results were acceptable, except for the results from the NPSI material sample. Results from the analysis conducted on that material revealed the chemical composition of the material samples to be equivalent to AISI 1020 steel requirements. A review of the heat treating records by SBF and NPSI failed to turn up any evidence which would indicate anything being wrong with the heat tr process used. This was further substantiated by the acceptable metallurgical results obtained from re-checking representative material samples (See attachment No. 1) that were processed in Ht. Lot No. 359. With an apparent combination of 1020 and 4340 material in the lot only the 4340 would have responded properly to the treatment, and 1020 mater would not have developed the desired properties. The material originally intended to be used for the order was 1-1/8" dia., E4340H, furnis: to SBF from Crucible Specialty Metals Division, under heat number 11526 A thorough review of all quality related records did not reveal an apparent reason for this unique occurrence. The actual problem, though is believed to have occurred in production at a point somewhere between the point of production order release for the material to be taken and "sheared" into forging lengths, and when the actual forging operation was performed. The exact origin from which the wrong material that apparently was used came can not be determined due to the length of tithat has elapsed since the event occurred and also because personnel that were directly involved with the work have either left or have otherwise been replaced since then. No evidence has been discovered that would place any other production order under suspicion since this occurrence, although very unfortunate, appears to be isolated to S/0 #1849-010.

PAGE 1 OF 4 ATTACH MENT I PAGE 3 OF 7 SEF QA NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO. 101 11 DRILE 1-00 PASE #2 OF \_\_\_\_

Old records, some not necessarily quality related, were also reviewed. Research back through old inventory records (current during that time period) has confirmed that the material originally intended for use on this NPSI bolting requirement (E4340-E, Crucible Ht. No. 115261) is in inventory. SBF metallurgical lab and QA personnel took a representative sample of that raw material and reverified that it is in fact the Crucible E4340E, 1-1/8" diameter, SBF Code A154, Heat #115261 material. No evidence such as an unexplained decrease in inventory count was found during the examination of the records to substantiate a possibility that the wrong NPSI material that was used was taken from some 1-1/8" dia., 1040 bars in stock.

In the final analysis of the results of the completed investigation, conclusions must be made realizing that due to the fact that it is known the purchase documents did not <u>specify</u> the provisions of 10CFR21 and Section III, NCA-3800, some slack existed in the degree of controls <u>required</u>. However, the results do indicate some sloppy workmanship was used by those persons processing S/O #1849-010.

A. 2 96 V

By the conclusion made as to the cause of the defective material being unique to the locating, transporting, and handling of the 1-1/8" diameter material for S/O #1849-010, and no proof or other known evidence has been reported for any other shop orders, no further action is believed warranted to be taken regarding any other bolting material, particularly code material, which was being produced. All the defective bolts affect are believed to have been identified (MTR No. 5795), their final disposition determined, and is reportedly being undertaken.

The analysis of the results also gives strong credit to the fact that all material processed, and then heat treated in Ht. Lot No. 359, did have representative samples checked during the investigation to verify chemical composition and heat treatment (See Attachment No. 1).

3. <u>SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM</u>: The defect, as described, was limited to only the <u>headed bolts</u> supplied to NPS Industries. P.O. No. PDX 9478N, and described by SBF MTR No. 5795. (See Attachment No. 1 for additional information). It has been determined from evidence found during the investigation, and supported by the fact that <u>all</u> of the <u>original</u> material (5 bars of 1-1/8" dia. E4340E, Crucible Ht. No. 115261) is presently located at the SBF Plant, under SBF control. As shown by Attachment No. 1, samples of all material heat treated in SBF Lot No. 30 were located and their proper ties were re-verified. The NPSI material (forged hex bolts), was found to be unacceptable, both for chemical composition and for mechanical properties.

ATTACHMENT I

PAGE 4 0 7

SEE OA NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO. NOTIT DATES TOOTHEE HO OF

4. <u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>: Upon the evaluation and acceptance of the results and conclusions of the completed investigation of bolting material manufactured and then heat treated in SBF Ht. Jot No. 359, SBF Management, as a additional step of precaution, instructed the SBF QA Manager, utilizing gualified persons from his own department, to completely revie implementation of all the current procedures used for the following specific actions:

- A. Receipt and identification of code material before manufacturing
- B. Control of code material during manufacturing
- C. Handling of code material scheduled to be thermal treated in-house.

The current SBF QA Manual was to be used as a guide against objective evidence to verify compliance and implementation of our current quality system for code material. The order to accomplish this review was given with the knowledge that although the bolting required by NPSI on P.O. No. PDX 9478N was not specifically requested under the provisions of 10CFR21 and Section III, NCA-3800, the action still was warranted out of the desire to offer assurance and every ounce of precaution. The deadline for completion of the review assigned to the QA Manager was August 29, 1980. To correct the immediate problem in the field, upon confirmation that the material was defective (6-10-80), SBF notified NPSI Quality Assurance by phone on 6-10-80 and followed that with a lett (dated 6-11-80) of its responsibility to advise that all materials suppl and described by MTR No. 5795 may not be in compliance with the specific P.O. requirements. Further, NPSI was ordered to return all the describe material to SBF for immediate replacement. SBF has subsequently been notified by NPSI by phone that steps were underway to have this done, and that a replacement order was forthcoming. SBF also requested that NPSI accept whatever responsibility that existed for reporting under 10CFR21 provisions, since their procurement document, PDX 9478N, did not clearly specify that the provisions of such were applicable to the order

A comparative analysis of applicable system elements which were current at the time the NPS material was processed (1978) and those currently being used for code work, (1980), is summarized as follows:

A. <u>THEN:</u> Raw material received, documents reviewed, and an identification number assigned so that material was permanently identified by SBF before QA authorized its release. <u>NOW:</u> After above occurs, a sample bar is cut from the raw material, identified by stamping each sample cut with identification to the Mill heat, and the sample is forwarded to the Metallurgist and Metallurgical lab for further verification and testing prior to QA release from the receiving <u>HOLD</u> area.

ATTACHMENT I PAGE 5 OF 7

B. <u>THEN</u>: Upon completion of heat treating operations, the items were placed in a <u>HOLD</u> area, and sample bars were forwarded to a designated QC person who had the test samples machined and testing performed. After satisfactory test results were received, the items were then released by QA by a sign off of the appropriate HOLD POINT. <u>NOW</u>: After heat treatment operations are accomplished, the items are placed in a <u>HOLD</u> area, and sample bars (which have been stamped with material ID) are forwarded to the Metallurgist and Metallurgical lab for testing. Heat Treat Charts are also reviewed by the lab and QA. After acceptance by Metallurgical and QA personnel, the HOLD POINT is signed off the QA, and the items are released.

As indicated by the above, the overall quality system has obviously since been improved by other SBF continuing efforts to technically upgrade all phased of its quality program.

5. FOLLOW-UP OF CORRECTIVE ACTION: SEF QA Manager shall report to the President of SEF the results of the review described above by 8-29-80. Any findings reported at that time shall be <u>immediately</u> placed with the appropriate manager or supervisor for corrective action to prevent recurrence. Upon receipt of the material from NPSI and the field, all the material shall be disposed of by SEF QC so that it will not be used The QA Manager shall follow up on this and document that it has been do

ATTACHMENT I PAGE 6 .F7

#### ATTACHMENT NO. 1

#### SUMMARY OF MATERIAL RE-VERIFICATION: SBF HEAT TREAT LOT NO. 359

SBF S/OH	REPORTED QTY. RUN (1)	TYPE MATERIAL	HEAT NUMBER	COMMENTS
1666-040	141 pcs.	4340-M 3-3/4" dia.	Rep. 6076970	SBF LAB RE-VERIFIED HEAT TREAT A BEING ACCEPTABLE FROM MAT'L. SAMPL LOCATED AT SBF (SA5410, 62.824, CL.4
1200-020	134 pcs.	4340-M 3-3/4" dia.	Rep. 8070419	SBF MET LAB LE-VERIFIED HEAT THE AS BEING ACCEPTABLE FROM MATL. SAMPLE LOCATED AT SBF
1849-010 (2) (NP5.L BOLTIN	-	E4340-H 1-1/8" dia.	Cruc. 115261	NPSI MATIL: SBF LAB REJECTED DUTSIDE LAB TEST RESULTS SAND COMPOSITION NOT TYPE E4340H, AND SBF LAB RESULTS OF MECHANICAC PROPERTIES NOT ACCEPTABLE ARR ST
1200-070	21 pcs.	4340-M Hexed from 6" dia. round bars	Rep. 6075519	SBF LAB RE-VERIFIED HEAT TACK AS BEING ACCEPTABLE FROM MAT SAMPLE TAKEN FROM SBF INVENTOR (A540, Ge, B24, CL.2)

NOTES:

(1) - Includes additional material for use as test bars.

(2) - NPSI Material - 1-1/8" x 6-1/4" Hvy. Hex Bolts - as described SBF MTR. No. 5795.
Chemical and mechanical properties not acceptable per ASTM A540, Gr. B23, Cl. 3.


PREPARED BY: W. SBF Metallurgical Lab HINK P6 7 .

DATE: 2 July 50

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#### SCUTHERN BOLT

5 FASTENER CORPORATION P. C. BOX 7195 301 MONTODMERY TELEPHONE AREA 1318: 221-4251 SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA



8-14-80 and 9-1-80

NPS Injustries, Inc. 10420 Metric Blvd. Austin, TX 78758

ATTN: Mr. Don Harbeson

Re: SBF letter to NPSI dated 7-9-80

Dear Don,

Enclosed please find a copy of the final segment of the defective material covered by our MTR's 6370, 6371, 6372, 6373, and 6374. Also, be advised that we now plan to ship the replacement bolts before the defective bolts are returned as agreed upon with Bechtel's Mr. Bob Dann (San Francisco) to facilitate matters at the jobsite. Bechtel has assured us that measures will be taken to prevent any misuse of the defective bolts, and they are fully aware of our concern that such cautic: be used.

Our schedule of heat treating the replacement bolts has been interrupted again, due to equipment malfunction in our No. 1 furnace. Also, to complicate matters further, Bechtel's QA audit team which visited our plant on 8-27-80 thru 8-29-80, recorded a finding in the heat treat area, and therefore has written a "stop shipment" and "stop heat treat" order until our furnace repairs are completed and re-surveyed, etc. Obviously the finding was directly related to the equipment malfunction mentioned. During our recent plant shutdown (July 18-31), we installed new equipment in the heat treat plant, and the problems are with that ecuipment.

Your patience and cooperation has been appreciated. When we get ... our equipment repaired, which should be done by 9-18-80, I will be contacting Bechtel QA with regards to clearing the audit findings. Source inspection could possible be made by you by 10-15-80.

Sincerely,

Alexander

ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 075

STAINLESS & ALLOY

Attachments: NCR No. 157-B with its Report No. 157-B

LARGEBOLTS & NUTS

KEPORT FITTACHED FOR Additioner INFO) DEE LOTE: DATE PROD. CUSTOMER NPS INDISTRIES 6/9 1 ORD. NO CANF 1'4 x52, 3, 5, 42, Hur Line Bours PART DESCRIPTION A490 ASTM shipped to cust. 98 as QUANTITY l- net u shop Returne NA QUANTITY CHECKED med material -NA ONFORMI QUAN mate ne OPERATI leterned material OPERATOR Dette rejected because nows de in NONCONFORMANCE DESCRIPTION ALGO requirements of completel. TRANSMITTED FOR E. Hexande 6-9-80 CTIVE ACTION NSPECTED 10 CFE 21 NOT SPEAFIED ON TRO. CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT SEE NCR-157-A EE NCR No 157-A ACTION REQUIRE CORRECTIVE NATURE OF REWORK YES NO WHOLE ORDER REJECTED 1. NO YES PART OF ORDER REJECTED PRODUCTION ORDER NO. Not Assourd QUANTITY 98 ISSUED REPLACEMENT NO DEFECTIVE PARTS REWORKED AN PUT IN STOCK YES 2. N-A QUANTIT N-A PRODUCTION ORDER NO. ISSUED NO DEFECTIVE PARTS PUT DIRECTLY INTO STOCK YES NO YES. DEFECTIVE PARTS TOTALLY SCRAPPED 6-9-80 DATE: 3. INSPECTED BY: 11 med N alual N-A PRODUCTION MANAGER QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER Gamia Upon completion of form return to Quality Assurance. ATTACHMENT TT SB-27 PAGE 2 OF Rev. 1

. SEF NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO. 157-B DATE 6-9-80

DEFECTIVE MATERIAL NPSI P.O. NO. PDX 9461 98 pcs.--1½" x 3,4,4½",5,5½"; ASTM A-490 MTR. NO. 6370, 6371, 6372, 6373, and 6374 HVY HEX BOLT (HT. LOT #36-HEAT #69784)

- <u>PROBLEM</u>: Bolts described above and furnished to NPSI all do not meet all the <u>specified requirements</u>, as purchased, <u>of the ASTM specification</u>. The bolts were manufactured by SBF and furnished to NPSI, as described by the MTR numbers listed above, and because the returned sample analyzed by our Metallurgical Lab during the week of June 9,1980 did not meet the A490 specification completely, it was therefore classified as defective by SBF, and all material of Heat #69784 from Heat Lot #36 was investigated to determine the cause.
- INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS MADE AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM: The cause 2. of the defect described above is believed to be that the bolts were not heat treated properly. The bolts were heat treated by SBF in Ht. Lot #36 as they were being manufactured for Stock. Upon the review of processin; records, it has been determined that the A490 bolts did not all receive a full heat treatment processing. Our findings indicate that some were only "normalized" and were not further hardened and guenched and tempered. This caused the problem of the NPSI bolts failing to pass the required mechanical properties. Southern Bolt needed 98 bolts to complet the required quantity of 845 pieces on NPSI P.O. No. PDX 9461, (which only required the bolts to meet A490 and a purchase order requirement als for an impact test performed @+40°F meeting 25 mils lateral expansion) against which 747 pieces were already supplied. The 98 bolts were obtained from an active stock order of "blanks" that were heat treated in HT. LOT #36, (They only needed to be cut to the lengths required and threaded up, etc. for NPSI). These bolts are described as follows:

MTR NO.	DESCR.	QTY	HEAT NO.	HT LOT.
6370	12" x 52" (A490		69784	36
6371	12" x 3" (A490	) 11	69784	36
6372	12" x 5" (A490	) 19	69784	36
6373	12" x 45" (A490	) 42	69784	36
6374	1½" x 4" (A490	) 11	69784	36

During the investigation it was also discovered that the MTR's were not properly prepared by the documentation personnel who were responsible for such at that time. The MTR's report properties as coming from mill certs when they actually did not since the Heat Treatment was by SBF. However, this was classified as a "paperwork mistake" which merely contributed confusion. An oversight or a mistake like that is not believed to be a

ATTACHMENTI

PAGE 3 OF5

safety related threat since corrected copies of the MTR's are easily obtainable. Because of the elapsed amount of time and the fact that many of the key personnel who were directly involved with the processing of this order have since departed, the investigation went a lot slower than originally expected. All records that were checked show that the NSPI bolts (identified above) of heat number 69784 were heat treated along with two other groups of material (4340M and E4340H) not supplied to NSPI, and were for SBF stock. The prescribed first step of the heat treating process for Lot #36 was to normalize for three hours at heat and then air cool to room temperature. The next step was to harden for four hours at heat, and finally quench and temper. However, when the first step rescribed above was completed, a shift change occurred, and a different operator took over. It is believed that particular operator failed to realize that he had not completed the process on all the bolt of heat number 69784, as intended. Records show that there were 205 pieces (including test bars) of this material scheduled to be heat treated, as described, along with the other material. Exactly how many of the bolts of heat number 69784 that did not make it through the complete heat treatment can not be determined, but some material of that heat apparently did because test results were obtained to verify the heat treatment and some bolts reportedly were field tested and passed tensile at 104,000 psi. It was concluded from this, however, that all bolts from that heat number (69784) could be suspected as defective and either be re-verified by gualified inspection. or be returned to SBF for disposition. No evidence was found to cause concern over the other two groups of material treated in Lot #36 and samples were also re-verified. The operator error which caused this problem did not have any affect on the other 747 bolts (A490) because they were not processed at the same time. Representative samples of those bolts were reportedly field tested and passed. Also, SBF received samples from the field and those all passed the re-testing.

By the conclusion made as to the cause of the defective material being unique to the heat treating of this material, and no proof or other known evidence has surfaced since the defect was discovered and reported the investigation into this incident is believed to have included all the affected bolts, and they have all been identified. Their disposition has been determined, and it is reportedly being undertaken: the materials furnished to NPSI described by MTR No. 6370, 6371, 6372, 6373, and 6374 are to be returned to SBF and replacement bolts shall be furnished which meet all the requirements of their purchase order. Also, records are still being checked to determine if any other nuclear jobsite--Bechtel or otherwise--may have received defective material caused by this probler No evidence to date has surfaced confirming that anyone else did.

PAGE Z OF 3

POOR ORIGIN

ATTACH MENT II PAGE 4 OF 5 SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: The defect, as described, was limited to the bolts (heat number 69784) heat treated in Ht. Lot. #36. It has been determined from the evidence examined during the investigation that no other A490 bolts were affected by this problem. Further, verification was made by the SBF investigation that the properties of a returned sample from other A490 bolts supplied NSPI on the same order were acceptable as ordered:

		TESTED	TESTED	
MTR NO.	Ht. Lot.	CHEMI CALLY	MECHANICALLY	SPEC
5718	336	passed	passed	A490

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Upon the evaluation and acceptance of the results of the completed investigation of the bolting materials as described, SBF management has directed the corrective action to follow that as reported in Report No. 157-A dated 6-9-80 for another NPSI bolting nonconformance which was investigated simultaneously with this one.

NPSI was notified by SBF letter dated 6-11-80 of the posibility that all the material supplied may not be in compliance with their P.O. requirements Since the material was not procured to 10CFR21 provisions or ASME Section III provisions, no code violation is believed to have occurred. All available records shall be examined by the QA Manager to determine whether any nuclear site may have received either directly or indirectly any of the material. If evidence should be found which confirms that one did, then the customer we sent the bolts to shall be notified. Although the changes of thi have been reported as extremely unlikely, this shall be thoroughly checked by QA as described.

FOLLOW-UP OF CORRECTIVE ACTION: SBF QA Manager shall report to the President of SBF the results of the action described above by 8-29-80. Any findings reported at that time shall be immediately placed with the appropriate manager or supervisor for corrective action to prevent it recurring. Upon receipt of the material from NPSI and the field, all the material shall be disposed of by SBF QC so that it will not be used. The QA Manager shall follow up on this and document that it has been done.



ATTACHMENTIL PAGE 5 OF 5

## PAGE 3 OF 3