Public Service Company of Colorado

16305 ROAD 19½
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

July 25, 1980
Fort St. Vrain
Unit No. 1
P-80230

Mr. Karl V. Seyfrit, Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012

Reference: Facility Operating License
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

Enclosed please find a copy of Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/80-35, Final, submitted per the requirements of Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2.

Also, please find enclosed one copy of the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/80-35.

Very truly yours,

Don Warembourg

Don Warembourg
Manager, Nuclear Production

DW/cls

Enclosure

cc: Director, MIPC

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OCCURRENCE REPORT DISTRIBUTION

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NRC Resident Site Inspector	1	(P Letter, LER)

REPORT DATE: July 25, 1980

OCCURRENCE DATE: June 25, 1980

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

REPORT NO. 50-267/80-35/03-L-0

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

During the regeneration of a batch of condensate polisher resin, waste water was discharged to the plant liquid effluent system instead of the waste neutralizing tank. This resulted in a degraded mode of LCO NR 1.1, and is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On June 25, 1980, at approximately 1100 hours, the valves which control the discharge path of waste water from the condensate polisher resin regeneration system did not automatically line up properly and discharged the waste acid and caustic used in resin regeneration to the Turbine Building sump instead of the waste neutralization tank. This resulted in the waste water being discharged to the yard drain and then to the Goosequill Ditch.

Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification LCO NR 1.1 requires that the regeneration effluent be stored in lined evaporation ponds, and establishes limits for various chemicals in the effluent. The discharge of the regeneration waste water to the Goosequill Ditch was not in accordance with the Technical Specification. Three of the chemical limits of LCO NR 1.1 were exceeded as noted below

Constituent	Maximum Concentration Or Value	Actual Value
Cu	1 ppm	1.3 ppm
Zn	5 ppm	9.2 ppm
pH	6.0 - 9.0	1.9 - 9.8

EVENT
DESCRIPTION: (Cont'd)

The remaining requirements of the LCO were satisfied as the liquid effluent did follow the prescribed discharge paths.

When the abnormal Goosequill chemistry was observed, the possible sources were investigated and the problem with the condensate polisher resin regeneration system was discovered. Immediate action was taken to terminate the release of regeneration chemicals by manually overriding the discharge path selector and putting all the waste water to the neutralizing tank. Corrective action returned chemical constituents to acceptable concentrations within the 24 hours required.

CAUSE
DESCRIPTION:

The inadvertent discharge of the regeneration waste water was due to a failed conductivity cell in the waste water line which prevented proper automatic valve line up. This equipment failure could not have been avoided or the discharge prevented by more frequent process sampling or testing of the instrument.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

Immediate action consisted of manually directing regeneration waste water to the neutralizing tank.

Followup actions were to continue the sampling until chemical concentrations were within LCO NR 1.1 limits. The conductivity element was replaced, and discharge valve operability was verified.

No further corrective action is anticipated or required.

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Manager, Nuclear Production