POOR ORIGINAL

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	T N S N P 1 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)
7	8	9 LICENSEE CODE 14	15 LICENSE NUMBER 25	26 LICENSE TYPE 30	57 CAT 58

CON'T

0	1	REPORT SOURCE L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 (7)	0 9 1 1 8 0 (8)	1 0 1 0 8 0 (9)
7	8	60	61 DOCKET NUMBER 68	69 EVENT DATE 74	75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On 7/27/80 containment isolation valve FCV-61-192 (glycol system isolation valve) took

0 3 approximately twenty seconds to stroke closed. This condition was noted by a test

0 4 engineer but was not reported to the Shift Engineer. The plant was subsequently

0 5 heated up to mode 4 in apparent violation of Tech Spec 3.6.3.1. There was no effect upon

0 6 public health or safety. Previous occurrences - none.

0 7

0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S D (11)	E (12)	B (13)	V A L V O P (14)	D (15)	Z (16)
7 8	9 10	11	12	13 18	19	20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 0	—	1 5 7	/	0 3	L	—	0
	21 22	23	24 26	27	28 29	30	31	32

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
H (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	N (25)	G 2 5 5
33	34	35	36	37 40	41	42	43	44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The test engineer who noted the condition was not aware that FCV-61-192 was a

1 1 containment isolation valve and that Technical Specifications specified a maximum

1 2 valve actuation time of ten seconds. Ice buildup on FCV-61-192 caused valve to

1 3 stroke slowly. Subsequent cycling of valve has revealed no problems.

1 4

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	G (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	D (31)	NRC Review
7 8	9	10 12	13 44	45	46 80

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA
7 8	9	10	11 44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA
7 8	9 11	12	13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA
7 8	9 11	12 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA
7 8	9	10 80

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	
7 8	9	10 68	69 80

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Tennessee Valley Authority
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-327/80157 Technical Specification Involved 3.6.3.1

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.13.c

Date of Occurrence: 9/11/80

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

An entry in a test engineer's daily log dated 7/27/80 noted that FCV-61-192 took approximately twenty seconds to stroke closed (timed with wrist watch). The test engineer was trouble shooting problems identified during the performance of TVA-56, ESF Reset Controls. The cycling of FCV-61-192 was not a part of the formal test and, as such no acceptance criteria was given. The test engineer did not identify that condition to the Shift Engineer and no subsequent action was taken on the valve. The condition was identified on 9/11/80 during a NRC review of TVA-56 date.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in mode 5. Testing in progress for ESF reset design verification.

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment.

N/A

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Ice buildup on FCV-61-192 caused valve to cycle slower than design.

Analysis of Occurrence:

A review of the surveillance testing on FCV-61-192 prior to and after 7/27/80 revealed the following:

Date	Time
6/18/80	7.5 Sec
8/24/80	9.2 Sec

Excess moisture apparently resulted in a buildup of ice on the valve. Cycling of the valve on 7/27/80 freed the valve up and subsequent operation has been satisfactory.

Corrective Action:

Valve cycle times were reviewed with no indication of valve inoperability either prior to or following the condition noted on 7/27/80. Operating experience of all glycol isolation valves will be reviewed to determine if a routine program of cycling these valves is warranted.

All preoperational test personnel have been cautioned to identify discrepancies noted during testing to the Shift Engineer if the discrepancy involves Unit 1 equipment.

Failure Data:

N/A