

## UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I **631 PARK AVENUE**

KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

August 19, 1980

Docket No. 50-333

Power Authority of the State of New York Jones A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ATTN: Mr. R. J. Pasternak Resident Manager P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093

## Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-30, "Potential for Unacceptable Interaction Between the Control Rod Drive Scram Function and Non-Essential Control Air at Certain GE BWR Facilities," is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

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## Enclosures:

IE Information Notice No. 80-30

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

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cc w/encls:

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## UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

August 19, 1980

IE Information Notice No. 80-30:

PUTENTIAL FOR UNACCEPTABLE INTERACTION
BETWEEN THE CONTROL ROD DRIVE SCRAM FUNCTION
AND NON-ESSENTIAL CONTROL AIR AT CERTAIN GE
BWR FACILITIES

Continued NRC evaluation of possible failure modes of the control rod drive system related to the Browns Ferry event (IE Builetin 80-17), has identified a potentially significant single failure mechanism which could degrade the scram function. The slow loss of non-essential control air pressure could degrade the scram function at certain facilities which have relatively poor communication between the scram discharge volume (SDV) and the scram discharge instrumented volume (SDIV) such that the SDIV drains more rapidly than the SDV drain rate into the SDIV.

The significance of such a single failure warrants transmission of an interim assessment by the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facility. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Enclosure: Memo from C. Michelson to H. Denton, dated August 18, 1980

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