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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
P. O. BOX 402
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

February 11, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. N-81-031
NO/RCS:mbf
Docket No. 50-339
License No. NPF-7


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for North Anna Unit No. 2.

Report No.	Applicable Technical Specifications
LER 81-010/03L-0	T.S. 6.9.1.9.b

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very Truly yours,



W. R. Cartwright
Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (30 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management and Program Analysis

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Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #2
Docket No. 50-339
Report No. LER 81-010/03L-0

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Description of Event

On January 13, 1981, with Unit 2 at 100 percent power, an overspeed trip of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump occurred during surveillance testing. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Two redundant full size motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were operable. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was tested and returned to operable status with 12 hours of the event. The action statement of the LCO was met. The public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

The turbine governor failed to control the turbine speed properly. The cause of the governor failure was not determined.

Immediate Corrective Action

The turbine trip valve was disassembled, checked, and reassembled. The turbine throttle valve, which is controlled by the governor, was checked for proper operation and the turbine governor was replaced. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was returned to operable status after being tested in accordance with T.S. and IWP requirements.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective actions are required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Since August 1980, the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump has had three overspeed trips unexpectedly and Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump has had two unexpected overspeed trips. Although turbine governor problems were responsible for all five events, the specific problems found do not appear to be closely related. An investigation is being conducted to determine actions which should be taken to prevent recurrence, if any.

Generic Implications

No generic implications have been identified.