

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | M A P P S | 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | 3 4 1 1 1 1 | 4 | 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 | L | 6 0 5 0 - 0 2 9 | 3 7 1 1 1 3 8 | 0 | 8 1 1 2 8 8 0 | 9  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩  
0 2 | On November 13, 1980 during an inspection of equipment within the Drywell, operating  
0 3 | personnel observed water leaking from a 2 inch reactor vessel drain line which connects  
0 4 | with the RWCV system. Closer inspection revealed that the leaks origin was a 2 inch  
C 5 | pipe coupling weld. The reactor which was critical at the time of the inspection  
0 6 | was shutdown. The pipe was repaired prior to reactor being made critical on  
0 7 | November 14, 1980.

0 8 | \_\_\_\_\_ 20

0 9 | C G | 11 B | 12 C | 13 P I P E X X | 14 A | 15 Z | 16  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 0 | 21 27 | - | 23 29 | 0 8 4 | 24 26 | / | 27 29 | 0 1 | 28 29 | X | 30 31 | - | 31 32 | 0 | 32 32

ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
B | 18 Z | 19 C | 20 A | 21 0 0 2 4 | 22 40 | 23 41 | N | 24 N | 25 43 | G 0 8 0 | 26 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ⑰  
1 0 | The faulty weld was isolated, ground out and the coupling rewelded. A level three  
1 1 | examiner, assisting in the repair, detected slag inclusions in the weld. The  
1 2 | presence of this slag predestined failure of the weld. This failure is the result  
1 3 | of a fabrication defect during construction.  
1 4 | \_\_\_\_\_ 80

1 5 | C | 28 0 1 0 | 29 NA | A | 31 Operational Event  
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46

1 6 | Z | 33 Z | 34 NA | NA | 36  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45

1 7 | 0 0 0 | 37 Z | 38 NA  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13

1 8 | 0 0 0 | 40 NA  
7 8 9 10 11 12

1 9 | Z | 42 NA  
7 8 9 10

2 0 | N | 44 NA  
7 8 9 10

8012020622  
NAME OF PREPARER

PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY  
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
DOCKET NO. 50 - 293  
Attachment to LER 80-084/01X-0

On November 13, 1980, operating personnel observed leakage in the drywell. A closer inspection revealed that a socket weld coupling had failed. The reactor was shutdown until repairs could be performed.

Weld number B-4-77 RI on a 2" socket weld coupling connection to a 2" Schedule 80 pipe on the Reactor Water Cleanup System located at approximately the 40 foot level in the drywell failed. The 2" stainless steel pipe was repaired using a PNPS approved welding procedure. A liquid penetrant examination was performed prior to excavating the area of the failure. The excavation extended to within approximately .025 inches of the interior wall. A filler weld was then performed consuming the remaining backup material to ensure a sound weld and enable sufficient penetration. Prior to acceptance of the weld, a final visual and liquid penetrant examination and a 950 psi hydrostatic test were performed.

In addition to inspections and repairs of the failed weld a liquid penetrant examination was performed on the opposite end weld of the socket coupling. No degradation of this weld was detected.

A level three inspector observed slag inclusion in the weld material during excavation of weld B-4-77RI which is believed to be the primary cause of this event.

This failure was caused by a fabrication defect during construction and is not the result of thermal stress induced corrosion.