



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-321/81-04 and 50-366/81-04

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
270 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Inspection at Hatch near Baxley, Georgia

Inspector:

R. F. Rogers
R. F. Rogers

3/9/81
Date Signed

Approved by:

P. Kellogg
P. Kellogg, Section Chief, Reactor Project 2B

Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on January 10, - February 20, 1981

Areas Inspected

This inspection involved 108 inspector-hours on site in the areas of technical specification compliance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities.

Results

Of the eleven areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were identified in ten areas, two violations were identified in one area (inoperability of the core spray system - paragraph 5).

8103240848

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *M. Manry, Plant Manager
- *T. Moore, Assistant Plant Manager
- *T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager
- S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations
- R. Nix, Superintendent of Maintenance
- C. Coggins, Superintendent of Engineering Services
- W. Rogers, Health Physicist
- C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 30, -February 6 and February 20, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. Noncompliance

(Closed) (321, 366/80-14-01): Excessive Radiation Levels in a truck cab. HNP-8016, Shipment of Radioactive Material, was acceptably revised on 10/27/80 to address this concern. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-17-01): Violations of secondary containment integrity. A design change has been implemented on secondary containment doors which assures that containment integrity is maintained. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-19-04): Failure of SRB to Audit Emergency Implementing Procedures as required by T.S. The required audit has been completed and the report issued. This item is closed.

(Closed) (366/80-35-01): Inoperable SDV high level scram switches. The licensee has modified his procedures to require a functional test following each scram. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-42-01): Failure of workers to follow HP procedures. The licensee's corrective action of providing more surveillance of HP activities in this area has been adequate. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-42-02): Failure of HP Technicians to follow procedures. The licensees corrective actions have been effective. This item is closed.

b. Unresolved Items

(Closed) (321/77-1/1): Analysis of RPV Transients. HNP-1-3981 Rev. 4, Cumulative Fatigue Usage Factor Monitoring, was issued on 12/19/80. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-19-01): Failure of plant manager to attend emergency duty officer training. Required training was completed on 5/30/80. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-19-03): QA Audit of emergency plan open items. The referenced open items have been closed. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321/78-29-03, 366/78-37-03): DCR Procedure review by PRB. HNP-809, Plant Modifications, revised to address this concern. This item is closed.

(Closed) (366/78-22-01): Improper breaker alignment in a MCC. Unit 1 and 2 MCCs have been modified to address this issue. This item is closed.

c. Open Items

(Closed) (321, 366/80-06-02): Classification of Operating Procedures. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-06-05): Smallbreak LOCA Procedure. HNP-1902, Pipe Break Inside Primary Containment, was suitably revised on 12/19/80. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-19-02): Emergency operating procedure reviews not complete. All required reviews complete as of 11/21/80. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321, 366/80-06-03): Training deficiencies in emergency training of operators. These have been corrected. This item is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment

tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.

On January 26, 1981, with the Unit 2 refueling outage in progress, preparations were being made to perform the RPV Hydro Procedure, HNP-2-1230, when Technical Specification 3.5.2.1.b.2 was inadvertently violated for approximately seven (7) hours. This specification requires both subsystems of the core spray (CS) to be operable when the torus is drained. The manual isolation valves, 2E21-FO07A&B, were closed as part of the valve lineup procedure for HNP-2-1230. The hydro itself was not to be performed until the torus was filled and core spray was not required.

Because the valve lineup was commenced prior to filling the torus (not normally the case) and the procedure did not contain a caution or condition for making CS inoperative, the technical specification was violated. The condition was identified by a shift supervisor who was checking the system lineup and noted that the valves should not be shut. It was properly reported to the NRC by the licensee. Had the same situation developed on Unit 1, it would not have been a problem because of different technical specification requirements. The failure to comply with T.S. 3.5.3.1.b.2 is a violation (366/81-04-01) and the failure of the Plant Review Board (PRB) to adequately review HNP-2-1230 as required by T.S. 6.8.2 is also a violation (366/81-04-02).

6. Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspector also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags and component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts.

Within the areas inspected no violation or deviations were identified.

7. Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operations (LCO's) and results of selected

surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.

Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.

8. Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.

Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.

9. Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 & 2)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and that the public health and safety were of utmost consideration.

LER No.	Date of Report	Description
50-321/80-8	1/30/80	Secondary containment violation
/80-21	3/13/80	Secondary containment violation
/80-22	3/11/80	Door annunciation to cableway
/80-23	3/10/80	HPCI Inoperative
/80-28	4/1/80	Secondary containment violations
/80-33	4/30/80	Seal on Unit 2 CST Slab
/80-40	5/15/80	Drywell to Torus Low D/P
/80-55	6/11/80	Mechanical snubber failures
/80-58	7/8/80	CRD Accumulator problem
/80-62	6/25/80	PSW piping backfill
/80-69	7/10/80	High D/P HPCI isolation

/80-70	7/22/80	Snubber failure
/80-74	7/24/80	RCIC failure
/80-76	7/14/80	RHR suction seismic supports
/80-78	7/15/80	Oxygen 4% on 2 occasions
/80-79	7/17/80	Smoke detector problems
/80-80	7/17/80	RWCU System cracks
/80-82	7/30/80	LPCI inverter failure
/80-83	8/5/80	ADS functional test O/D
/80-84	8/26/80	Faulty HPCI amplifier
/80-85	8/7/80	Chloride analysis
/80-86	8/4/80	Instrument air supports
/80-89	8/14/80	Stripped gear in printer
/80-91	8/12/80	Fan motor failure
/80-92	8/29/80	LPCI inverter trip
/80-93	8/19/80	Torus level recorders inoperative
/80-96	9/23/80	High temp in torus/drywell
/80-99	8/28/80	Room unlocked
/80-87	8/5/80	RCIC pump discharge anchor
/80-100	9/5/80	D/W cooler service water
/80-101	9/9/80	Missed standing order
/80-102	9/9/80	Inverter trip
/80-102	9/9/80	Snubber failure
/80-105	10/2/80	Vibration in RHRSW pump
/80-108	10/14/80	HPCI system trip
/80-109	10/16/80	Overhead fire doors
/80-111	11/24/80	Reactor water level switch

/80-113	12/16/80	Nitrogen tank low
/80-115	11/11/80	Masonry block wall stress
/80-118	1/6/81	RHR inboard injection valve
/80-119	12/30/80	Fission product monitor setpoint drift
/80-120	12/19/80	N2 tank level low
/80-121	12/30/80	D/W temperature high
/80-122	12/30/80	Sprinkler hangers inadequate
/80-123	1/15/80	RCIC valve galling
/80-124	1/15/81	Control room air valve timing
/80-126	1/16/81	Low N2 pressure
/80-127	1/13/81	Valve inspections
/80-128	1/27/81	High D/W pressure relay failure
/81-01	1/15/81	HPCI pressure switches
/81-02	1/27/81	High leakage in the D/W
50-366/80-17	3/13/80	Vacuum pump failure
/80-22	3/13/80	MSIV leakage high
/80-24	3/31/80	"D" RHRSW pump low flow
/80-45	4/15/80	ADS leak test
/80-54	6/17/80	Containment purge pressure switch
/80-55	5/29/80	RCIC outboard steam valve
/80-73	5/20/80	Hydrogen recombiner problem
/80-96	7/9/80	Reactor building to torus vacuum breaker.
/80-97	7/15/80	HPCI steam line flow high
/80-98	7/14/80	HPCI suction gage out of calibration

/80-99	7/17/80	D/W Hydrogen - oxygen analyzer inoperable
/80-100	7/8/80	ECCS switches out of calibration
/80-101	7/29/80	Injection valve failure
/80-102	8/5/80	Late surveillance
/80-103	7/17/80	ADS switches out of calibration
/80-104	8/5/80	Switchgear 2F breaker trip
/80-105	9/18/80	SLCS nitrogen pressure low
/80-106	8/26/80	Chemicals on D/W shield
/80-107	8/4/80	Jet pump integrity
/80-108	8/6/80	Torus to D/W vacuum breaker
/80-110	8/4/80	SDV valve found shut
/80-111	8/19/80	HPCI inboard, isolation valve shut
/80-112	8/19/80	HPCI DP switch inoperative
/80-113	8/25/80	SDV high level switches inoperative
/80-115	8/20/80	2C D/G failure
/80-116	8/19/80	Torus temperature high
/80-117	8/19/80	RCIC failed reset
/80-118	8/19/80	D/W hydrogen - oxygen analyzer failure
/80-119	8/29/80	Fire barrier penetration
/80-120	8/21/80	Recirc pump trip
/80-121	8/9/80	Pressure switch drift
/80-122	8/26/80	High RX press switch out of calibration
/80-123	8/29/80	RCIC outboard isolation valve
/80-124	9/4/80	Torus-D/W vacuum breaker indication

/80-125	9/11/80	MSIV leakage control system
/80-126	9/9/80	Hydrogen - oxygen analyzer inoperative
/80-127	9/23/80	2C D/G failure
/80-128	9/23/80	Rx press inst. out of calibration
/80-129	9/30/80	Torus - D/W vacuum breaker failure
/80-130	9/30/80	Hydrogen - oxygen analyzer inop
/80-133	10/9/80	Reactor level switch tripped high
/80-135	10/16/80	High conductivity
/80-136	10/14/80	Seismic PSW support
/80-137	10/21/80	HPCI exhaust pressure switch
/80-139	10/21/80	D/W drain line not seismic
/80-140	10/23/80	D/W Vacuum breakers not tested
/80-141	11/4/80	HPCI D/P switch set high
/80-142	11/7/80	Break in fire wall
/80-145	11/26/80	Standby service water pump flow and head low
/80-146	11/24/80	"B" D/G Blower failure
/80-147	11/13/80	Hydrogen - oxygen analyzer inoperative
/80-148	11/13/80	Low level in torus
/80-149	11/26/80	RHR pump suction valve leak
/80-150	11/20/80	HPCI isolation low pressure
/80-151	12/6/80	FW isolation valve leakage
/80-157	1/6/81	Hoist inspection not done
/80-159	12/19/80	2C D/G failure
/80-161	12/16/80	SRV surveillance failures

/80-163 12/23/80

Reactor head insulation not seismic

/81-02 1/29/81

RCIC isol. switches out of calibration