

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M	A	P	P	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5
7	8	9	14	15	LICENSEE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSEE TYPE					30	57	58				

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	-	0	2	9	3	7	0	8	0	6	8	0	8	0	8	1	4	8	0	9
7	8	DOCKET NUMBER										58	89	EVENT DATE					74	75	REPORT DATE					80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | Contrary to Technical Specification 3.12.A.a an hourly fire check of the Auxiliary

0 3 | Off-gas Building (AOG) was not performed on a continuous basis from July 7, 1980 to

0 4 | present while the fire detection units of this system were inoperable. A communi-

0 5 | cations lapse between Operations and Security personnel resulted in this oversight.

0 6 | However, twice hourly, security personnel check the exterior of the AOG Building

0 7 | and would have detected smoke or fire emitting from it.

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0	9	Z	Z	11	A	12	X	13	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	18	Z	15	Z	16
7	8	SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE							COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE				
17	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	8	0	—	0	3	6	—	0	1	T	—	0						
21	22	23	24	26	27	28	29	30	31	32									
33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	45									
33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	45									

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | To prevent occurrences of this type in the future, operations personnel will note

1 1 | in the W.E. Log Book the time equipment fails, the time security is notified, and

1 2 | name of the security individual contacted. The fire protection engineer will also

1 3 | be notified.

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1	5	E	28	1	0	0	29	N.A.	30	Z	31	Management Review										32
7	8	FACILITY STATUS		% POWER				OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									

1	6	Z	33	Z	34	N.A.										35	N.A.										36
7	8	ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY										LOCATION OF RELEASE											

1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N.A.										39
7	8	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES			NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION									

1	8	0	0	0	40	N.A.										41
7	8	PERSONNEL INJURIES			NUMBER		DESCRIPTION									

1	9	Z	42	N.A.										43	
7	8	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION									

2	0	N	44	N.A.										45
7	8	PUBLICITY ISSUED		DESCRIPTION										

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NAME OF PREPARER

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U.S. G.P.O. 1977-526

SUPPLEMENT TO  
LER 80-036/01T-0

Description

On July 7, 1980 smoke detectors in the AOG Building were found inoperable as reported in LER 80-035/03L-0. Review of the subsequent corrective measures revealed that a continuous hourly fire check was not performed as required by T.S. 3.12.A.a. Station records indicate that a communications lapse between operations and security personnel occurred on July 7, 1980 and as a result a fire watch was not started on this date. On July 24, 1980, however, this hourly fire watch was initiated following notification from the control room that the fire detectors were out of service.

Security techniques for scheduling, tracking and logging the performance of the hourly fire check were altered on July 24, 1980. This revision apparently resulted in the surveillance interval being lengthened from 1 hour to 24 hours at sometime between July 24, 1980 and July 29, 1980 and continuing at this interval.

The hourly fire check of the AOG building, which is not a Vital Area, should have included a check of the inside of the building. This was not done; however, twice each hour security patrols the AOG building and entrance for security reasons and would have detected any smoke or fire emitting from the building. Additionally, a fire sprinkler system protects the equipment in the AOG building. For this system the melting of a fusible link initiates water flow which in turn causes an alarm in the control room. This system was operable throughout the period in question.

Immediately upon appraisal of this omission the hourly fire check was re-initiated. Surveillance testing of the AOG fire detection units was completed, the fire check terminated, and the system returned to service at approximately 1000 hours on August 7, 1980.

To prevent recurrence of this type of event the following action has been taken:

1. Security personnel have instituted a new control mechanism for continuation of requested patrols whereby the duty security police supervisor will log this activity each hour into the "Daily Security Activity Log".
2. Operations personnel have been instructed via the W.E. Instruction Log Book and a memo, issued to the Watch Engineers, that following a determination of inoperable fire equipment they will do the following:
  - A. Enter into the W.E. Log Book the faulty equipment and the time of failure.
  - B. Refer to applicable Technical Specifications
  - C. If a fire watch is required the W.E. Log Book will indicate the time of security notification and the person notified.
  - D. Notify the Fire Protection Engineer.